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INTRODUCTION 
THE GOOD LIFE AND THE THIRD AGE 
	
For most people, retirement marks a transition into a ‘third age’ of one’s life, a time of 
enormous change. No longer needing to set an alarm clock is the least important, but perhaps 
first significant change one may look forward to. It signifies not needing to be somewhere, not 
needing to do something, not having a particular responsibility. It is a small indicator of a new 
and profound condition of freedom. However, persons transitioning into and developing through 
the Third Age are confronted with various images that try to model how that freedom should be 
expressed. These images present opportunities for Third Agers to assimilate or develop 
authentically, to follow socially constructed patterns of behavior, or to flourish on their own 
terms. The normative images for the Third Agers allow them to either envision and live their new 
life, or adopt a course set out for them. These new lives require a re-discovery and re-defining of 
the self, a reinterpretation of one’s role in society, and relationship to others. As with other 
phases of life, individuals need guidance when confronted with images of living well that are 
contradictory or perhaps antithetical to what they imagined for themselves. Various social and 
cultural practices and beliefs limit acceptable modes of self-expression for the retired person. 
The current economic climate complicates what is meant by a ‘retired person,’ so first a word on 
the subjects of this dissertation.  
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The aging population is popularly associated with the language of senior citizen, the 
image of the nursing home, and, in biomedical ethics, the end of life. It is true that aging persons, 
at some point, fulfill these images, but it is not fair to generalize all aging persons so narrowly. 
Yes, we are all aging, but there are differences between the aging person at 25, 45, 65, and 85. In 
a seminal article that tries to parse out the distinctions between phases of aging, Bernice 
Neugarten explains that there exists an increasing amount of differentiation among various age 
groups, particularly those to whom we would refer as aging or older persons. In articulating 
different phases or ages of life, in accord with the medical and psychological developments of 
the time, Neugarten turns to the indispensable marker of chronological age to help explain how 
there might be differences in aging persons. The young-old, as she identifies them, are those who 
are between the ages of 55 and 75, and those who are 75 and older are classified as old-old. 
Neugarten admits an overlap in middle age and the young old, but she cites that the lowering of 
the retirement age in the US precipitated a shift to a lower age.1 That more inclusive age group, 
believes Neugarten, is comprised of people who “are relatively healthy, relatively affluent, 
relatively free from traditional responsibilities of work and family, and who are increasingly 
well-educated and politically active.”2 Following in the footsteps of Neugarten are other social 
scientists who settle on another term to describe this broad period of adult life, the Third Age. 
The Third Age can simply be defined as “the period of healthy retirement in later life.”3 For the 
purpose of this dissertation, the so-called aging person is to be understood as someone who falls 
																																																						
1 Neugarten, Bernice L. 1974. “Age groups in American Society and the Rise of the Young-Old,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 415 (1): 187-98. 191.  
 
2 Neugarten, “Age Groups in American Society and the Rise of the Young-Old,” 187. 
  
3 Carr, Dawn C., and Kathrin Komp. Gerontology in the Era of the Third Age: Implications and next Steps. (New 
York, NY: Springer Pub., 2011,) 4. 
	 3 
into the Third Age or who can be classified as Neugarten’s young-old. From this point forward, 
the terms “the aging” and “Third Ager(s)” will be used interchangeably.  
Achieving the good life, whether that be in the Third Age or another phase of life, has 
been a subject of philosophical inquiry since the Ancient Greeks. Plato and Aristotle spoke of 
living well as an activity of the soul, an active pursuit orienting the whole person. Stoic 
philosophers emphasized the role of reason in the pursuit of the good life and believed that living 
the good life required adhering to the laws of nature as well as living virtuously. Aquinas, Locke, 
Mill, and others all described a vision of the good life and outlined how humans might achieve it. 
However, translating the abstract metaethical notion of the good life into normative claims is, of 
course, not simple regarding the lived experiences of individuals. Because human experience is 
mediated through various social imageries, normative claims derived from abstract notions of the 
good life limit the individual’s opportunity for self-reflection, self-knowledge, freedom and 
therefore, living an authentically good life as it is defined in modernity. This ontological problem 
must be addressed by philosophical ethicists, but is not the focus of this dissertation. Instead, I 
wish to highlight here this project’s place as an example of the type of interpretive analysis that 
is born of the tension between metaethics and normative ethics. The dissertation demonstrates 
this problem by exploring the social imageries of aging well presented to Third Agers. So how 
then are the limits of normative claims vis-à-vis social imageries revealed in the Third Age?  
 Using Aristotle’s notion of happiness, namely the life that the individual wishes to lead 
and is a pleasing activity of the soul as the broadest vision of the good life, a quick search will 
show that a number of normative frameworks offer the Third Ager imageries (or ways) to be 
happy. Defining a more specific vision of good life for the Third Age cannot and will not be 
done in this dissertation, because of the ways in which the lived reality of the Third Age (and 
	 4 
years before that phase) contextualize the individual’s understanding of the self and of the good. 
Narrowly focused normative visions of the good life in the Third Age present a practical problem 
to the diversity of Third Agers in the US; that is, not everyone will have an opportunity to pursue 
any one vision of aging well today. Narrow visions also limit how Third Agers come to learn 
what living well means; they inhibit authentic modes of knowing and expressing the self. Of 
particular importance is the fact that contemporary visions of the good life in the Third Age are 
informed by or emphasize autonomy, yet those visions undercut the authenticity of autonomy by 
limiting its range of expression.  
In a pluralistic society, proffering a singular normative vision is impossible precisely 
because it would be unable to account for the diversity of individual beliefs, values, and moral 
systems. Moreover, a normative vision of the good life would impose a particular way of life 
upon others, thereby undermining their own autonomy. Despite the problem of plurality, the 
models examined in the dissertation are rather specific in identifying what will bring about or 
enable an individual to live the good life. Because these visions of the good life pervade the 
social, cultural, and political landscape of the US, they often remain unchecked, leaving the 
targeted group conflicted by what is and how to pursue the good life. Thus, the dissertation 
analyzes and responds to these responses and proposes an ethical framework to be used moving 
forward when considering the good life in the Third Age. 
In the first chapter, I explore the ways in which medicine, gerontology, and medical 
ethics consider the question of aging well. A brief overview of the relationship between health 
and the good life will be provided before delving into the modern claims of medicine, 
gerontology, and medical ethics. The discussion of medicine and aging well will reveal 
medicine’s limitations in conceptualizing aging well as having an optimally functioning body 
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and mind, or simply as healthy aging alone, which shapes the discourse within medical ethics 
insofar as aging is understood as a natural process or a disease to be treated. A foray into the 
parallel developments within gerontology will show how the Third Age can be a fruitful time in 
one’s life and should not be viewed with the negative perceptions that emerge from certain 
medical ethicists. 
Building from the theme of healthy aging identified in chapter one, the second chapter 
addresses several social and cultural forces that inform notions of aging well in 21st century 
America. Consumer culture will provide the context for the discussion of the Third Ager’s 
pursuit to live the good life. Being productive and consuming as means of maintaining or 
reforming one’s self-identity is addressed as is the concept of autonomy and its connection to 
individualistic independence. The chapter shows that the political and cultural landscape of the 
United States, intertwined with the US capitalistic economic system plays a significant role in 
how notions of the good life in the Third Age are shaped. 
In order to begin to respond to the imageries of aging well, enforced by a consumer 
culture that promises postponing aging through medicinal products and cosmetics, Chapter Three 
turns to theological sources that consider the good life in aging in a different way. A brief survey 
of biblical literature shows that the aging population was to be revered, afforded protections 
because of their vulnerabilities, and given a special status within the community. Contemporary 
theologians and ethicists follow in the biblical tradition insofar as they insist on care for the 
aging; Third Agers, however, are once again told that living the good life is largely a matter of 
their individual effort to remain productive. Faith and hope for the Third Ager represent one 
answer for how to age well; the other is by practicing specific virtues relevant to the Third Age. 
Integrity, generosity, humility, and friendship are but a few of the virtues identified as integral 
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for the Third Ager’s navigation of this phase of life as he or she practices living well.  Though 
helpful, appealing to virtues ethics as an approach to aging well reveals the profound problem 
posed by the pervasive nature of individualistic independence addressed in Chapter Two.  
The fourth chapter begins the constructive process by turning to the communitarian 
approach of Alasdair MacIntyre and the Capabilities Approach (CA) of Martha Nussbaum. Both 
MacIntyre and Nussbaum critique the overemphasis on individualism and the misinterpretation 
of autonomy in American culture. Both present frameworks for conditions to enable a Third 
Ager’s good life. MacIntyre and Nussbaum provide complementary models for aging well that 
recognize the naturalness and positive experience of communality and dependency (MacIntyre) 
and the importance of a range of fundamental freedoms in one’s pursuit of the good life 
(Nussbaum). Structuring an environment in which these two frameworks can operate 
cooperatively becomes the task of the final chapter. 
While MacIntyre’s and Nussbaum’s approaches are helpful because of their emphasis on 
dependence and basic requirements for flourishing respectively, they do not consider the 
obligations of individuals and institutions in enabling Third Agers to live well. In order to 
explain how dependency and the basic requirements of flourishing transcend the Third Ager’s 
practice of virtues alone, the chapter develops a normative social ethics. This is accomplished by 
first introducing Onora O’Neill’s interpretation of principles as duties or obligations, and second, 
through interpreting the principles of Catholic Social Teaching in light of the good life of and for 
Third Agers. Though not negating the importance of MacIntyre and Nussbaum’s contributions to 
an ethics of aging, the chapter turns to a principled model as an overarching framework for an 
ethics of aging. The principled model secures the space that is necessary both for Third Agers to 
consider what the good life in this phase may mean, and for society to ensure their dignity and 
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actualize the care and solidarity that is necessary for Third Agers to flourish. By spelling out the 
normative framework that obliges the social institutions and structures of society in view of the 
Catholic social ethical tradition, the groundwork for a new ethics of aging is created.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
AGING AND LIVING WELL IN MEDICINE AND MEDICAL ETHICS 
 
Introduction 
 Aging well will always require a certain level of good health. Without an adequate 
measure of physical and mental health, fulling one’s vision of the good life may be hampered or 
prevented entirely. However, health is a contributing factor to the good life, not the ultimate 
deciding factor (the exception being the absence of health, death). Yet, of the ways in which 
aging well is described, the various metrics of physical and mental health feature prominently. 
Oftentimes the good life for aging persons is reduced to a clinical diagnosis. Should a patient be 
diagnosed with living a not-so-good life according to the various measurements, a treatment is 
prescribed until the good life is achieved. Such a one-dimensional view of the aging person 
disregards the other components of what it means to be a person with dignity, a moral agent, a 
being that is more than a mechanism. Both dignity and agency will be addressed in later 
chapters, but the mechanistic or functionalist interpretation of the person and the good life will 
be highlighted and critiqued in this chapter. Aging, however, is clinically studied in fields 
beyond medicine; therefore, more than the functionalist interpretation must be addressed 
regarding the good life in aging so that the Third Age is not viewed as inherently bad.  
 Due to the interdisciplinary nature of studying the aging population, I will separate the 
relevant fields into three broad categories: historical approaches to aging well, healthy aging in 
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modern medicine, and medical ethics. In the first, historical part, works from thinkers, physician-
philosophers, of the ancient era up to those of the Middle Ages will be reveal the way in which 
the practice of medicine addressed aging members of society primarily in practice. The second 
section of the historical overview will take up the development of gerontology as a social 
science, taking its cues from psychology, medicine, and sociology in the study of the aging 
population. Professional medical conceptions of aging well will constitute the second part of the 
chapter, taking up the question of what wellbeing means according to physicians and researchers. 
Following the review of medical literature, the third part will turn to the field of medical ethics in 
order to uncover the current ways in which the interdisciplinary insights on aging well have been 
received. These broad categories cannot possibly elaborate all of the intermediary steps in the 
given histories; however, the exemplary moments that follow are intended to provide a 
panoramic view of the beginnings, middle, and current state of the manner in which aging well 
has been and is conceptualized.  
Historical Conceptions Of Aging Well 
In the first part of this section, I will provide a brief history of aging in the field of medicine, 
starting with Hippocrates, moving swiftly up to the Medieval era, and ending with the 19th 
century. Important to note from the outset is that aging well in this and later sections will focus 
on the field of medicine or disciplines associated with medicine, and not those areas of inquiry 
that consider additional, more holistic conceptions of the good life. Some authors, particularly 
those writing before the modern era, do not distinguish between a philosophical conception of 
the good life and a healthy life. That being said, there may be redundancy in the authors, and 
perhaps some contradiction as the science of medicine has advanced over time; however, the 
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importance of the section below is to emphasize the fact that the question of healthy aging or 
aging well has been and continues to be a primary interest in medicine. The second part of this 
history will take up the developmental psychology foundations of gerontology and then move 
into modern gerontology’s approach to the question of the good life. 
Ancient Medicine 
 Known widely for the professional medical code of conduct, the Hippocratic Oath, 5th 
century BCE Greek physician (or philosopher-physician), Hippocrates is commonly referred to 
as the ‘Father of Western Medicine.’ Certainly, the title may be presumptuous given the more 
archaic and simultaneous development of medicine across myriad cultures; however, 
Hippocrates remains, at least in the West, a source of medical wisdom. Part of what has made 
him stand out amongst other ancient Greek, Egyptian, Indian, or Chinese physicians, was his 
ability to collect “what was known, tracing its resemblances and analyzing its differences, and so 
combining all into a rational method”1 of medical literature. Aside from the widely known oath, 
Hippocrates and his followers2 were first in outlining the relationship between health and disease 
                                                
1 Wilder, Alexander. History of Medicine: A Brief Outline of Medical History and Sects of Physicians, from the 
Earliest Historic Period; with an Extended Account of the New Schools of the Healing Art in the Nineteenth 
Century, and Especially a History of American Eclectic Practice of Medicine, Never before Published. (New 
Sharon, Maine: New England Eclectic Publ., 1901), 62. 
 
2 Wilder, History of Medicine, 64. A lack of concrete historical evidence has made it difficult to recall exactly what 
Hippocrates may have said or done. The Hippocratic tradition is a representation of his collected teachings fused 
with the work of his followers, those of the Hippocratic School of medicine. Teachings of the tradition are often 
attributed to ‘Hippocrates,’ where the name is symbolic of the leading member of the tradition. According to Wilder, 
an attempt was made to organize the tradition of Hippocrates into four distinct categories: 1) “Works distinctly 
Hippocratic, being in the Doric language, and ‘manifestly authentic,’ 2) Works of Hippocrates published by his sons 
and disciples, 3) Works written by others, accordant with his doctrines and ascribed to him, and 4) Works not in 
accord with his doctrines, but imputed to him” 
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vis-à-vis diet.3 Hippocrates saw medicine as a distinct discipline to be studied, illness as a natural 
occurrence, and prognosis and care as the paths to healing the person.  
Hippocrates’s working definition of health was informed by the philosophy of the time, 
namely the Doctrine of the Four Humors. The balance of the four humors, phlegm, blood, black 
and yellow bile, and a nondescript watery substance,4 yielded health, and an imbalance, disease 
or sickness. In “Airs, Waters, and Places”, Hippocrates mentions the effects of phlegm and bile 
on the person such as, acute fevers attacking all but especially those with phlegmatic problems, 
and dermatological and ophthalmological problems resulting from biliary complications.5 In “Of 
the Epidemics,” Hippocrates offers case analyses in which the impact of discolored or 
particularly acrid bile is prominent as an indicator of disease, and, over the progression of the 
disease, the return to the so-called normal coloration and odor as a sign of improvement and 
healing.6 Though each case was different, the Hippocratic tradition continued to focus on the 
nature of the disease by evaluating its effect on the balance of the humors, and the only definition 
of health to be generated was the aforementioned balancing of the humors.  
 Not surprisingly, the Hippocratic tradition does not offer a treatise on the aging person 
and what health might entail for the aging person outside of the humors. Still, what can be 
inferred is the association of the balance of functioning of the humors with the aging person’s 
ability to live well. Specifically offered for the aging, however, are a series of aphorisms or brief 
                                                
3 Hippocrates. On Ancient Medicine. Particularly Parts 3,5,6 http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/aphorisms.mb.txt. 
Accessed October 16, 2015.  
 
4 Some authors break down bile into black and yellow and do not address the so-called watery substance, while 
others do not separate bile and add the watery substance. The distinction is not of great importance for this particular 
work, but worth noting.  
 
5 Hippocrates. On Airs Waters and Places. http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/airwatpl.html  
 
6 Hippocrates. On the Epidemics. Section 2, Case X.  
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statements that are unique to the aging or older/elder person. Missing from the writings is a 
definition of the aging person. Hippocrates does, however, mention younger and older patients, 
and goes into a fair amount of detail regarding how certain diseases effect older persons 
differently than younger persons.7 Be that as it may, some of what can be gleaned from 
Hippocrates is the way in which he conceptualized what aging entails. He addresses the notion of 
chronic disease, suggesting that once an aging person contract a chronic disease or condition, it 
is likely to never leave him or her for the aging have a depleted capacity to recover. 8 Here is an 
early invocation of a popular modern claim regarding the aging: susceptible to disease and slow 
to recover. Not only does Hippocrates unknowingly set in motion a long history of 
generalizations made by medical professionals toward the aging, he also suggests the functional 
interpretation of the aging person. Stating that the aging person is likely to be diseased and 
incapable of ever fully recovering, the focal point becomes the bodily or mental function of the 
person rather than the whole person. Some of those conditions affecting the aging include: “pains 
of the joints, nephritis, vertigo, apoplexy, defluxions of the bowels, eyes, and nose, dimness of 
sight, cataract, and dullness of hearing.” These conditions are commonly associated with aging 
today and perhaps serve as the basis for the belief that aging is itself a disease to be cured. In 
fact, Hippocrates addresses the way in which the overweight person will naturally have a shorter 
life than the more fit person, suggesting that diet and exercise, as they are today, were ways in 
                                                
7 There is one instance in which Hippocrates offers a chronological distinction. “Persons are most subject to 
apoplexy between the ages of forty and sixty.” Outside of this instance, there are few specifics regarding what age 
constitutes one who is old. Hippocrates. Aphorisms. Translated by Francis Adams 
http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/aphorisms.mb.txt. Accessed July 28, 2015. 
 
8 Hippocrates. Aphorisms. Translated by Francis Adams http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/aphorisms.mb.txt. 
Accessed July 28, 2015. 
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which life could be extended and the chronic diseases of old age avoided.9 The healthy life is the 
young life, and the sick, diseased, or imbalanced life is most often the life of the older person; 
the good life is not and cannot be the aging life. For Hippocrates, life is simply more enjoyable 
when there are no physiologic abnormalities inhibiting the individual. Aging for Hippocrates is a 
physiologic abnormality. 
Some five centuries later, Celsus Galen emerged in the Greco-Roman world, and would 
became the second most famous Greek physician after Hippocrates. Greek by birth and Roman 
by historical association, Galen is known as the founder of experimental physiology, a 
distinction that can be evidenced in today’s medical textbooks.10 Galen, renowned for this 
practical skill and superior intelligence among physicians, offered what would become the 
standard of medical knowledge and care from the Greco-Roman world until the Middle Ages.11 
His encyclopedic collection provided the field of medicine with expanded, updated, and 
improved Hippocratic information, but more importantly he wrote more systematic and 
comprehensive works concerning areas of medicine and health unimaginable by Hippocrates and 
his followers. In the Hippocratic vein, Galen adopted the Four Humors, but added elements from 
Pythagoras and his own conception of the spirit, or pneuma.12 Holmes explains Galen as 
representative of one school of so-called Old World medicine, 
                                                
9 Hippocrates. Aphorisms. Translated by Francis Adams http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/aphorisms.mb.txt. 
Accessed July 28, 2015. 
 
10 Garrison, Fielding H. An Introduction to the History of Medicine: With Medical Chronology, Suggestions for 
Study and Bibliographic Data. 3rd Ed., Rev. and Enl. ed. (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1922), 103 
 
11 Wilder and Garrison agree that Galen served as the benchmark for medical practice and knowledge for some 14-
17 centuries after his death. See Wilder, History of Medicine, 101 and 103-110. 
 
12 Garrison, An Introduction to the History of Medicine, 103. The notion of a spiritual dimension to healing will be 
taken up in chapter 3 more explicitly.  
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the body, the microcosm like the macrocosm, was made up of the four elements – fire, air, 
water, earth; having respectively the qualities hot, fry, moist, cold. The body was to be 
preserved in health by keeping each of these qualities in its natural proportion…diseases 
which arose from excess of heat were to be attacked by cooling remedies (etc.).13  
 
He offered further remarks on elements of the Hippocratic tradition in a number of his writings, 
but what is most relevant in the transition from Hippocrates to Galen regarding health and the 
aging can be found in at least two of the seven classes of some 700 books,14 Hygiene and 
Therapeutics. 
  The collection of works in the class of hygiene demonstrates the ways in which food and 
air contribute to the preservation or depletion of health, and the class of therapeutics emphasizes 
the curing of disease, most of which is in accord with methods outlined by Hippocrates. Health, 
explains Galen, is judged by all of an individual’s natural functions, and is defined as a state 
consisting in the full functioning, free from pain or uneasiness, of all an individual’s faculties.15 
Normal function, then, is the meaning of health. As was seen in the works of Hippocrates, 
exercise and diet are the primary means by which good health is attained, restored, and 
preserved. Interestingly, Galen notes that health, though contingent upon the physical and mental 
functioning, may not provide a complete picture of the good life: 
Health, action, and beauty, in conjunction, form the summum bonum of the body; and what 
tends to this conjunction is by him [Galen] traced in the particulars of the air, wakefulness 
                                                
13 Holmes, Oliver Wendell. Medical Essays, 1842-1882. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1883), 318 
 
14 Hippocrates. The Writings of Hippocrates and Galen. Epitomised from the original Latin translations, John 
Redman Coxe (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston, 1846), 473-477. Coxe uses the existent organization of Galen’s 
texts and qualifies them for the reader. Those seven classes are: Physiology, Hygiene, Aëtiological (study of 
disease), Semeiotics (study of disease re: prognosis), Pharmacy, Phlebotomy (study of blood re: bloodletting), and 
Therapeutics. 
 
15 Coxe, The Writings of Hippocrates and Galen, 571-572. 
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and rest, sleep, motion, food, and drink; and the influence of moderation in preserving 
unchanged a state of health, is noticed.16 
 
 The summum bonum, or highest good, is invoked to signal Galen’s appeal to philosophical 
notions of the good life; however, it is comprised of bodily imagery. At first glance Galen 
appears to depart from Hippocrates, but it is clear that Galen does not dissociate health or the 
normal body from the good life. In fact, use of the word beauty, a subject to be explored in the 
next chapter, proves to have further damaging effects on how the good life in aging is 
conceptualized regarding the specious link between aesthetics and functionality. Still, Galen 
contributed positively insofar as he went beyond Hippocrates in speaking to the summum 
bonum. He built a bridge between medicine, philosophy, and theology, a foundation upon which 
later inquiries into medicine, and the intersections of medicine, theology, and philosophy would 
be based.  
  Offering one succinct explanation of medicine in the Medieval period is near impossible 
given the expanse of time, the overlapping developments across the European Continent, and the 
inescapable influence of the Catholic Church on Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire 
and through the Renaissance. The impact of religion on medicine in the Dark and Middle Ages 
can be traced back to the conversion of the Saxons, the monastic movement’s belief in healing as 
a divine calling, the introduction of Arabic-Muslim medicine to the somewhat-established 
practice of European medicine, Jewish medical care for the clergy, and the relationship between 
the practice of medicine and clergy made manifest in the medical School of Salerno.17  
                                                
16 Coxe, The Writings of Hippocrates and Galen, 575. 
 
17 Garrison, An Introduction to the History of Medicine, 126-137. 
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As the healing practice of the middle Ages gave way to further advancement, it remained 
fundamentally homeopathic, and health continued to be defined in philosophical or religious 
terms. A popular response to homeopathic medicine was provided by American physician Oliver 
Wendell Holmes. With the emergence of new pathologies in Northern Europe and later the 
Americas, Holmes sets out to debunk the popularity of health as it had been conceived by the so-
called herb-doctors or homeopaths. Instead, he urged that medicine re-conceptualize the meaning 
of health and how medicine, as a scientific discipline, ought to respond to the needs of patients. 
Holmes’ language of disease and health showed a marked change in the practice of medicine and 
in medical knowledge in general. “Every healthy cell,” he wrote “necessarily performs its 
function properly so long as it is supplied with its proper material and stimuli.” Here is a 
conception of health that is not contingent upon the elements or of philosophical, cultic, or 
astrological beliefs; instead, this understanding of health is a precursor to what one may read in 
today’s biology textbooks. For Holmes, food was an important element of health, but not a 
panacea. Other elements,18 which during his time were not considered medicinal, were to be used 
to restore the cells of the body to order, to kill parasites, and to heal wounds. According to 
Hippocrates and Galen, an individual’s health was the result of some sort of balance, and 
Holmes, standing on the shoulders of others, identified the cause of that imbalance on a fairly 
advanced level given the technology of his time. Starting in the 19th century and continuing 
through today, health is understood to be proper cellular function in accordance with the design 
of the human body, while its counterpart, disease, is any disordered functioning on the cellular 
level. Though celebrating the progress made by Holmes regarding the cellular dimension of 
                                                
18 Holmes, Medical Essays, 254 “Iron, phosphate of lime, sulfur” are examples of substances he wishes to be 
included in medical practice. His argument is based on their efficacy for plant cells, and expanding the definition of 
what should constitute ‘food’ for the human.” 
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health is important, the literal microscopic turn is symbolic of the way in which the good life in 
aging would continue to be described in medicine. In Hippocrates and Galen, aging came with 
disease and severely impeded one’s living well. Emphasis on the functioning of the body 
presented a one-dimensional view of what it means to live the good life, and, regarding the 
aging, how the aging may have been viewed within society (a point to be taken up in chapter 
two). In turning to the cellular level, the person is likely to be overlooked, if not dismissed, as 
person in favor of an examination of the healthy or diseased cells. Examining the cellular health 
of the aging person not only reduces his or her good life to bodily functioning, but also goes 
further in truly reducing the aging person the smallest mechanisms of which the body is 
composed, cells.  
Life Stages And The Emergence of Gerontology 
 As a field of study, gerontology is the result of combined efforts from the social sciences. 
Despite the influence and importance of economics, political science, and anthropology, 
gerontology champions one social science over the others, namely psychology. In a majority of 
gerontological writings the works of Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung and/or Erik Erikson are 
referenced as foundational influences, or sometimes more directly connected as nascent forms of 
modern gerontology. Because of the importance placed on these transformative psychologists, I 
will examine the one whose work is most closely connected with what would become 
gerontology, namely Erik Erikson’s developmental psychology.19 After a short review of 
Erikson, I will turn to modern gerontological conceptions of aging well. 
                                                
19 The choice of Erikson is not arbitrary insofar as he represents a thinker who synthesized Freudian psychoanalysis 
into his developmental approach. Carl Jung’s influence in gerontology will be addressed through the voice of his 
followers in a later chapter.  
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Erik Erikson 
 Concerned with the experiential and behavioral changes experienced at various ages, 
developmental psychology has its roots in evolutionary science, philosophy, and turn-of-the-20th-
century psychology.20 Historically, developmental psychology has focused on childhood, as was 
the case with Freud, but as the 20th century unfolded, its emphasis shifted to adolescence, 
adulthood, and eventually a complete lifespan development approach and life course approach. 21 
Integral to the shift from childhood to adulthood, and from Freud to a newer type of 
psychoanalysis was Erik Erikson. Erikson admits22 to knowing a much older and ‘different’ 
Freud than the one who created the field of psychoanalysis; he claimed to be indebted to Freud’s 
analysis of the psychosexual/psychosocial development that took place within childhood and that 
served as the basis for his developmental stages. What distinguishes Erikson from Freud and 
other developmental psychologists was the way in which he approached adulthood, in particular 
his identification of three distinct yet interconnected stages: young adulthood, maturity, and old 
age. The stages will be addressed below, but suffice it to say that such an approach “opens [our] 
awareness to the full developmental potentials of all stages of life –that is, both the later stages 
                                                
20 Butterworth, George. Principles of developmental psychology: An introduction. (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 
2014), 3-14 
 
21 Butterworth, Principles of Developmental Psychology, 244-246 According to Butterworth and Harris, the lifespan 
approach has contributed greatly to the study of aging for it has been able to address the myriad ways in which an 
individual’s circumstances (physical health, culture, time period, social class) affect the way in which one ages. The 
life course approach, in contrast, emphasizes the impact of particular life events on the aging person. That impact 
often correlates to a change, perhaps radical, in behavior that sets the individual off in a new direction. The contexts 
of these events are often characterized as family, work, health, and marriage.  
 
22 Erikson, Erik H., and Robert Coles. “The First Psychoanalyst (From Insight and Responsibility)” in The Erik 
Erikson Reader. 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 139. 
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when disturbances often become fully manifest, and the earlier ones, to which they are clearly 
related.”23  
 How Erikson influenced gerontology requires an examination of his major project, the 
Psychosocial Theory of Development. His theory of development highlights a psychosocial 
conflict believed to invariably arise as a person moves from one developmental stage to the next. 
Progressing through the stages “requires the integration of personal needs with the demands of 
society,”24 a task that is complicated by the social and cultural forces to be addressed in chapter 
two. Erikson’s chart25 of psychosocial crises outlines eight stages of development, but 
conspicuously leaves out a number or range of numbers representing the ages for a given 
phase.26 Without the chronological constraint, Erikson’s work provides a necessary flexibility 
and fluidity for study and analysis, an analogue to the heterogeneity of the aging population. It 
                                                
23 Erikson, Erik H. Adulthood: Essays. 1st ed. (New York: Norton., 1978), 23. 
 
24 Schroots, Johannes. J. F. 1996. “Theoretical developments in the psychology of aging,” The Gerontologist 36 (6): 
742-8, 744. 
 
25  
Developmental Stage Conflict Strength/Virtue 
Maturity/Old Age (8) Ego Identity vs. Despair Wisdom 
Adulthood (7) Generativity vs. 
Stagnation 
Care 
Young Adulthood (6) Intimacy vs. Isolation Love 
Adolescence (5) Identity vs. Role 
Confusion 
Fidelity 
School Age (4) Industry vs. Inferiority Competence 
Play Age (3) Initiative vs. Guilt Purpose 
Early Childhood (2) Autonomy vs. Shame 
and Doubt 
Will 
Infancy (1) Basic Trust vs. Mistrust Hope 
 
26 Erikson, Erik H., and Joan M. Erikson. The Life Cycle Completed. Extend version ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1997), 105. While the original edition of the text does not assign age ranges to phases, the final (Ninth) stage penned 
by Joan Erikson does in fact offer some chronological context. “Old age in one’s eighties and nineties brings with it 
new demands, reevaluations, and daily difficulties. These concerns can only be adequately discussed, and 
confronted, by designating a new ninth stage to clarify the challenges. We must now see and understand the final 
life-cycle stages through late eighty- and ninety-year-old eyes.”  
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enables the stages of development and the corresponding characteristics/conflicts to be examined 
more openly. Thus, Erikson’s developmental approach offers a sufficiently wide range of 
interpretation for the diverse aging population. For now, I will focus on Stages Seven and Eight 
as they were understood prior to their adoption by gerontology. 
 Each stage points to a particular psychosocial conflict expressed with two terms, each 
characterizing the ego struggle of a given developmental phase. One term represents the 
syntonic, or helpful, characteristic necessary to ‘get through’ the particular stage; the other is the 
dystonic tendency, or the one that impedes developmental progress. For example, in infancy the 
antithetical tendencies are basic trust and basic mistrust, and upon moving into the next stage the 
individual has developed the strength of hope. The syntonic is thought to be dominant insofar as 
a greater presence of that trait will move one closer to resolving the crisis of that stage, but that is 
not to say that the dystonic trait is vanquished once the stage is completed. The strength that 
emerges from the completion of a given stage goes on to re-contextualize the landscape of one’s 
development in two ways. First, development is an ongoing process that is more fluid than not. 
One can advance through stages but revisit parts of a given psychosocial struggle at any given 
time during one’s life, thus employing the strength of that stage already achieved in combination 
with the experience and other relevant strengths achieved through development. Second, each 
strength achieved as one passes through a stage of development is needed for the successful 
completion of the next stage.  
Through the passage of each stage, the strengths achieved offer a new lens for evaluating 
and employing previously developed strengths as on progresses through the life stages.27 The 
                                                
27 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 59. “But the chart also makes clear in its verticals that each step (even 
wisdom) is grounded in all the previous ones; while in each horizontal, the developmental maturation (and 
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person who is in Old Age (according to Erikson’s framework), may reenter the generative stage 
that precedes Old Age, Adulthood. Doing so means having to work to once again to resolve the 
interplay between generativity and stagnation in light of his or her new struggle: integrity and 
despair, and strength: wisdom. Thus, we turn to Adulthood before the more immediately relevant 
developmental stage. 
Adulthood,28 Stage 7, possesses the tendencies of Generativity and Stagnation. 
Generativity encompasses “procreativity, productivity, and creativity, and thus the generation of 
new beings as well as of new products and new ideas, including a kind of self-generation 
concerned with further identity development.”29 The antithetical tendency, stagnation, can be 
experienced by any person, but is particularly relevant to the aging person who transitions from 
being vitally necessary to the workplace or the family (and in effect one’s society) to being 
perceived as inessential. Feeling as though one is unproductive or lacking in value can be 
debilitating, thus the psychosocial struggle that occurs in one’s later years. Adulthood can be 
interpreted as the “generational link”30 because the resolution of generativity and stagnation 
gives the aging person a strength that comes with a sense of meaning and purpose, namely care. 
The adult who is concerned with being productive is so concerned because he or she has an 
interest in the development of the future, whether that is in the form of children, products (things 
the agent creates), or ideas. Thus, caring is not only caring about, but also caring for or taking 
                                                                                                                                                       
psychosocial crisis) of one of these virtues gives new connotations to all the ‘lower’ and already developed stages as 
well as to the higher and still developing ones.” 
 
28 Erikson deviates from the rigidity of his chart and classifies both young and adulthood and adulthood under the 
larger phase, Adulthood.  
 
29 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 67. 
 
30 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 66. 
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care of those things for which the individual is responsible.31 Part of this process involves setting 
the appropriate models of behavior and activity that the adult wishes the next generation to 
continue, i.e. what it means to be a parent.32  
Although the outcome of Stage 7 is positive, an overemphasis on one’s productivity can 
be have detrimental effects in a social environment such as the US. In the seventh stage of 
development, the positive experience of aging is achieved when the individual learns how to 
provide something, i.e. care or knowledge, to others. The very value that the aging person 
believes him or herself to have lost in retirement must be retrieved through the discovery of a 
new productive contribution to the family or society. The cultural influence on self-worth 
regarding productivity will be explored more thoroughly in the next chapter, but its presence in 
Erikson’s stages is noteworthy given his own internalizing the relationship between 
production/contribution and self-worth. Instead of focusing on the biological functioning of the 
aging person as medical authors do, Erikson implicitly suggests that the development directed 
toward the good life is in part functionalist. The meaning of functionalist, however, shifts from 
the biological or cellular functioning of the aging person to the role that he or she plays in the 
family or in society. Despite the damaging potential of Erikson’s tacit functionalism, finding a 
new role to fill is a necessary step. The ability to adapt and find a new role makes possible any 
and all success that is to be had in the eighth stage.   
 Old Age, Stage 8, is characterized by the struggle between Integrity and Despair and 
Disgust; the outcome of which is Wisdom. In the analysis of this last stage33 Erikson returns to 
                                                
31 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 67. 
 
32 The intergenerational concern demonstrated by adults during this developmental phase will be explored in more 
depth in a later chapter. 
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the very first strength achieved in the stages of development, hope. By the time an individual has 
reached Old Age, he or she has a mature and profound hope that has been shaped and informed 
by the experiences of all previous stages of development. The hope of Old Age is described as 
capable of overcoming the despair one feels when confronted with mortality. The positive 
tendency, integrity, enables the individual to synthesize all of one’s previous experiences, 
assuming, of course, that the individual has the cognitive health enabling this type of review. 
Without the requisite mental health, it would be impossible to mature. Surely, the timing of the 
final stage34 and inherent difficulty with confronting mortality and properly reviewing one’s life, 
would make mental health all the more important for Stage 8. Also assumed is an autonomous 
aging person, who has been and remains capable of negotiating developmental stages without the 
assistance of others. Erikson does not attend to the presence of, let alone assistance of others in 
the individual’s progress through the developmental stages. Autonomy and dependence will be 
addressed in chapters two and four respectively, but Erikson, like his internalization of the 
productivity-value relationship above, adopts a cultural perspective that does not adequately 
represent the human experience. He ignores the aging person’s experience regarding human 
sociality. Erikson presumes too much about the kind or level of autonomy experienced by all 
persons, and that psychosocial development can be completed so long as the individual matures 
in accordance with his schema. The irony is that the social dimension of Erikson’s approach 
appears to be more about isolated social encounters rather than the ways in which relationships 
can shape, inform, and facilitate the good life.  
                                                                                                                                                       
33 Erik Erikson’s chart ends with this stage, and there is no official place for Stage 9 created by Joan Erikson. 
 
34 I do not mean to fall into the trap of suggesting that all aging people will suffer from some cognitive impairment. 
However, as one ages, there is a greater risk for a decline, to varying degrees, in cognitive function. 
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These two glaring oversights notwithstanding, Erikson explains the tendency to conduct a 
form of life review, to create a more cohesive and whole vision of one’s life is a syntonic 
developmental shift for it provides a type of closure for the person who is confronted by 
mortality.35 Realized upon the reconciliation of despair and integrity, is Wisdom. Wisdom “rests 
in the capacity to see, look, and remember, as well as to listen, hear, and remember.”36 It is in the 
actualization of wisdom that we come to see a nascent form of Lars Tornstam’s theory of 
gerotranscendence37 and what might be the Ninth Stage. Having achieved wisdom in the Eighth 
stage, the individual realizes the capacity to move beyond the previous stages by continuing to 
develop in a somewhat-unconventional manner, meaning non-linear or non-formulaic. The 
gerotranscendent individual having moved into Joan Erikson’s Ninth Stage, continues to develop 
outside of traditional notions of self and social norms, regaining so-called “lost skills, including 
play, activity, joy, and song” and even “a major leap above and beyond the fear of death.”38 Part 
of this rather fluid stage is the capacity for “feedback on a life that can be relived in retrospect,”39 
which presents its own final tension between the syntonic and dystonic: to be able to move 
forward with the purpose without being weighed down by the past, but instead being informed 
by it. The conciliatory review that takes place during this last stage of development will feature 
                                                
35 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 63. 
 
36 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 112. 
 
37 In the 9th Stage, Joan Erikson focuses on the dystonic tendency of each developmental phase. She does this so as 
to highlight the potency of the dystonic elements when there no longer exists the capacity to wage the 
developmental battle. Essentially she poses the practical question: what happens when one can no longer see, listen, 
hear, or remember? As mentioned above, this stage does come with an age range, eighties and nineties; however, 
seeing as it describes a particular set of limited capacities, one could appeal to the potency of the dystonic tendency 
once its corresponding physical or mental capacity has diminished.  
 
38 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed, 127. 
 
39 Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed 128. 
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prominently in the theological approaches to aging well addressed in chapter three, but it is 
worth noting here that this psychological contribution to aging well crosses over into other 
disciplines.  
 However, the reading of gerontology into his developmental framework is retrospective, 
and not necessarily the point of Erikson’s project. What remains then is how the connection was 
made between psychoanalytical work and the unintentional influence on gerontology. That 
connection comes in snippets in Erikson’s other writings that point to ‘real life’ examples of his 
developmental schema. One such text is “Reflections on Dr. Borg’s Life Cycle.” 
 Erikson admits that the protagonist of Ingmar Bergman’s film Wild Strawberries, Dr. 
Isak Borg, is a favorite in his course on the life cycle. The story offers a reflection that highlights 
the complexities one faces whilst vacillating among the stages of adulthood. Relying on the 
explanation of Old Age, Erikson notes that Dr. Borg hopes to understand his development, “in 
light of the whole course of life.”40 Though Dr. Borg has become aware that his age has brought 
him face-to-face with death, his struggle revolves more around affirming his legacy or life’s 
accomplishments. “Borg’s old-age struggle against despair that makes him comprehend what he 
has become must not be all that he is and must not be all that he leaves behind;”41 this is struggle 
typifies Stage 8. In Old Age, the psychosocial struggle causes the older person to reflect 
backward and forward across one’s life and future in an attempt to stitch together known 
meaning in the face of the unknown. Erikson captures this struggle in addressing a scene in 
which Borg laments he is no longer necessary or depended upon by others. Continuing to reflect, 
                                                
40 Erikson, Adulthood, 5. 
 
41 Erikson, Adulthood, 7. 
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Dr. Borg offers rather morose comments on his dreams, wondering if they are harbingers of 
death. The pause and reflection offered by Borg captures precisely what Erikson believes the 
Life Cycle does, namely help an older adult “gain some integrated sense of one’s life.”42 The 
conclusion of Erikson’s brief synopsis is that when the aging person is confronted with the final 
stage of the life cycle, he or she returns to the beginning, to the fundamental hope of infancy with 
a completely new way of understanding and interpreting the developmental battles one had 
previously thought to be resolved. 
 In the conclusion of the analysis, Erikson provides the answer to the question of the link 
to gerontology: Wisdom, “is the detached and yet active concern with life itself in the face of 
death, and that it maintains and conveys integrity of experience in spite of the Disdain over 
human failings and the Dread of ultimate non-being.”43 Fulfilling the life cycle is a matter of 
constantly engaging with it for the benefit of the self and future generations. Erikson concludes 
that the generational cycle–one group’s interacting with another, or specifically the members of 
later adulthood passing the proverbial baton to the next group–is “vital to the maintenance of 
evolving social structures.”44 Regarding the service of future generations, the purpose of 
fulfilling the life cycle can be interpreted differently. What appears to be a framework intended 
to help the individual navigate various psychosocial crises so that he or she may be at peace 
throughout the developmental process actually takes on a bit of a different meaning at the end. 
No longer is the individual solely responsible to and for him or herself, an already problematic 
                                                
42 Erikson, Adulthood, 13. 
 
43 Erikson, Adulthood, 26. Emphasis in original text. 
 
44 Erikson, Adulthood, 29. 
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point to be debated in later chapters; instead, the aging person who has made it to Old Age is 
obliged to be productive by way of passing on one’s knowledge to and caring (in various 
capacities) for younger generations. The turn outward, though described in a way that almost 
reads as a boon to the aging person, is yet another way in which the good experience of aging 
and arguably the good life in aging is located in one’s productivity. Unfortunately, the implicit 
connections of Erikson are lifted up and concretized in more robust and overtly production-
oriented gerontological approaches to aging well. 
 John Rowe And Robert Kahn 
 Aging well in gerontology experienced a renaissance in the 1980s that began with John 
W. Rowe and Robert L. Kahn’s publication of a short article, “Human Aging: Usual and 
Successful.”45 Moving away from a developmental approach, the authors focus on how to age 
well rather than on the differences between the stages of life. This new conceptualization of 
aging was intended to “counteract the longstanding tendency of gerontology to emphasize only 
the distinction between the pathologic and nonpathologic,”46 or to debunk the first myth of aging 
that “to be old is to be sick.”47 The short article grew into a larger benchmark text that addresses 
three foundational questions: “what does it mean to age successfully, what can each of us do to 
be successful at this most important life task, and, what changes in American society will enable 
                                                
45 Rowe, John W., and Robert L. Kahn. "Human Aging: Usual and Successful." Science 237, no. 4811 (1987): 143-
49. 
 
46 Rowe, John W. and Robert L. Kahn. "Successful Aging." The Gerontologist 37, no. 4 (1997): 433-40, 433. The 
term pathologic is used here to preserve the integrity of the quotation, but pathologic has been replaced by 
pathogenic elsewhere in the this chapter and the dissertation.  
 
47 Rowe, John W., and Robert L. Kahn. Successful Aging. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998), 13. 
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more men and women to age successfully?”48 This turn to the ‘positive aspects’ of aging replace 
Erikson as the foundation for further gerontological scholarship.49 While a more in depth look 
into the text will be taken below, a brief summation of what the authors mean by successful 
aging will suffice at present. 
 Successful aging is defined by three central behaviors or characteristics: low probability 
of disease and disease-related disability, high cognitive and physical functional capacity, and 
active engagement with life.50 First, low probability of disease encompasses the “absence, 
presence, or severity of risk factors for disease.”51 Thus, it becomes relevant to investigate not 
only the intrinsic factors that play a part in the contraction of disease during the aging process, 
but also the extrinsic factors that lead to lifestyles that possess a disproportionate proclivity for 
disease.52 The conclusion of such an investigation reveals that not all aging people fall ill with 
the same diseases or disabilities. Moreover, those who fall ill do not universally experience the 
de facto suffering of old age so much as the culmination of preventable conditions, suggesting 
that the link between old age and inevitable disease is tenuous at best. What Rowe and Kahn 
have done in turning first to health as a determinant of successful aging is unfairly limited to a 
gerontological notion of aging well. Universalizing the aging experience comes with a series of 
problems, the least of which is the actual condition of health experienced by all members. They 
                                                
48 Rowe and Kahn, Successful Aging, xi. 
 
49 While the successful aging model has proved important, it will be explored later an approach that finds its roots in 
American cultural and social influences that muddy the waters for what it might mean to age well.  
 
50 Rowe and Kahn, “Successful Aging,” 433.  
 
51 Rowe and Kahn, “Successful Aging,” 433.  
 
52 This further supports Rowe and Kahn’s basic premise that the aging population is not homogenous. However, I 
shall argue that while it is true that the aging population is not homogenous in terms of disease or ability to function, 
there can exist a framework for aging well that is applicable across the heterogeneous aging population. 
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do not account for the gendered experience of aging, the economic dimensions of health care, or 
the very basic possibility that one can be sick and still live a good life. Worse, however, is the 
manner in which Rowe and Kahn address disabilities as impediments to successful aging. 
Disabilities will be covered extensively in the fourth chapter, but it is worth noting here that the 
suggestion that being disabled precludes the aging person from living the good life is abhorrent. 
Equally objectionable is the idea that aging is a condition likened to a disability. To be clear, the 
authors do not make the claim that aging is a disability, but the manner in which they speak of 
aging and disability leaves too much space for such an interpretation to be made.  
In addition to the element of disease, they argue that a capacity for high cognitive and 
physical function is essential to successful aging. Like Erikson before them, Rowe and Kahn fall 
victim to the cultural perceptions of their time, and perpetuate the belief that the experience of 
aging is riddled with loss of ability to function. However, loss of physical or cognitive function 
can be avoided or prevented, and losses can be restored.53 Yet, what this element shows is the 
repeated pattern of focus on functionality as essential to aging well, which in this case is 
described as successful aging. The importance of health and functioning cannot be understated in 
one’s pursuit of the good life in aging; without health or an adequate level of function, aging well 
may be exceptionally difficult, but overstating the importance of functionality runs the risk of 
reducing the aging person to a functioning machine rather than a less than optimally healthy 
human being. The authors conclude that most undesirable cognitive and physical effects of aging 
do not come until very late in life and more often than not do not drastically impede an aging 
person’s overall functioning. Despite this ‘late onset’ caveat, successful aging is described as 
impossible without a capacity for high cognitive and physical functioning. Once the authors 
                                                
53 Rowe and Kahn, Successful Aging, 42. 
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provide actual parameters that qualify high levels of functioning, it will likely be the case that 
too many aging people will be excluded from aging well at one point in their lives or another.  
Lastly, the third behavior or characteristic, active engagement with life, reminds the 
aging person that involvement with others in varied ways continues to be important. Rowe and 
Kahn explain that isolation or lack of social relationship pose a risk to one’s health.  Social 
interactions, impromptu or organized, can have positive health-relevant effects (i.e. scheduled 
encounters can keep a declining mind active, meetings themselves can be centered around 
physical activity aimed at promoting health etc.). Rowe and Kahn stress that no single type of 
support is uniformly effective, thus reinforcing the import of thinking about the heterogeneity of 
the aging population rather than its uniformity.54 Without properly naming it, the authors identify 
the agency of the aging person as a desired end of successful aging. The three elements of 
successful aging addressed demonstrate that agency is both the means to and the end of 
successful aging. One’s ability to act upon and interact with others, and to be aware of one’s self 
and one’s acting are necessary for and revelatory of successful aging. The agent who 
successfully ages is one who is physically well and mentally sound, and capable of making use 
of his or her agency to remain an active member of society. Chapters three and four will explore 
agency in more depth, but this particular contribution of Rowe and Kahn to the discourse on 
aging well within gerontology is critical. Turning to agency is a positive step because it allows 
for a broadening of the definition of how diseased or how highly functioning an aging person 
might be. Agency relaxes the criteria of aging well that appear to be more limiting than aging 
persons might wish. As a basic understanding of agency, the capacity for acting and being acted 
upon sufficiently expands the scope of who can actually age well and by what standards an 
                                                
54 Rowe and Kahn, “Successful Aging,” 438. 
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individual’s good life in aging can be measured (if such a thing is possible). As will be shown in 
Chapter Two, Rowe and Kahn’s open-ended description of social engagement or activity is also 
important because being active in society does not or should not have to require economic 
productivity. Raising up their interpretation of an active lifestyle in aging is important. Yet, 
because of the remarks about functionality, the cultural environment draws its own conclusion 
about successful aging in such a way that functionality is attached to productivity: if one is 
functional, he or she should be productive/contributing to society; if one is not 
productive/contributing to society, it must be because he or she is not functional. Despite its 
faults, Rowe and Kahn’s model of successful aging can help inform ethics of aging that seeks to 
negotiate agency, activity, and health in pursuit of the good life in aging.  
 Lars Tornstam 
Another approach born during the gerontology renaissance of the 1980s was Lars 
Tornstam’s model of gerotranscendence. Gerotranscendence represents both fulfilling and 
moving beyond Erikson’s final developmental stage. In effect, it is a theory that addresses the 
totality of aging in that it is not limited to those members of the Third and Fourth Ages; rather it 
is a framework that is applicable to all starting in young adulthood.55 Tornstam notes that, 
according to Erikson, those who do not reach the eighth and final stage ultimately experience 
despair and fear of death. That despair, according to Tornstam, can only be overcome by 
embracing a model of gerotranscendence.56 What then is gerotranscendence? 
                                                
55 Tornstam, Lars. Gerotranscendence: A developmental theory of positive aging. (New York: Springer Publishing 
Company, 2005), 39. 
 
56 Tornstam, Gerotranscendence, 40. 
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 Tornstam’s model brings together his complex view that “old age is not a mere 
continuation of the activity patterns and values of mid-life, but, rather, something different: a 
transformation characterized by new ways of understanding life, ‘activities,’ oneself and 
others.”57 Divided into three levels of age-related ontological change,58 gerotranscendence 
addresses the shift humans make, or should make, from a materialistic and rational perspective to 
a cosmic and transcendent one. The first level of change is the cosmic dimension in which broad 
existential changes occur. Time is an integral area of change in this first level insofar as the ways 
in which time is understood shifts so as to break down the barriers that exist between living in 
the present and being able to make previous times equally present. An increased connection to 
earlier generations emerges that not only serves the function of remembering, but also helps the 
gerotranscendent individual recognize his or her importance as someone who represents a living 
connection between generations. In many ways, this is not all that different from the recognition 
of one’s relationship to future generations that appears in Erikson, Rowe and Kahn, and will 
appear in the theological literature of the third chapter. It is markedly different in that it does not 
oblige an aging individual to make him or herself of service to the younger generation in some 
capacity. In some cases, Tornstam notes that recognizing one’s connectedness to both previous 
and future generations inspires a popular thought that one has lived long enough and served his 
or her purpose. Second, aging the concern individuals have for themselves change “in the view 
of the present self and the self in retrospect.”59 Tornstam begins addressing the changes within 
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the self as self-confrontation, paying homage to Carl Jung, but what is perhaps more important 
and most relevant, is what he refers to as a “decrease in self-centeredness.”60 Tornstam argues 
that this move provides relief to those whose aspirations were unrealistic and damaged their self-
esteem. Decreasing self-centeredness reduces the so-called burden of thinking that one is the 
center of the universe, which more often than not is psychologically damaging. Turning away 
from self-centeredness is a theological task picked up on by Edward Vacek in his articulation of 
the virtues and vices of retirement, but it is Tornstam who distinguishes himself within 
gerontology for highlighting the importance of this move so as to facilitate completing the life 
cycle. Detaching oneself from the type of self-interest that can impede one’s happiness is integral 
to aging well, and will be more fully addressed in the next chapter. A gerotranscendent 
individual’s ability to break from patterns of self-centeredness and reflect upon the good (and 
bad) that one has achieved for oneself and others better enables him or her to truly understand 
life in the past, present, and future, differently. Last, social and personal relationships begin to 
more closely mirror the final developmental change of the gerotranscendent person. Tornstam 
notes that the gerotranscendent person begins to lose interest in superficial relationships, and in 
an attempt to demythologize the risks of isolation, sometimes opts for solitude because it can be 
more meaningful. This is not to say that Tornstam believes that living in solitude is the best 
approach to or a necessary step for aging well; however, he is clear that being alone in some 
capacity is integral to the satisfaction of gerotranscendence. Thus, he navigates a very fine line 
between an overemphasis on autonomy in aging and the myth of complete dependence. He 
leaves open the possibility of experiencing the good life in aging in isolation and in relationship, 
without claiming them to be mutually exclusive or placing restrictions on one’s commitment to a 
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particular mode of aging (i.e. autonomously or completely dependently). Tornstam’s insights 
regarding autonomy and dependence are integral to an ethics of aging, and will be further 
explored in later chapters.      
Margaret Cruikshank 
 The imperfect work of Rowe and Kahn and other gerontologists continues to influence 
how gerontologists think about, address, and engage with the aging population. A problem with 
their work is that successful aging is contingent upon individual effort. Margaret Cruikshank 
argues that “the success model overlooks the elements of luck and mystery in aging.”61 Aging, 
she argues, is socially constructed insofar as the abilities of the individual to live well are 
constrained or at least influenced by other forces. This particular issue will be considered in 
economic and political contexts in the following chapter; however, Cruikshank’s emphasis on 
the ways in which a feminist approach to gerontology will contribute to the flourishing of aging 
women, or as she terms it “comfortable aging”62is relevant to this chapter’s discussion. 
 In crafting a model of comfortable aging, Cruikshank appeals to the oft-overlooked 
experience of the aging woman. She notes that the experiences of women are fundamentally 
different than that of men, and this oversight is intensified when it comes to the aging woman. 
Physical health and its impact on aging well is but one area in which women experience a 
disproportionate amount of discomfort compared to their male counterparts. Despite the fact that 
women live longer than men, they are 50% more likely to have arthritis, and deal with more 
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chronic illness such as hypertension and diverticulitis.63 Women are left to “see their health 
status only in individual terms and expected to find solutions on their own,”64 rather than be 
given the same kind of social, economic, and medical support that their male counterparts are 
given. Nutrition is one of the areas of healthy aging that affects women differently. After 
menopause maintaining weight becomes more difficult as lifestyles change without a correlative 
change in diet and amount of exercise, and because women live longer than men but have earned 
lower wages, some of the means necessary to improve physical health are lacking.65 This 
problem is highlighted by research that shows “people over 65 spend an average of 20% of their 
annual income on health care gaps in Medicare coverage,” with the “costs of single, older 
women” nearing one third of an individual’s annual income.66 Diagnosis has been shown to 
differ between men and women, at least on the subject of heart disease and heart attack. In 
women, presentation of the condition may be atypical–back instead of chest pain, no arm pain. 
After heart attacks and diagnosis of heart disease, studies have shown that women are less likely 
to receive a pacemaker in an expedient manner. Mental health, particularly the question of 
depression, represents another area in which the healthy aging of a woman is different than men. 
Cruikshank connects the effect of prescription medication designed for younger persons on the 
aging woman with changing the very structure and chemistry of the brain. In the case of women 
whom report depression more often than men throughout their lives, the experiences of loss of 
partners, illness, and loss of independence, represent a confluence of issues that exacerbate an 
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underlying pathology which leads to further isolation, inactivity, and an increased likelihood for 
more severe forms of depression.67 In short, aging women tend to suffer more and worse than 
men, yet are given fewer resources, thus thwarting their ability to age well according to the 
medical and gerontological models.  
 Moreover, women tend to have the experience of being a caretaker or caregiver as they 
age, a specialized and demanding type of service that further complicates the aging process. 
Increased longevity and shifting demographics have resulted in a change in the ways in which 
care is given to older persons. Caregiving, a task that disproportionately is expected of women, is 
understood as anything from intermittent help for a family member to round-the-clock care given 
to a family member in one’s home.68 Perhaps this is a result of a cultural expectation that women 
be caregivers, a sexist tendency that piggybacks Erikson’s and Rowe and Kahn’s thought that the 
aging person should be doing something for others. As a result, women are forced to make 
sacrifices in other areas of their lives, i.e. career. Loss of work has its own consequences that 
manifest in the moments of caregiving, i.e. lost wages, but also later on when that very caregiver 
is in need of care and does not have the income or savings to take care of oneself, thus creating a 
cycle of family-based and women-centered care. The very experience of taking on the role of 
caregiver drastically changes the ways in which one might come to age well, or comfortably. 
Perhaps it is the cycle of caregiving that perpetuates the myths about dependency in the Third 
Age, but it is obvious that the social construction of aging plays a much larger role than popular 
culture might believe. The language of burden is often used in describing the way in which the 
recipient feels, but it might well be the case that it is a mutual feeling. “Caregiving studies have 
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documented a wide range of physical and psychological illnesses experienced by care 
providers,” illnesses to which women may already be susceptible. The female caregiver now has 
to manage her own aging process and the aging process of an older, and sometimes more needy, 
parent.  
 Cruikshank lays the foundation for a feminist gerontology that is attentive to the multiple 
factors that influence the way in which one ages. A notion of comfortable aging is distinct from 
successful and gerotranscendent models precisely because of its attention to the multifaceted 
experiences of the aging woman. Though many obstacles faced by women have been briefly 
mentioned above, there exists one more obvious barrier that goes unnoticed, yet its influence is 
unmistakable–the word gerontology. She notes that the word gerontology comes from the Greek 
word, geron, meaning old man.69 Thus gerontology is effectively the study of old men, and it is 
no wonder, given that word and the history of medicine, and the myriad social and political 
impediments to women’s rights, that women are often forgotten or, worse treated differently than 
men. By limiting gerontological literature to the experience of males, the experience of the aging 
woman is further marginalized. A turn to a more critical model, such as comfortable aging, 
therefore, is a necessary evolution of gerontology. The model also previews the perspective 
needed for a theological ethics of aging for the US. Comfortable aging “emphasizes ease rather 
than external measurement”70 and is connected to the individuality and autonomy of the aging 
agent. Comfortable aging recognizes the social, cultural, and political forces of aging while being 
attentive to the narratives of aging persons, especially women. Comfortable aging provides a 
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model for a way forward in constructing an ethics of aging, but there remain many more 
perspectives to be considered.  
 The sweeping historical overview has outlined several insights: the good life and health 
in ancient medicine were inseparable and held a functionalist or mechanistic view of the body; 
the functional assessment of health and the good life persisted into the Middle Ages and into the 
modern era; the psychoanalytical tradition of the early 20th century possesses the specter of that 
functionalist interpretation of the body and contends that the good life in aging is in part linked 
to one’s contribution to society; late 20th century gerontologists continue in the tradition of 
making productivity and a functionally healthy body and mind requirements of aging well until a 
feminist perspective provides sufficient critique and offers a new model for aging well. 
Healthy Aging In Medicine 
 When one wishes to explore the question of aging well today, a simple search is likely to 
yield a number of sources ranging from scholarly articles to blog posts and every credible or 
incredible thing in between–all of which can be quite confusing and sometimes contradictory to 
an individual seeking to uncover how it is that he or she may age well. Oftentimes what is 
revealed for living well within the medical community is an overwhelming amount of statistics 
that are indicative of healthy aging, not necessarily the question of aging well. These statistics 
keep with the tradition of Hippocrates in linking the functioning body to the good life, thus much 
of what is offered in this section will focus primarily on that mechanistic dimension of living 
well. The professional perspectives on aging well from The National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
and National Institute on Aging (NIA), Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and the Mayo Clinic 
emerge from a number of empirical studies, and constitute the foundation for current medical 
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conceptions of healthy aging. Such studies include the NIH and NIA’s “Baltimore Longitudinal 
Study of Aging” (BLSA) and its follow-up report, “Healthy Aging: Lessons from The Baltimore 
Longitudinal Study of Aging” (HABLSA) and the CDC’s “The State of Aging & Health In 
America 201371” (SAHA13).  
 HABLSA attempts to “identify the true effects of aging” and “separate factors such as 
disease, socioeconomic disadvantage, or lack of educational opportunity from the underlying 
biological or other mechanisms common to human aging.”72 Using BLSA, the report analyzes 
and makes more widely accessible the older study’s data. So, what then does the BLSA have to 
offer? This observational study73 measures the changes that occur during the aging process: the 
biological, behavioral, genetic, and environmental factors insofar as they are responsible for 
changes, potential risk factors for later in life pathologies, possible interventions that may 
ameliorate the aging process, and the factors associated with healthy aging over time.74 The two 
primary conclusions of the study will resonate with earlier remarks: “‘normal’ aging can be 
distinguished from disease,” and “no single chronological time table of human aging exists, we 
all age differently.”75  
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 The CDC’s study differs from HABLSA in that it is public health-oriented, meaning that 
its focus is on the policy changes required to address the demonstrated needs of the aging 
population, understood by the study as the Baby Boomer generation.76 The healthy lives of the 
aging are important insofar as they affect the lives of the entire society. It is here that the concern 
for the aging as integral to the success of the community comes into focus, a point to be taken up 
in the final three chapters. Aging well, then, is not only a matter of importance for individuals 
but for all persons, and therefore should inspire a public health responsibility for all.  The 
primary impact to be had on the overall populace is economic: SAHA13 estimates that by the 
year 2030, health care expenditures will increase by close to 25% and Medicare spending will 
nearly double from $555 billion to $903 billion in 2020 without accounting for inflation.77 
SAHA13 demonstrates that while many persons develop chronic diseases later in life, there exist 
a number of diseases which present later in life but which can be prevented or mitigated during 
one’s youth. Thus, the public health orientation of the study is intended to assuage the effect of 
the future aging population by examining the current aging population and addressing its needs.78 
Those needs tend to be characterized by the negative effects of chronic disease. According to 
SAHA13,  
Chronic diseases can affect a person’s ability to perform important and essential 
activities, both inside and outside the home. Initially, they may have trouble with the 
instrumental activities of daily living, such as managing money, shopping, preparing 
meals, and taking medications as prescribed. As functional ability—physical, mental, or 
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both—further declines, people may lose the ability to perform more basic activities, 
called activities of daily living, such as taking care of personal hygiene, feeding 
themselves, getting dressed, and toileting.79  
 
All of these factors are believed to have a direct correlation to the enjoyment of life. The loss of 
meaning and enjoyment of life can contribute to other conditions (i.e. depression) in later years 
that can work together with the underlying chronic condition to further erode one’s joie de vivre. 
To combat these and other problems, both the CDC and NIA have offered a series of tools for 
improving quality of life, and to whether the underlying condition diminishes one’s physical or 
mental wellbeing.   
Frequently found in discussions about aging well are the following words or phrases: 
healthy behaviors, longevity, productivity, self-reported health, and social connectedness.80 
Together they ultimately lay the groundwork for what the CDC addresses as wellbeing. Though 
wellbeing is examined through the lens of public health, it is important to highlight the 
tendencies of such research in describing what the professional medical organizations would 
consider as living well, or at least healthy living. The CDC admits that there is no mutually 
agreed upon definition of wellbeing, but points to particular characteristics that correlate to 
indicators or metrics within medicine. An absence increase, or decrease of those characteristic 
leads to a reduced level of wellbeing. Wellbeing is broken down into at least81 two categories, 
physical and mental.  
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Physical wellbeing refers to the condition of the body in terms of fitness, average (not 
pre-hypertensive) blood pressure, fully functioning circulatory and respiratory systems, and 
generally standard vital statistics. Though the standard vitals change based on age, sex, and other 
factors, the health of an adult would be directly linked to a blood pressure reading between 90/60 
mm/Hg and 120/80 mm/Hg, a pulse between 60 and 100 beats per minute, and a temperature no 
lower than 97.8 and no higher than 99.1 degrees Fahrenheit,82 all of which should sound familiar. 
Average weights, based on an average height for women and men, are not merely statistics; 
rather they represent a guideline for a healthy size according to the National Heart, Lung, and 
Blood Institute.83 Vitals such as these are the current tools used to determine the physical 
wellbeing of an individual. Obviously, there is more to wellbeing than a series of numbers, but 
when the aging person engages in a conversation about wellbeing with today’s medical 
professional or in the context of medicine, these are the metrics to which wellbeing may be 
reduced. If that is the experience of speaking with a physician about one’s health, what can the 
aging patient do to ensure that she or he is in fact trying lead a healthy life? 
 According to the medical authorities addressed above, living well requires that one 
commit oneself to the so-called ‘healthy’ lifestyle. The CDC, NIH, American Heart Association 
(AHA), American Lung Association (ALA), American Diabetes Association, and numerous 
others conclude that diet, exercise, being temperate with alcohol consumption and refraining 
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from tobacco products are the foundations for a good healthy life in aging. HABLSA stress that 
“exercise and physical activity are the cornerstone to almost every healthy aging program,” 
reminding the reader that any physical activity is integral to helping individuals “do the things 
you enjoy and stay independent as you age.”84 However common this knowledge may be, or is 
believed to be, its repetition remains the singular foundation upon which most other health 
maintenance or improvement programs are designed. Yet, this seemingly obvious solution to 
aging well implicitly points to the myth that aging is inherently connected to disease: conditions 
such as heart disease, type II diabetes, hypertension, depression, and anxiety are believed to be 
inevitable manifestations of the aging process. Surely an inactive lifestyle will lead to weight 
gain and other issue when one ages, but the manner in which such information is presented can 
suggest that the problems faced by the aging are part of the aging process. This troubling 
connection feeds into popular perceptions about what it means to age, and unfortunately informs 
a segment of bioethicists who will be addressed below.  
Mental wellbeing or mental health is defined as “a state of wellbeing in which the 
individual realizes his or her own abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work 
productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to his or her community.”85 
Though mental health is a well-known issue, when it comes to the aging population the question 
focuses on a related yet different type of brain-related health, cognitive health. Healthy cognitive 
functioning includes language, thought, memory, planning and carrying out tasks, judgment, 
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attention, perception, remembered (learned) skills, and the ability to live a purposeful life.86 
Taken together then the mentally and cognitively healthy person possess the following 
characteristics: absence of depression, possessing a generally cheerful disposition, maintaining a 
level of optimism and hopefulness, and lacking any signs of neuropathology such as dementia or 
Alzheimer’s.87 While some of these areas will be addressed in further detail in later chapters, it is 
important to note that a comprehensive consideration of pathologies that affect mental wellbeing 
will not play a large role in the remainder of this project. Such a study would require research 
into areas that are outside the scope of the dissertation. Attempting to address the myriad ways in 
which the aging person who suffers from a mental illness of such magnitude conceptualizes 
aging well is a task too monumental for most.88  
The CDC offers a program for addressing the question of mental wellbeing called The 
Healthy Brain Initiative: A National Public Health Road Map to Maintaining Cognitive Health. 
Cognitive health can be measured or assessed based on the degree of functioning within the 
focus areas mentioned above. It is the improvement or at least preservation of cognitive function 
that the CDC wishes to achieve; however, achieving it is quite elusive, even some nine years into 
the research. Though the CDC does not offer much in terms of how the individual can work 
toward aging well in view of cognition, the NIA offers its own solutions. These suggestions for 
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cognitive improvement are familiar: physical activity, exercise, and healthy eating, all of which 
are believed to be beneficial. Additionally, being involved in leisure social activities or more 
productive and structured activities have been linked to decreasing one’s risk for dementia. The 
NIA reports that being more sociable helps to alleviate depression, and that setting goals and 
achieving them or at least working toward them reduces the risks of diminishing cognitive 
function.89 Still, it remains to be seen if universally proven strategies for maintaining one’s 
cognitive health are to be found. 
Aging Well In Medical Ethics 
The medical profession’s understanding of health is limited to the physiological 
functioning of the person, quantified by a series of metrics.  Yet, the notion of health promoted 
by medicine sometimes points to elements of a broader vision of the good life, (i.e. recreational 
activity, social engagements,). The proper role of medicine is, and should remain, the relief or 
prevention of suffering; however, when modern medicine moves “beyond the promotion and 
preservation of health into the boundless realm of general happiness,”90 medicine demonstrates 
its moral dimension. To more proficiently address this moral dimension of medicine, I turn to 
biomedical ethics. Within biomedical ethics, there exist at least two schools of thought 
concerning the relationship between the good life and aging. One group considers aging to be a 
natural (nonpathologic) part of life that does not hinder one’s fulfillment of the good life. At the 
other end of the spectrum are ethicists who interpret aging as a pathogenic impediment to the 
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good life requiring therapeutic intervention. While there are ethicists who do not create such a 
dichotomy, the former and latter are representative of how aging is generally perceived. What is 
more problematic than the two camps existing is what they implicitly say about aging, namely 
that aging means end-of-life. Bioethicists do not focus exclusively on the Third Age; instead the 
aging are always viewed as near death, or in decline, thus the emergence of the two competing 
perspectives are respond to the underlying premise that aging is bad. 
 What needs to be kept at the fore, however, is the limited manner in which the discourse 
on aging persons is generally conducted in biomedical ethics. Presumed in the above section and 
in what follows is that a disparate population can be addressed as a homogenous group that 
progresses through aging in a uniform manner and whose needs can be met and problems 
resolved in a correlatively uniform way. The CDC and NIH are marginally more attentive to the 
diversity of experiences across the aging population91 than other resources. The biomedical 
ethicists, despite being categorized into two groups regarding perspectives on aging, provide 
more space for continued discussion of how aging well might be considered beyond a purely 
functional health assessment. Still, the two views, aging as natural and aging as disease, will 
show that within the biomedical ethics community there remains a tendency to discuss the 
physical health of the aging person as a primary indicator for his or her capacity for achieving 
the good life.  
Aging As Natural 
 There is much debate about just how natural the aging process is given the occurrence of 
chronic disease, susceptibility to physical and mental decline, and other issues that tend to be 
associated with ‘being old.’ Research has shown that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a 
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distinct line between aging as a standalone non-pathogenic process and the diseases that happen 
to coincide with certain ages. Yes, there is a range of diseases typically present in older adults, 
but determining whether they are a result of the aging process or of other factors is challenging. 
For those who maintain that aging is a natural process, authors such as Daniel Callahan, Norman 
Daniels, and Leon Kass, turn to the cultural denial of mortality and the absolutization of life. 
Their collective approach to aging begins with categorically different premises than ‘aging as 
disease’ ethicists.  
 Among his many publications, Callahan is perhaps best known for his work on health 
care rationing. An uncomfortable topic regarding the aging population, rationing is often viewed 
as an extreme option when it comes to resource allocation in health care.92 Callahan maintains 
that aging is a natural part of life, an organic process shared by all forms of life, and that it in no 
way should be treated the same as a disease. However, his goal is not necessarily to defend the 
‘aging as natural’ position theoretically so much as it is pragmatically – rationing among certain 
segments of the aging population can help improve the health care delivery system.  Thus, 
Callahan’s position on the issue of aging is difficult to separate from his overall project, and may 
be more of a necessary element rather than impetus.  
 Framed by his belief that the aging population represents the most daunting health care 
problem of the coming years (in the 1980s, but still true today), Callahan advocated for re-
imagining both the way in which medicine was understood in light of the aging members of 
society. A shift in medicine’s understanding of the aging population also required a fundamental 
                                                
92 Callahan, Daniel. Setting limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 20. 
Callahan considers the aging population as those who are 65 and older. He accepts a separation of chronological 
ages similar to that of Neugarten and other advocates of the Third Age. For Callahan, there are the young old (65-
75), the old-old (75-85), and the old-old (85 and above).  
 
  
48 
change in how aging itself was understood, argued Callahan. Aging had to be reconsidered 
socially, culturally, politically, and medically.  
First, recognizing this potential dilemma in resource allocation in the 1980s, Callahan 
argued that what was needed was “a common conviction that old age has meaning and 
significance,” where meaning includes “the interior perception, backed up by some specifiable 
traditions, beliefs, concepts or ideas, that one’s life is purposive and coherent in its way of 
relating the inner self and the outer world.”93 The significance of aging to which Callahan refers 
indicates “the social attribution of value to old age, that it has a sturdy and cherished place in the 
structure of society and politics, and provides a coherence among the generations that is 
understood to be important if not indispensable.”94 The details of what Callahan deems to be 
meaningful and significant will not be addressed here but it is worth noting that much of what he 
suggests is a combination of theological insight, developmental psychology (see Erikson and 
Tornstam above), and virtues ethics (to be addressed in chapter three). Creating a new meaning 
to be sought for the aging person first requires a change in medicine’s one-dimensional 
functional assessment of aging, and a dissociation between aging and disease.  
It is modern medicine—what it is capable of offering in terms of preserving, prolonging, 
and extending life—that contributes to the perception that the aging population is a threat to 
health care resource allocation. Modern medicine’s belief that “life, death, and illness can be 
scientifically dominated and pacified,”95 must be overturned, lest the cultural denial of mortality 
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persist to our collective detriment. In what Callahan classifies as the second era of medicine 
(today’s era), there exists a constant quest to dominate nature. This Promethean complex 
nourishes a cultural belief that medicine and technology provide an unlimited horizon of 
possibility for improving the human condition. Not to be overlooked is the ever-important 
historical description of the good life in medicine that shows the good life and health are one and 
the same; with an increase in medical technologies, the good life becomes more widely available, 
but perhaps not more accessible given the cost of new technologies. Not until we move beyond 
this second era of medicine, which appears to involve a cultural and social shift as well as a 
medical one, will there be an effective change for the aging population. That third era will be 
characterized by what Callahan describes as sustainable medicine.  
 Integral to the creation of a sustainable medicine is the equitable distribution of health 
care “without undue strain, [and] affordable to the society” that embraces “finite and steady-state 
health goals” and moderates “aspirations for progress and technological innovation.”96 The 
steady-state goals of medicine are rooted in the belief that there exists a threat to other social 
goods. Endlessly pursuing the “satisfaction of almost every individual health need, desire, and 
dream”97 will ultimately cost an entire society too much, economically and socially. “Societal 
priorities such as education, jobs, and culture,”98 will suffer from an insatiable thirst for medical 
technologies that enhance or extend life. Still, it is difficult to see how these priorities are distinct 
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from Callahan’s economic concerns without his offering specific details on how those social 
priorities will suffer.  
 Moreover, steady state goals can be supported by emphasizing the notion that people in 
good health in a place like the United States have achieved a satisfactory level of health for now 
and the future. In order to achieve this shift in perspective, society must be reminded that health 
is a good, but not an absolute, good. With this comes the obvious yet extremely difficult-to-
accept fact of human mortality. The acceptance that death is inevitable, suggests Callahan, is the 
biggest hurdle in helping to address the aging population. This begins with medicine and 
society’s enabling of aging persons to live as comfortably as possible. Setting limits on the 
financial costs incurred by the public or by insurance companies is one of Callahan’s proposals, 
though the details remain elusive in his vision of sustainable medicine. Such limits will not 
necessarily result in a correlative shortening of life expectancy or overall health because both 
physicians and Callahan agree that longevity and health are largely dependent on “earlier health 
habits and other factors.”99 If aging is something to be embraced rather than feared, what might 
that mean for the claim that there can be value or good found in aging? 
Though it is clear that Callahan believes medicine cannot bring a profound happiness or 
offer meaning to one’s life on its own, he does maintain that without medicine’s ability to 
physically and mentally enable an individual’s pursuit of the good life in aging, the experience of 
the Third (and Fourth) Age may be rather difficult. Integrity, wholeness, completeness–these are 
words that Callahan believes help to offer solace to the aging person who is confronted with the 
inevitability of death. He contends that solace that can further reduce the effects of the varied 
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types of suffering the aging person might experience, a thought not all too dissimilar from 
Tornstam’s notion of gerotranscendence. In fact, Callahan invokes the idea of transcendence as 
being an important goal for the aging individual to achieve in the face of whatever decline in 
health he or she may be experiencing.100 Being able to transcend requires the acknowledgment 
and acceptance of the fact that by the time one has entered into his or her mid 60s, and certainly 
by age 80, life’s opportunities for “work, love, procreating and raising a family, life with others, 
the pursuit of moral and other ideals, the experience of beauty, travel and knowledge”101 have 
been presented and actualized or attempted, offering a sense of completion. That completion 
allows for appreciation and value to be made of the aging process. Up to this point, Callahan’s 
remarks on the good life in aging do not oblige an aging person to serve others as was the case 
with most other authors above, but he leaves open the possibility of such an interpretation in his 
turn to kinship, specifically with the next generation(s), as a practice in which the aging person 
should engage in to feel more complete. Such relationships can help to fill help to fill the void 
when the aging parent is no longer needed in the same ways as he or she once was. Still, 
Callahan is cautious about reducing the role of the aging parent to caring for grandchildren and 
offering life advice to their children, but some level of engagement with others remains 
important for the aging individual. Surely, a longer life may be what the aging person wants, a 
desire that may be supported by his or her family and friends, but it is not necessarily the case 
that a shorter life, or not-so-long later life is “a self-evident evil; it may at worst be a regrettable 
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loss.”102 Upon establishing the kind of value to be found in the aging process, and planting the 
belief that a prolonged life is not necessarily the best life, Callahan moves to address the question 
of health care rationing. 
 In an attempt to justify that health care for the aging should be rationed, Callahan asserts 
that this is to be done not in a dehumanizing way. The practice is not intended to be 
discriminatory; instead, the limits imposed on the aging intended to establish a more equitable 
distribution of resources in light of the community’s overall health care needs. What is routinely 
allocated to the aging should be evaluated in light of its efficacy: Acute care, though ‘necessary,’ 
may not improve one’s overall quality of life. As a first step in rationing health care distribution 
Callahan suggests that improvements in primary and preventative care must be made so as to 
mitigate the potential negative health outcomes that aging persons may experience. Compression 
of morbidity, the shortening of the time from terminal diagnosis to death, is a potential step 
forward in improving the overall quality of life without unnecessarily protracting illness or 
prolonging life, but this appears to be more in line with an ethics of dying well rather than aging 
well. The health care system as whole should do its best to limit suffering, embrace the 
accomplishment and value of living into old age, and create the space for comfort and enjoyment 
rather than extending life for the sake of extending life. 
Similar to rationing health care is Norman Daniels’s belief that health care should have 
limits. Well known for his interpretation of just and unjust health inequalities, he asks the 
following question concerning the aging population:  
How do we treat age groups fairly within distributive schemes, such as health care 
systems? What is a just allocation of resources to each stage of life, given that needs vary 
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as we age? When is a distributive scheme age-biased in an unfair way? Is age itself a 
morally permissible criterion for limiting access to new technologies?103  
 
Daniels does not see the aging population as a threat to the healthcare system itself, but rather a 
group that poses potential harm to other groups of persons. It is fairness to others, not the 
inherent value of the experience of aging that leads to Daniels’ position that aging is not a 
pathology to be cured. For Daniels, health is of special moral significance because it is a 
controlling factor in one’s ability to participate in society, but health care cannot and need not 
“be a bottomless pit.”104 Preventative and acute care, are for Daniels important as they concern 
the functioning of the person. Enhancement and prolongation of lives that cannot proportionately 
contribute/function, however, are not germane to health care distribution. Daniels echoes the 
earlier contributions on functionality and the aging vis-à-vis self-worth and value. Despite the 
positive elements of his work – asserting that aging is not a disease, and life is not to be 
absolutized or preserved at all costs – Daniels continues in the tradition of those whose 
comments on the aging do not move beyond the aging person’s ability to contribute to society. 
Participating in society, as has been stated on numerous occasions above, is important, and will 
later be shown to be central to an ethics of aging; however, defining the aging person by his or 
her contribution cannot be the first and only way in which the aging person is understood.    
Although Daniels believes that health care should be distributed justly or equitably, he 
acknowledges that inequitable distribution is partially caused by the consumption of resources by 
the aging. It is Daniels’ conceptualization of a prudential lifespan that defends him against the 
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critiques of ageism, but as with Callahan, it is difficult to say whether his framework is targeting 
the aging. In his account of a prudential lifespan Daniels reminds the audience that individuals 
age and experience aging differently, an allusion to the developmental framework of Erikson 
adapted by gerontologists. Starting with this allusion to the developmental tradition reminds the 
Third Agers and younger people alike that individual needs will change over time. Throughout 
one’s developmental progress, needs will change; over the course of time the satisfaction of 
those needs will yield an equitable distribution of resources. Balanced compromises or tradeoffs 
made throughout the course of life constitute Daniels’ view on a prudential lifespan. Such 
tradeoffs are not fully described by more than those decisions that “make life better as a whole 
[or] better than the alternatives,”105 but the underlying point of this framework is to create a more 
just distribution in view of scarcity. Distribution “from a slice-of-life perspective seems unfair,” 
argues Daniels and will be viewed as “egalitarian in an over-a-lifetime view.”106 The slice-of-life 
perspective requires that one is capable of conceptualizing his or her own vision of the good life 
and making the decisions required to attain that life both in the moment and over the course of 
one’s life. This perspective is similar to that of Tornstam’s gerotranscendent view which requires 
an individual have the capacity for conceptualizing a more comprehensive notion of the good life 
looking forward and backward while satisfying that good life in the present moment. Still, 
Daniels does not suggest that the resources be limited simply because one has aged; rather, the 
aging should willingly ration resources as a result of a gerotranscendent notion of the good life. 
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Bioethicist and physician Leon Kass further supports the claim that aging is a natural part 
of life. Like others in the ‘aging as natural’ camp, he believes that there are no real cures for 
aging–mortality will always win. However, he does suggest that there are different ways in 
which the condition of the aging person can be improved personally, experientially, and socially. 
Kass raises a theological question that also challenges cultural feelings about aging and death: 
“Should we, partisans of life [members of the Jewish faith], welcome efforts to increase not just 
the average but also the maximum human lifespan, by conquering aging, decay, and 
ultimately mortality itself?”107 For Kass, the problem rests with the culture in which we live, the 
culture that wishes to extend life through medical technologies without ever considering what the 
ramifications might be or even what the limits of such extensions should be. His critique is of a 
culture that shies away from moral evaluation. He is willing to consider a reasonable lifespan but 
notes that the problem is defining what a reasonable lifespan is. Perhaps such a lifespan can be 
described this way:  
Time needed for our plans and projects yet to be completed? Some multiple of the age of 
a generation, say, that we might live to see great-grandchildren fully grown? Some 
notion–traditional, natural, revealed – of the proper lifespan for a being such as man?108  
 
However, he concludes that there is no answer to the question of what defines reasonableness in 
the realm of extended lifespan, so how then can we advocate for something that is unprincipled? 
The unknown boundaries of such technologies are but one problem, another being a 
consumeristic culture’s talent for generating ‘needs.’109 A consumer culture that fabricates new 
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needs only capable of being met by life extension or life improvement technologies will never be 
existentially or physically satisfied. Couched in different terms, Kass’s analysis suggests that 
there continues to be a cultural obsession with the functionality of the body as an indication of 
the good life or happiness. Merely prolonging the life in some state of health is perceived to be 
better than living in a condition of disease of less than optimal health, or worse having lived well 
and died. How then might aging be reconsidered so as to enable the aging person’s continual 
attainment of the good life in aging? 
 Attempting to find the good in the experience of aging in view of finitude, Kass outlines 
four benefits of mortality.110 He asks if an increase in lifespan would yield a commensurate rise 
or extension in happiness. In other words, if I were to live an extra percentage of my current 
projected lifespan would the same goods continue to generate the same amount of good or 
happiness in the additional segment of the lifespan? Assuming I experience an average physical 
decline that comes with age, will skiing be as enjoyable to me at 95 as it was at 65? Probably not 
as I might not be able to ski at 95 –  extending my lifespan from 65 to 95 may not necessarily 
bring about more good or more happiness. If the good life can be separated from an arbitrary 
number, and instead understood in terms of quality of life, moving to extend life ad infinitum 
may not appear so appealing. Seriousness and aspiration are Kass’s next benefit of mortality; 
together they emphasize the impact that one can have on this life and this world when there is a 
definitive, albeit unknown, end to this life. Mortality can serve as a motivating force by ensuring 
that everything individuals do and accomplish in life has more substantial meaning. “For most 
activities, and for most of us, I think it is crucial that we recognize and feel the force of not 
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having world enough and time”111 concludes Kass, even though there may be certain activities in 
life that do not require such motivation. Third, beauty and love bring about an appreciation that 
is contingent upon not knowing if one will experience such a sight or feeling ever again. 
Regarding love, he asks how deeply one could possibly love another knowing that there is no 
end in sight. Despite the harshness of such a hypothetical question, is it not true that the 
preciousness of time makes certain moments more profound than an otherwise timeless type of 
experience? Lastly, Kass addresses what he terms the beauty of human character: virtue and 
moral excellence. Mortality enables the individual to transcend creatureliness and act on behalf 
of “the good and noble.”112 If one were immortal, there would be no virtue, no pursuit of justice, 
or the good, according to Kass. Living authentically cannot be accomplished, according to Kass, 
without being aware of and accepting one’s finitude. He concludes his discussion of the four 
benefits:  
Mere continuance will not buy fulfillment. Worse, its pursuit threatens--already 
threatens--human happiness by distracting us from the goals toward which our souls 
naturally point. By diverting our aim, by misdirecting so much individual and social 
energy toward the goal of bodily immortality, we may seriously undermine our chances 
for living as well as we can and for satisfying to some extent, however incompletely, our 
deepest longings for what is best.113 
 
While the language and insight of Kass are noticeably different from the authors mentioned 
above, his contribution to the ‘aging as natural’ end of the biomedical ethical spectrum is 
important. He critiques the cultural denial of mortality and is cautious about the perceived 
relationship between medical technologies and the good life. Though it is possible to interpret his 
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work as that of a bioethicist who groups the Third Agers into the end-of-life category, the way in 
which he addresses mortality suggests otherwise. Instead of offering an underdeveloped ethics of 
dying well he speaks to the good that can be experienced in aging, and how the aging person 
may be able to achieve it. While the aging person must be aware of mortality, this does not mean 
that he or she should give in to mortality and never seek treatment. Negotiating the good life in 
aging is in part a question of medicine and medical technology, but aging well cannot be 
achieved solely through a diet, a medication, or a surgical intervention.114  
Aging As Disease 
While the authors addressed in this section can be categorized as believing that aging is a 
disease, it is important to note that there exists a wide array of perspectives within this school of 
thought. To say that aging is a disease means that there are pathologies that present during the 
aging process attributable to the aging process itself. For example, hypertension is assumed to 
happen to almost every Third Ager–outside of a real medical abnormality, one does not suffer 
hypertension as a teen or younger adult. It is this type of belief that a medical condition is a 
chronological inevitability that serves as the basis for the approach of those who believe aging is 
a disease. A majority of authors who view aging as a pathology contend that the pathological 
nature of aging establishes a moral imperative to treat, avoid, or cure aging. Two such 
individuals are Arthur Caplan and Peter Singer. 
A former associate director of the Hastings Center and widely published ethicist, Arthur 
Caplan currently serves as the founding director of the Division of Medical Ethics at New York 
University’s Langone Medical Center’s Department of Population Health. In a 2005 article, 
“Death As an Unnatural Process,” Caplan names the popular voices who oppose his 
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interpretation of the aging process, notably Callahan and Kass, and places the onus on them to 
explain their misguided understanding that aging is natural. Caplan argues that his critics’ 
opinion that aging is natural and not pathogenic contradicts the very definition of the type of 
change demonstrable change witnessed in aging. Such a change, he argues, “is inevitably defined 
as constituting any morbid process in the body,” where a morbid process is related to a diseased 
state of the body.115 These morbid changes are how the age of a corpse is determined by a 
coroner in an attempt to support his opinion that can only be classified as a disease. Disease, 
Caplan argues, is comprised of the following elements: 
One criterion is that the state or process produces discomfort or suffering. A second is 
that the process or state can be traced back to a specific cause, event, or circumstance. A 
third is that there is a set of clear-cut structural changes, both macroscopic and 
microscopic, that follows in a uniform, sequential manner subsequent to the initial 
precipitating or causal event. A fourth is that there is a set of clinical symptoms or 
manifestations (headache, pain in the chest, rapid pulse, shortness of breath) commonly 
associated with the observed physiological alterations in structure. Finally, there is 
usually some sort of functional impairment in the abilities, behavior, or activity or a 
person thought to be diseased.116  
 
Such an explanation of disease is not all that different from other widely accepted definitions of 
disease, i.e. Christopher Boorse.117 Caplan offers two caveats to this definition: there are always 
exceptions to the ways in which disease presents, and not all diseases will actually satisfy the 
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definition upon which his claims are based.118 Thus, there is in fact nothing ‘normal’ about 
aging, and that once one enters adulthood those conditions that are may otherwise seem natural 
are, in effect, diseases. However, these arguments are circular and seem to evade any ethical 
dimension of the question at hand. For this, we must turn to Caplan’s other works. 
In an essay entitled, “Is Aging a Disease,” Caplan articulates why there is a question as to 
whether or not aging might be considered natural. He explains that aging is common, and 
“occurs with a statistical frequency of one hundred percent.”119 Surely, Caplan has addressed a 
convenient way in which one can rationalize his or her thought that aging is natural–it happens to 
everyone, all the time, much like the above-mentioned statistic about mortality. However, this 
simple approach to the argument is insufficient and not the primary culprit in the eyes of Caplan. 
Instead, he focuses on other more powerful notions that underlie those with whom he disagrees. 
Those other ideas supporting the naturalness of aging are “design, purpose, and function.”120 
Quickly he dismisses the design argument by offering examples of tools and bodily organs being 
capable of doing that for which they were not designed. Thus, purpose and function remain as 
arguments to be defeated. Purpose in aging, he believes, has theological or philosophical roots, 
and given the Judeo-Christian history of the US, it would make sense that many people would 
hold a belief that God’s designing the aging process established aging as part of the natural 
process of life. As a result of this perspective, the aging process and its effects are widely, albeit 
unwittingly, seen as reminders of human frailty, fallibility, and mortality. Caplan concludes that 
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despite the popularity of such a theological conviction, it carries no weight in the medical 
profession and should be cast aside as a baseless argument meant to undermine the pathogenic 
essence of aging. However, Caplan overlooks the importance of such deeply embedded cultural 
convictions, and his response is dismissive rather than critical or engaging. To say that because a 
belief related to one’s perspective on health care is irrelevant or inconsequential because it comes 
from a theological tradition undermines a majority of biomedical ethical texts and makes Caplan 
appear unprepared to address this important component of bioethics. Finding a purpose and 
understanding one’s function, as has been shown above, are integral in most discussions of aging 
and aging well, yet Caplan dismisses them because their roots are in a religious or philosophical 
tradition.  
In addition to Caplan, a prominent voice in biomedical ethics belongs to Peter Singer. 
The utilitarian ethicist widely known for his positions on animal rights, controversial views on 
third trimester abortions, and stem-cell research, has recently taken strides in promoting the 
rhetoric of aging as disease and a Promethean response. In that article Singer argues that the 
aging process limits an individual’s capacity for happiness and capacity to contribute to the 
happiness of others over time. “So, instead of targeting specific diseases that are much more 
likely to occur when people have reached a certain age, wouldn’t a better strategy be to attempt 
to forestall or repair the damage done to our bodies by the aging process?”121 Singer believes that 
anti-aging technology will improve both in efficacy and availability across the socioeconomic 
spectrum, a preposterous claim given the current state of healthcare distribution. Of course, there 
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exists the possibility that over time life-extension technology will become more widely available 
and perhaps accessible as the supply-demand curve flattens, but critics remain rightly skeptical. 
 In a 1991 essay, “Research into Aging: Should it be Guided by the Interests of Present 
Individuals, Future Individuals, or the Species,” Singer argues that the aggregated utility or 
happiness of the population would be hurt by a radical extension of the lifespan. Singer poses a 
hypothetical scenario in which a scientist is ready to test a new medication that drastically retards 
the aging process to the point when a person can live to 150 while maintaining the happiness or 
utility of the average 60 or 70-year-old. Should society encourage this research? At the time of 
writing, Singer believed that from a utilitarian perspective it would be better to have a smaller 
group of people with a higher level of utility than a larger group with a lower average level of 
utility. In other words, it is best to have 10 aging persons with a happiness level of 8 (on a scale 
of 1-10, 10 being the highest) than 25 aging persons with a happiness level of 7. While more 
people may experience some happiness in the latter, the greatest amount of happiness is higher in 
the former. Thus, it would be best to avoid the hypothetical development of a medicinal 
technology that could increase the number of individuals living into very old age for the sake of 
their aggregated happiness. However, what if it was the case that the technology commensurately 
improved happiness with age as modern research suggests? Then we can see how a shift in 
perspective is possible for Singer. 
 Adding the fruits of modern anti-aging research to the hypothetical scenario outlined 
above might urge Singer to change his conclusion. Research shows that humans can potentially 
live better (read: younger feeling) lives later in life. If this were the case then Singer would have 
to approve of such technology being widely used, for it would not diminish the overall happiness 
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of the whole. For Singer, there is no question as to whether or not age should be combatted–it 
must so because it poses a threat to an individual’s happiness regardless of whether he or she is 
in the Third or Fourth Age. What anti-aging scientists have shown is that there is a real 
possibility of being able to ensure a better quality of life for those living into radically later years 
(i.e. 80s-early 100s) than those individuals would have had in their 60s. It becomes slightly 
clearer then that with such an improvement in collective happiness, there is nothing wrong with 
seeking to extend life, other than the effects of indefinite life-extension technologies on a cultural 
denial of mortality in the face of scare medical resources. This, however, seems to not be a 
concern of Singer per se. Singer at least minimally concerns himself with one’s ability to 
contribute to the happiness of others, so presumably the increase in quality of life and life years 
would enable an individual to contribute to the happiness of others. However, entirely 
overlooked is any discussion of what life-extension therapies mean for the rest of society 
regarding the distribution of scarce medial resources, the allocation of research dollars, and who 
will be afforded the opportunity to live a radically longer life.  
 It would be unfair to characterize either Caplan or Singer as suggesting that they 
absolutize life.122 However, the manner in which each approaches the issue of aging does point 
to a trend that is best not understood as absolutizing life, but rather as absolutizing optimal health, 
which, interpreted for the aging, returns to the functional understanding of the person. By 
focusing on the pathogenic dimensions of aging, both authors suggest that it is returning the body 
to ‘normal’ or maintaining ‘average’ levels of functioning that should be valued. Perhaps the 
aging are victims of coincidence given that achieving optimal health somehow becomes 
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increasingly difficult as one ages, but being viewed and described in terms of their physical and 
cognitive function is no coincidence. The mechanistic understanding of the body and 
subsequently of the aging body and its ability to achieve a healthy and good life has been 
incorporated, knowingly or not, into segments of medicine and medical ethics. Again, this is not 
to say that the functional aspect of the human body should be pushed aside in favor of a purely 
abstract formulation of the good life; instead, it is to highlight how such a reductionist approach 
can and has been damaging to how two professional disciplines talk about and conceptualize the 
question of aging well. Furthermore, this view of the aging person as aging body as deficient and 
unproductive feeds into other narratives to be addressed in chapter two that, when studied 
together, reveal a rather troubling cultural image of aging and how to age well. The health-
related information one receives is an important part of aging well, and does not change much as 
one matures. ‘Take care of yourself, watch what you are eating, only drink in moderation, try to 
walk at least 30 minutes per day,’ are mentioned in conversations that Third Agers had in their 
20s with the same goal in mind: age well. In the Third Age, however, aging well requires 
different attention to health and is generally accompanied by a different type of lifestyle 
complete with its own psychological adjustments.  
Women, Medical Ethics, And Aging 
 In the introduction to Mother Time: Women Aging and Ethics, Margaret Urban Walker 
explains that more research concerned with “gendered effects of aging on moral standing for 
both men and women, on interactions of aging with other factors that define social privilege or 
devaluation,”123 is necessary so as to not continue to impose a distinct moral risk on women. 
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That moral risk concerns the dignity, agency, and identity of women, and is a risk that can only 
be adequately identified and addressed by women.124  
 Given the influence of the work of Callahan, it is worth making note of a direct retort to 
his Setting Limits by Nora Bell. She argues that Callahan overlooks how age-based rationing will 
disproportionately impact women. Because “the so-called ‘frontier’ of old age extends endlessly 
for many more women than men,”125 women who would have normally lived longer will bear the 
brunt of Callahan’s proposed rationing.  
Of the many issues taken up by Bell, her primary concern remains Callahan’s lack of 
attention to the experiences of aging women, with the exception of his attention to women as 
caregivers in later life. Her critique is specifically of Callahan’s notion of a tolerable death,126 
and is directed toward its tri-partite definition: 
A tolerable death is this: the individual event of death at that stage in a lifespan when (a) 
one’s life possibilities have on the whole been accomplished; (b) one’s moral obligations 
to those for whom one has had responsibility have been discharged; and (c) one’s death 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
124 Walker, Mother Time, 2. 
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126 Callahan’s “Age, Sex, and Resource Allocation” in Mother Time was written after Bell’s critique of tolerable 
death and is therefore not part of Bell’s comments. In “Age, Sex, and Resource Allocation,” Callahan takes up the 
question of rearranging the health care system in the face of rationing (not the question of a tolerable death per se) so 
as to better take care of the elderly, both men and women alike. While resource allocation is not necessarily the 
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issues of unjust distribution, but does note that the improvements to the health and health care of the elderly can be 
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However, he does not fully back off of his age-based rationing in health care despite the known differences among 
elderly men and women in terms of longevity and resource consumption. He maintains that elderly women will 
disproportionately need more medical care than men, and while this is problematic, endless pursuit of medical 
technologies, even if they do benefit women, cannot be continued at the risk of sacrificing the quality of care for all 
other members of society.   
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will not seem to others an offense to sense or sensibility, or tempt others to despair and 
rage at the finitude of human existence.127 
 
First, Bell considers the possibilities women have been offered in light of the fact that the 
possibilities themselves were constrained by sexist and ageist norms and practices. She argues 
that while Callahan’s push toward a biographical understanding of life is a refreshing change, it 
proves to be counterintuitive and instead devalues women’s concerns and reduces the 
possibilities of a woman to “servile functions.”128 This point resonates with the broader critique 
that the visions of aging well offered by many authors are those of serving others, but Bell’s 
contention is that the serving, let alone the type of service, that women are expected to do is 
inherently degrading. The biographical definition of life is limiting insofar as the range of 
experiences for women are vastly different than those of men, resulting in an externally imposed 
handicap that trivializes any meaningful experience a woman may have, and likely will have by 
virtue of her living longer than her male counterpart. There is more to be experienced by women 
than men can even conceptualize because of their inability to see a woman as independent and 
having a longer lifespan. Bell’s comments on Callahan’s second point raise a practical question 
to this very day–if women live longer than men, and women have been in the work force for a 
shorter amount of time, how does the public view an older woman’s consumption of resources, 
medical and financial, if she no longer has responsibilities to anyone but herself? The woman, 
then, becomes the primary subject of Callahan’s limiting schema.129 Bell considers Callahan’s 
remark that death resulting from discrimination or indifference is unconscionable, but remains 
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unconvinced that this parenthetical comment will influence the way in which the needs of 
women will or will not be met. The final and most confusing quality of Callahan’s tolerable 
death causes Bell to reflect on whether or not the death of an elderly woman can ever not 
engender some sort of rage or despair. “Abuse, neglect, and exploitation include failing to 
provide the ill and fragile with minimal medical care, medication, and hospitalization,”130 a 
problem that will assuredly affect women more than men if the age for rationing, as suggests 
Callahan, is based on the life expectancy of men. Fairness in healthcare allocation cannot be 
differentiated into fairness for some and not for all, a problem Bell believes Callahan does not 
address. Bell ends her critique with these profound words, “appealing to an age standard will 
make the deaths of women premature in every sense of the word,”131 and for that reason, there 
remains the need for a feminist critique of biomedical ethics in general, but specifically as it 
concerns the aging population.  
 In addition to targeted critiques, feminist voices in medical ethics are needed to help craft 
a vision of aging that navigates the space between ‘aging as natural’ and ‘aging as disease.’ Bell 
provides but one reminder that there are and will continue to be problems unique to women that 
require special attention. “In the US, women are twice as likely as are men to seek prevention 
services,” and as a consequence of a patriarchal culture, women are “negatively and 
stereotypically portrayed as whiners, complainers, and hypochondriacs.”132 Still, there are 
benefits from frequent contact with physicians despite what might be said of a woman’s frequent 
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visits to her primary care physician. It is known that women have a higher frequency of acute 
trauma, physical illness, and are diagnosed with more chronic diseases than men, but what might 
not be known is that women “perceive their health to be poorer and have greater rates of 
disability.”133 If some women already feel as though their health is in poor, the fact that the 
medical profession uses a standard metric that does not account for the individual experience of 
aging and that there is a widely held belief about age hastening a decline in health do not help 
women feel any better. An additional area of difference rests in the changes in menopause. 
Perhaps it is here that the feminine voice is capable of speaking to the discussion of natural 
versus pathogenic given the ways in which menopause has been reconsidered in recent years. 
Menopause has come to signify a developmental or social change in the woman that correlates to 
other personal, social, and economic aspects of the woman’s life that very well may not have 
anything to do with the physiological changes of menopause. Changes based on age have 
become part of a so-called “menopausal syndrome,”134 that marks the end of a ‘normal life’ and 
the beginning of a soon-to and always-to-be diseased life of the Third and later Fourth Age. 
Linda Gannon provides a summary of how what is normal for aging men is abnormal for women 
because of causal links made to menopause:  
In women, however, these are not regarded as diseases but as manifestations of an 
underlying disease process – the disease being femaleness. In aging men, osteoporosis is 
the purview of bone specialists, cardiovascular disorders of cardiologists, mood swings of 
psychologists, Alzheimer’s disease of neurologists, and all such disorders are treated with 
specific medications and/or advice on lifestyle modifications. In aging women, these 
disorders, as well as others, are deemed the consequence of menopausal hormonal 
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changes, and all are readily treated by a gynecologist who is likely to recommend 
hormone therapy as a panacea.135 
 
The commingling of menopause, disease, and aging136 creates the space for other pathologies 
typically associated with women to be assigned a gender despite their occurrence in both sexes 
and at all ages. Gannon argues that osteoporosis is one such condition that is all too often only 
associated with aging women. “Osteoporosis is not a disorder associated with menopause,” she 
concludes, but rather a disorder that affects any person whose “lifestyle[s] preclude healthy 
bone.”137 It is important to note that scientific138 research has revealed a fundamental disconnect 
between menopause and overall health–women who are postmenopausal are generally less likely 
to suffer from diseases than younger women. While it remains true that certain disease may 
present later in life for women it is unfair and inaccurate to correlate the hormonal changes of 
menopause to declining health or to label a postmenopausal woman as one who will assuredly 
suffer from a list of diseases or chronic conditions.139  
In addition to the problems addressed by Bell and Gannon, the defining of health as it 
pertains to women is problematic. The WHO140 has an ever-expanding definition of health that 
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makes the determination of an individual’s health increasingly difficult. A feminist notion of 
health would look to include the characteristics of physical and mental wellbeing, but it would 
also include social and psychological wellbeing so as to more closely resemble what the WHO 
believes to be healthy. However, it remains to be seen how medical professionals could 
adequately judge one’s social health as a dimension of overall health. Still, taking into 
consideration the ways in which women’s health results from myriad factors and the manner in 
which it is treated (differently than men), brings to the table a necessary conversation partner for 
the currently held positions in medical ethics regarding aging women. 
Conclusion 
 At that end of a long historical and medical assessment of the question of health and 
healthy aging at least two themes emerge: first, the good life in aging has historically been and 
continues to be linked to a functional understanding of the body and mind; and, that the good life 
in aging tends to oblige aging persons to perform an act or series of acts in order to find 
fulfillment or achieve a sense of completeness. To a lesser degree, the chapter has also revealed 
the tendency within medicine and medical ethics to associate the aging person with the 
discussion of the elderly or end-of-life questions. Modern medicine explains how it is that 
humans might be judged to be healthy or not, but reduces wellbeing to categories of anatomical, 
physiological, and biological health, overlooking what other disciplines have highlighted as 
integral to the wellbeing of a person in general, and the aging person in particular. 
 The functional assessment of the good life began with Hippocrates, but somewhere along 
the way health and the good life became separated. However, the functional or mechanistic 
interpretation of health remained prominent within medicine and found its way into parts of 
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gerontology and medical ethics. Medicine focusing on how the body works is not inherently 
problematic, but retrieving medicine’s moral dimension that health is integral to the good life 
and finding that health is limited to the way the body and mind work limits what an ethics of 
again can glean from a tradition that should more wholly inform such an ethic. Emphasizing the 
functionality of the body paves the way for a model of productive or successful aging that 
obliges aging persons to be of service to others, or, more broadly, contribute to society. In order 
to age well, then, the aging are told by some gerontologists that so long as the body and mind are 
functioning at an adequate level, the good life can be achieved after he or she does something for 
someone else. Attention to the health of the aging person is highlighted in the medical ethics 
literature. Whether it come from the ‘aging as natural’ or ‘aging as disease,’ the message from 
medical ethicists is that aging will always come with a decline in health; the only difference is in 
how to respond. This further supports the notion that the optimal functioning of the body and 
mind are all that matter when it comes to aging well. However, an ethics of aging cannot be 
based on the medical question ‘what does your health enable you to do,’ alone nor can it make 
the corollary claim, ‘because you are healthy you should/must do…in order to achieve the good 
life in aging” because it reduces the good life to being physically or mentally capable of 
performing a task. An ethics of aging will, of course, include health, but its focus will extend 
beyond this chapter’s descriptions of aging well.  
Regarding the relationship between the aging and the end-of-life, much of the medical 
history shows that lifespan was such that today’s Third Ager was much closer to death than just 
another phase of life in previous eras. Granted that longevity has changed, it is plausible that the 
connection between adulthood and death facilitated today’s conceptions about the aging person 
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as the frail elderly. Looking to developmental psychology first, it is clear that Erikson leaves 
open the possibility for adding sub-stages of adulthood prior to the final stage of development, 
yet this is nothing with which Erikson concerns himself – there may be developmental changes, 
but nothing in Erikson suggests that there are real discernible differences between his 45-year-
old adult and 64-year-old adult, but there is between the 45-year-old and the 85-year-old. 
Gerontologists attempt to peer into that empty space left by Erikson, but the primary concern of 
gerontology remains the study of how people age and what might be helpful or hurtful in that 
process. The difference between the aging person and the elderly person is not parsed out 
entirely, but gerontological literature at least allows for further separation to be made. Medical 
ethicists on the side of aging as natural completely overlook the aging population and instead 
focus on the elderly, those facing the end of life, for the most part. Whatever good comes out of 
the belief that aging is natural is undermined by the lack of attention to the distinctions between 
the aging person and the older person who happens to be near death – a common problem in 
bioethical discourse. Biomedical ethicists who espouse the views of aging as pathogenic 
diminish the value of the aging life by suggesting that the goal of aging well is to continue to live 
and overcome whatever might make the aging process challenging. Feminist voices critique 
notions of health generated out of male experience and founded upon data that is decidedly male-
oriented, and they take up the task of separating aging from disease by further investigating the 
aging process. The male-centered investigation, unfortunately, strengthens the connection 
between aging and the elderly/end-of-life. What is most troubling about the way in which the 
aging person is considered may stem from the influence of Erikson’s schema and the language 
used by medical ethicists.  
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 As has been explained, Erikson’s model does not provide enough on its own for an ethics 
of aging. Thus, it is necessary to explore the possibility of sub-stages within Adulthood, sub-
stages that cannot be reduced to the struggle between generativity and stagnation. If Adulthood 
truly is the generational link, there must be something of meaning and value beyond the achieved 
strengths of care (Stage 7) and wisdom (Stage 8). It is implausible to suggest that the period 
between one’s fifties and eighties (Adulthood) can adequately be interpreted through one 
developmental phase given the experiences of that group, let alone today’s changing 
demography. This problem points to the larger critique leveled against Erikson and the 
developmental approach. The vagueness of the stages may be appealing to some as a general 
outline of psychosocial development, but the abstraction tends to reveal the “inherent 
fuzziness”141 in evaluating individual behavior. The stages themselves are vague in not 
identifying a specific age range, but also unclear regarding the terms (psychosocial crises and 
strengths) of each stage. While this more abstract and universally applicable approach is 
oftentimes seen as a strength of Erikson’s theory cross-culturally, the generic Western 
experiences upon which he bases the stages are largely insufficient. More importantly, the 
vagaries of the stages can be seen as establishing a rather simplistic view of the aging 
experience. The strength achieved after stage 7, care, can mislead the aging person into believing 
that his or her psychosocial conflict can be solved with a new type of productive role in society. 
Similarly, the 8th stage’s strength of wisdom suggests that the life experience of the sweeping 
range of adulthood can only be fulfilled when the individual has passed through the penultimate 
developmental phase. There must be an in between period, perhaps a sub-phase of Stage 7 that 
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more adequately addresses the significant real-life changes experienced by the aging person: the 
transition out of the work place and into so-called leisure time, the changing role within the 
family structure, the shift in social or community involvement, and the recognition of mortality 
in the face of the body’s changes.  
These same limitations regarding Erikson’s contributions to the good life in aging apply 
to Tornstam’s model of gerotranscendence. He does not explain with any precision what 
gerotranscendence entails and how the aging individual might practice it so as to continue to 
move toward or realize the good life. Yet, the work of Erikson and Tornstam are integral in 
reminding the aging individual that aging itself need not get in the way of achieving the good 
life. The two actually suggest that as one develops through the later years, achieving the good 
life becomes easier to a certain extent. Of additional import is that Erikson and the gerontologists 
provide enough distance between aging and the end-of-life that the stages of development are not 
so closely associated with mortality. This added benefit of developmental psychology and 
gerontology can aid in nuancing the biomedical ethical discourse by further separating aging 
from disease and also offering something to be achieved in aging that might mitigate the 
sometimes-nihilistic views of the aging as natural advocates. 
 Within medical ethics the fundamental problem of not considering the Third Age as a 
separate group worthy of a focused ethic. Instead, most or all aging persons are lumped together 
with the elderly, a group that is very much different in demographic make-up and medical need–
to be aging does not mean to be actively dying or near death. In Callahan and Daniels, we see 
that the only context in which the aging person is considered is that of the very old or elderly 
person who has chronic disease or faces the woes of end-of-life care. Callahan’s age-based 
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rationing is a prime example in that he is not addressing the Third Age, rather those who are so 
close to the end-of-life that offering them more healthcare could be construed as futile for one 
reason or another. Callahan and Daniels do not address the needs of today’s 65-year-old or even 
75-year-old; instead their focus is on the old person who is near death. Regardless of the time in 
which it was written, the correlation between an older age and death underscores the way in 
which aging persons are considered. Though they represent the other end of the spectrum, 
Caplan and Singer, in their advocacy for life extension technologies and the overcoming of the 
disease of aging, also reduce aging to a process that only progresses toward sickness and death. 
The Third Age, in either school of thought, possesses no distinct value and only exists in relation 
to the end. Given changes in longevity, advances in technology, and other shifts in the lives of 
aging persons, it is fair to say that Callahan and Caplan alike are wrong, not only about age-
based rationing and extending life ad infinitum, but also fundamentally wrong in their premise 
that aging persons are either healthy adults or frail and sickly elderly persons facing the end of 
life. The problem is not only one of the language used when it comes to the aging person, but 
also one of uncovering a substantive meaning of the good life for the aging person. A concept of 
the good life that is not immediately concerned with mortality is needed to develop a more 
appropriate ethics of aging. The Third Age, like any other period of life is natural, and, however 
fluid if referring to individual experiences, like the other stages should be treated as one 
particular stage in the context of the lifespan. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SOCIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF AGING AND LIVING WELL 
 
Introduction 
The good life in aging is as much informed by medicine and gerontology as it is by the 
very context in which those notions are mediated. Much of what is absorbed into the cultural 
context from medicine and gerontology is the relationship between the functional and productive 
body with the good life. Without a healthy body and mind, one cannot age well, and it is upon 
this functionalist notion of aging well that the American cultural response is built. Consumer 
culture pervades the very fabric of that social landscape which promotes varying notions of aging 
well. While it is not the purpose of this chapter to examine in detail the specific cultural 
influences on medicine and medical ethics vis-à-vis the good life in aging, it is important to note 
that what will follow regarding the impact consumer culture can have on an individual is not all 
that different than its effect on medicine and medical ethics. Pierre Bourdieu identifies the effect 
of one’s culture on an individual’s conception of the self and manner in which one moves toward 
self-actualization as the habitus of a given society. He explains the term as “a system of lasting 
transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a 
matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of 
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infinitely diversified tasks.”1 As much as the habitus affects an individual’s socio-cultural life 
and understanding of the self, so too are the social institutions to which one is exposed similarly 
informed. In the US, Bourdieu’s matrix of perception comprises political liberalism and free 
market capitalism, both of which, overtly and subliminally, esteem individual liberty. The 
individual, fully aware or not, acts in response to this framework built upon individual liberty 
that has very much penetrated the core of American identity. The ‘good American life’ is the 
individually-lived life to a certain extent—the good life is achieved through the individual’s hard 
work alone. The productive person has already been suggested as the one who is best suited to 
age well at least in terms of serving future generations, but the value of an individual who is 
productive must be explored further. In an economic sense, production in part means 
contributing through one’s work, which requires a certain level of functional health. However, 
one’s contribution to the economy and society can also be measured by what one consumes and 
what type of value one adds to society. For the aging person, the Third Age transition is mostly 
away from the work contribution and into alternative interpretations of productivity. Still, being 
productive, whether that be in the work place or being able to consume the goods advertised as 
essential to the good life, presumes an ability to function. That functioning, however, because of 
the American matrix of perceptions, not only implies but also requires that one does so 
independently. Accordingly, exploring the complicated history of independence is necessary 
when considering an ethics of aging.  
Of the many discourses in which individual liberty or autonomy remains a central value, 
biomedical ethics provides a unique example of the manner in which the politico-philosophical 
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history of autonomy in the US has taken on a life of its own as it has evolved within the habitus 
of consumer culture. Thus, I will first explore the most prominent example of autonomy’s value 
in biomedical ethics and then move to trace the historical contours of its entanglement with 
consumer culture. The prominence of autonomy as a central value in American culture led to a 
change in how the good life was to be understood, but for the purposes of the dissertation that 
shift will only be considered in light of consumer culture. A rather vague term, it is worth noting 
what is meant by consumer culture here: a culture that “is organized around the consumption and 
display of commodities through which individuals gain prestige, identity, and standing.”2 Such a 
culture is additionally capable of altering the very meaning of goods, further complicating the 
matrix in which the aging person acts and is acted upon. This capacity to change the meaning 
and value of goods suggests that identifying a more fixed understanding of the good life in aging 
is at least difficult if not impossible. A notion of aging well, contingent upon evolving socio-
cultural values that are expressed in various social images and norms, requires both the 
recognition of the social milieu and a way forward.  
The Historical Context of American Autonomy 
As seen in the first chapter, medicine tends to focus on measurable physical and 
mental/cognitive metrics that mark standard or substandard levels of health, which indicate 
whether or not one is or is not living or capable of living the good life. Medicine generally 
concludes that if an aging person demonstrates healthy functioning then the individual is living 
well. There is little to no consideration of the other factors that determine one’s health let alone 
the other influences that contribute to one’s overall wellbeing. Some medical ethicists suggest 
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that the longer one lives the less likely one is to live in a condition of being able to experience 
the good life. Absent from the first chapter’s biomedical ethical discussion was the role played 
by the principle of autonomy in the satisfaction of the good life in aging. As a principle within 
biomedical ethics, autonomy has a history that is not born out of medicine or medical ethics; 
instead, it is a principle that precedes the emergence of biomedical ethics, a principle that is far 
more reliant upon the political and philosophical history of that term and its particularly 
American cultural context. For the aging person, the principle of autonomy espoused in 
biomedical ethics is not only about patient choice, but also about its place in the broader 
conceptualization of the good life in America. 
Within biomedical ethics, the principles-based framework outlined by Tom Beauchamp 
and James Childress represents the preeminent, or at least a widely popular interpretation of 
autonomy, in the American context. Principlism, as it is commonly known, attempts to address 
the difficulty of decision-making processes within the biomedical ethical realm by offering a set 
of duty-values to be adjudicated in any case. Within this framework, outlined in Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp, professor of philosophy and senior research scholar at the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, and Childress, professor of ethics and 
director of the Institute for Practical Ethics and Public Life at the University of Virginia, identify 
the four principles to be used in resolving such dilemmas: Beneficence, Nonmaleficence, Justice, 
and Autonomy. Both beneficence and nonmaleficence are physician-oriented in that each place 
upon the physician the duty to work toward promoting the welfare of the patient while avoiding 
directly causing harm respectively. Moving to broader questions of healthcare delivery, 
Beauchamp and Childress turn to the question of justice, but submit that there is no single 
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approach to justice that is suitable for addressing the numerous problems that may arise in 
healthcare allocation. Questions of access to health care tend to emphasize egalitarian 
approaches to justice while specific instances of allocation employ more utilitarian thinking.3 
Lastly, Beauchamp and Childress begin their discussion of autonomy with a rather 
straightforward etymological explanation of the term, citing its Greek meaning of self-
rule/governance/law, defining it as encompassing “at a minimum, self-rule that is free from both 
controlling interference by others and from certain limitations such as inadequate understanding 
that prevents meaningful choice.”4 That self-rule means being able to hold a view, make choices, 
and act based on that which the individual values. The four principles aid in relevant decision-
making scenarios, and in identifying four components of living well. 
Central to the vision of Beauchamp and Childress is the moral significance of these 
principles in ensuring that the good of the patient is achieved in a medical context. Each 
principle attempts to present what the authors assert as normative claims indicative of a common 
(American) morality, though the context is limited to biomedical ethics. Being responsible to 
promote the welfare of another individual suggests that care and wellbeing are both central to 
one’s ability to achieve the good life. Beneficence requires that individuals be cared for 
physically and mentally, and that care be more broadly construed as access rather than simply the 
clinical setting. Similarly, nonmaleficence indicates that living well requires protection against 
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harm – the health of the body and mind are to be safeguarded so as to protect the aging person 
from factors that might impede his or her fulfillment of the good life. Having fair access to health 
care resources and being afforded necessary resources formalizes beneficence and 
nonmaleficence in the public sphere – it is fair that all individuals be given the opportunity to 
obtain the services requisite to good health. The good health of the individual understood in this 
framework continues in the tradition of others in such a way that physical and mental health are 
essential to if not the primary components of the good life. Beneficence and nonmaleficence are 
intended to protect the optimal functioning of the individual so that he or she can live well. 
Claims about justice are relevant only insofar as they facilitate the functioning of the body and 
mind – they do not appear to have philosophical value unto themselves. Lastly, autonomy means 
that individuals are to be respected as self-directing persons capable of choosing how they wish 
to live. The ability to choose one’s life plan and move toward it, specifically in a medical 
context, establishes the implicit primacy of autonomy within the framework of principlism – the 
good life is known to the aging person, and beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice function to 
support the agent’s autonomous fulfilment of that plan. However, Beauchamp and Childress 
argue that only when all four are upheld or equitably weighed in the decision or policy-making 
process of biomedicine is the totality of the good life considered. However, the principle of 
autonomy occupies a unique position among the four given the history from which it emerged. 
As the preeminent value in American culture, autonomy’s place in biomedical ethics is 
commensurately privileged as the primary principle toward which patients, physicians, and other 
health care workers look for guidance. “Respect for the autonomous choices of persons,” argue 
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Beauchamp and Childress, “runs as deep in common morality as any principle.”5 While this may 
resonate with most, the priority of autonomy, albeit unintended by Beauchamp and Childress,6 
has caused disagreement among biomedical ethicists about how and why autonomy should be 
valued over and against other ethical principles and the competing values of health care 
professionals and/or cultural values of patients. As Martha Holstein et al argue, it is “because this 
practice [applying abstract principles as rules in decision-making contexts] emerged in the 
American context, where individualism is central to national self-identity”7 that, quickly, 
autonomy was unofficially crowned the most important principle despite the Beauchamp and 
Childress’s repeated claims that it was equal to the others. 
Although each of their principles can be seen as contributing to the good life, autonomy 
undergirds all three. Beneficence, note Beauchamp and Childress, is part of their basic 
understanding of morality that requires individuals to be treated as individuals capable of making 
their own choices, of determining their own lives, and determining how a course of medical 
treatment contributes to or detracts from one’s welfare.8 By avoiding doing harm to patients, 
nonmaleficence presumes the capacity for autonomy, thus serving as a minimum or threshold 
when it comes to preserving the rights of individuals. Justice presumes autonomy insofar as the 
desired good is articulated by the individual in question or is related to an established health 
                                                
5 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles, 99. 
 
6 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles, 99. The authors maintain while the first principle appearing in the text is 
autonomy it is not an indication of their opinion on the moral priority of autonomy. They argue that while their 
“critics suggest that the principle for respect for autonomy overrides all other moral considerations,” their work is in 
no way “excessively individualistic.”  
 
7 Holstein, Martha B., Jennifer A. Parks, and Mark H. Waymack. Ethics, Aging, and Society: The Critical Turn. 
(New York, NY: Springer Publishing Company, 2001), 8. 
  
8 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles, 197. 
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threshold. The good to be satisfied also belongs to the individual patient, not necessarily to the 
collective whole. So, what then is meant by the principle of autonomy that plays such a 
prominent role in biomedical ethical discourse and practice, and that serves to ground the other 
three principles outlined by Beauchamp and Childress? To answer this question, it is worth 
looking into the historical development of autonomy in America.  
Autonomy In American History 
Firmly fixed in American identity, individual liberty has a history that extends farther 
back than its articulation in the founding documents of the nation. Its prominent placement 
within those documents established individual liberty as a foremost American value and indeed 
identified a fundamental American characteristic. Individual freedom was the very essence of the 
newly formed nation’s struggle for independence, and it was the clear path to establishing the 
good life. Independence was protected by a series of positive and negative freedoms that, when 
codified, concretized the essence of being American. Those freedoms, understood as 
fundamental rights, permeated all areas of social interaction and became the cornerstone of 
American enterprise, integral in the expansion and innovation of commerce. Precisely how 
individual liberty transitioned from being an identifying characteristic, however, to a value unto 
itself requires an examination of not only the founding texts of the nation, but also the context 
from which they were born and continued to evolve. 
Liberty, defined as the state or condition of being free, is personal and political in the 
Declaration of Independence. As much as the Declaration is about the freedom one sovereign 
nation has from external political control, it is also about the freedom(s) of the individual 
members of that sovereign nation. The sovereignty both of the nation and the individual are, 
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according to the Declaration, founded in nature and divine will. When the Declaration lists 
divinely-inspired truths, which also happen to be self-evident, such as life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness, the individual is given sufficient space for interpreting what constitutes an 
infringement upon his or her sovereignty. The relationship between those truths is most pertinent 
to the discussion here.  
The interpretation of the order of these words can perhaps begin to shed light on the link 
established between liberty and the good life. Perhaps it is the case that the first two terms are 
requisite for the fulfillment of the third: Without one’s life or health, one cannot exercise one’s 
liberty, and therefore, cannot pursue happiness. This causal relationship places one’s health as a 
foundational characteristic, a minimum condition making the good life possible. Another 
interpretation could be such that one’s possessing life and liberty being about a state of 
happiness: When one is healthy and free, one is happy. Here, being a healthy and free individual 
automatically establish a state of happiness. In either case, both the health and liberty of the 
individual are essential to the good life. Though the proposed relationship among those qualities 
is speculative, the influence of these rights on American policy and social and cultural norms is 
not. The Constitution carries these American principles forward into a more robust and 
comprehensive articulation. 
Continuing in the spirit of the American Revolution and the contemporaneous spread of 
anti-monarchy/pro-liberty political movements, the Constitution set out to organize the new 
American government with the goal of “promoting the general welfare, and securing the 
blessings of liberty.”9 Upon completion of the statutes regulating the branches of government 
                                                
9 United States Constitution. Preamble to the Bill of Rights. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution. 
Accessed February 21, 2016.  
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and their respective processes and responsibilities, the Constitution moves into the more widely 
known series of positive and negative freedoms, namely the Bill of Rights. It outlines how it is 
that the welfare of the populace shall be protected through a series of liberties. An exemplary list 
of such liberties appears in the First Amendment,10 which affirms an individual’s right to speak 
his or her mind, to openly practice any or no faith, to gather peacefully, and to have recourse to 
action should those freedoms be constrained in any capacity. Those freedoms as well as the 
claims regarding individual liberty in the general sense above and property, outlined in both the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, have come to symbolize the core of American identity. Yet, 
these liberties do not come with any justification beyond being touted as self-evident. The move 
from self-evident rights claims to the real-life manifestation of those freedoms was made 
possible by a political and philosophical context amenable to such a transition. Much of that 
context was informed by classical liberal thought.  
A primary philosophical influence in early America was the classical liberal thought of 
John Locke. He adopts Thomas Hobbes’ starting point of individual freedom and the pursuit of 
self-interest by invoking the language of ‘state of nature.’11 While Locke relies heavily on 
Hobbes in this regard, specifically on the question of moral individualism, Locke differs on the 
question of political individualism, which is apparent in his Two Treatises on Civil Government. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
10 US Constitution. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably 
assemble; and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” https://www.archives.gov/founding-
docs/constitution. Accessed February 21, 2016.  
 
11 Thomas Hobbes. “Leviathan” in Ethical Theories: A book of readings. 2d, with revisions. ed. (Englewood, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1967), 138. Hobbes outlines the state of nature as one of conflict noting that all individuals are 
inherently self-interested and that only in an effort to secure one’s self-interest does an individual cede his or her 
freedom in the form of a social contract. An essential feature of the individual, liberty serves to both keep the 
individual free from external restraint and enable him or her to choose how it is that he or she wishes to live. Any 
influence that diminishes an individual’s ability to do what he or she would do must be removed or at least 
mitigated. 
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Locke illustrates the way in which the political enslavement of the monarchical structure 
contravenes the natural order. Locke argues all individuals are born into “a state of perfect 
freedom” that enables them to direct their actions and to “dispose of their possessions and 
persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or 
depending upon the will of any other man.”12 Later appearing in the founding documents, 
Locke’s language of natural law connects individual sovereignty to the divine, establishing that 
the limits capable of being placed upon an individual’s free will and liberty cannot come from 
the “inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.”13 Here Locke shows that 
autonomy is essential to the individual, and history has shown that this claim, in relation to the 
good life, would only be fortified over time.  
Upon grounding autonomy in a divine right or the natural law, Locke moves toward 
another facet of Enlightenment discourse – the role of reason and its relationship to freedom. 
Reason is the power by which the individual is capable of expressing his or her own freedom, 
that that use of reason “is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by.”14 The 
capacity to reason to such an extent that the individual does not need to consent to the rules or 
laws of an external authority further supports Locke’s claims against forms of government that 
work toward undermining autonomy. No government can dictate how it is that the good life 
should be conceptualized; the government, upon receiving power from the governed, is only 
responsible for providing the environment in which the governed can move toward 
                                                
12 Locke, John, and Ian Shapiro. Two Treatises of Government: And a Letter Concerning Toleration. (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 102.   
 
13 Locke, Two Treatises, 110. 
 
14 Locke, Two Treatises, 126.  
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autonomously determined visions of the good life. Thus, Locke presumes that humans are social 
beings who come together to find mutual fulfillment while the individual is not stopped from 
pursuing his or her own good. Yet, the notion of communality begins to wane in view of 
property.  
 Property, both physical holdings and what an individual creates, is for Locke, the source 
of happiness. Those possessions are forms of self-expression that align with the autonomous 
individual’s vision of the good life – having them makes one happy. Because such happiness, 
attached to possession or ownership, is integral to the good life, Locke’s individual interprets 
activity in the producer-consumer cycle as a form of moral expression. This moral dimension of 
possession is furthered when Locke transitions to his notion of the moral self who owns material 
items, the work that one does, and the very manner in which one behaves.15 The moral self, the 
self that is expressed in what one owns and does, reshapes the way an individualistic drive for 
ownership might be understood. It introduces the idea that what one owns not only expresses 
what one believes to be symbolic of the good life, but the objects or one’s behaviors are actually 
means to fulfilling the good life. Locke’s individual moral self creates his or her own vision of 
the good life and then works to possess goods that contribute to the individual’s good life 
metaphorically or literally. The relationship between autonomy and property as it contributes to 
an individual’s satisfaction of the good life was an important step in a series of shifts that 
evolved with the growth of the American economy and economic spirit. 
 Locke’s resulting proprietor model meshed well with the economic philosophy of Adam 
Smith that was adopted by the fledgling US. Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
                                                
15 Fairfield, Paul. Moral Selfhood in the Liberal Tradition: The Politics of Individuality. (Toronto, Canada: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000), 35. 
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the Wealth of Nations, commonly The Wealth of Nations, offered a new interpretative framework 
for Locke’s proprietor model. As a tool for increasing productivity and profit, the division of 
labor brought about the following changes: workers earned more, consumers could acquire, and 
the organic market was empowered to respond to and generate new needs. Smith explains the 
expansion of the market, 
When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a very small 
part of a man's wants which the produce of his own labour can supply. He supplies the far 
greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, 
which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other 
men's labour as he has occasion for. Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in 
some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a 
commercial society.16 
 
As a result of this expansion of commerce, wants and desires diversified, and were transformed 
into products to be exchanged on the market. Smith’s explanation of ‘value’ suggests that the 
goods produced and exchanged on the market were very much understood in the Lockean 
fashion. Smith distinguishes two different meanings of value, in use and in exchange: the former 
“expresses the utility of some particular object” and the latter “the power of purchasing other 
goods which the possession of that object conveys.”17 However, Smith notes that the things an 
individual may hold to be valuable do not necessarily possess any worth in exchange and vice 
versa,18 yet both are equally important – especially considering the subjective nature of what is 
valuable. Smith delineates the ways in which price and currency become the common language 
of commercial enterprise, but what remains important throughout is the individual’s choice to 
                                                
16 Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. ed. Edwin Cannan. (London: 
Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1904. Library of Economics and Liberty [Online] available from 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html ) Book I, Chapter IV. Section 1. Accessed February 25, 2016.  
 
17 Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter IV. Section 13.  
 
18 Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter IV. Section 13.  
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exchange what he or she has for goods that he or she has identified as valuable, goods whose end 
is not that of further exchange, but of fulfillment of the individual. Smith's market creates the 
mechanism by which Locke’s moral proprietor can physically, either in possession or action, 
display his or her vision of the good life. However, the mere possession of goods intended to 
display one’s conception of the good life is only relevant when the notion of the good life is 
unchanging. Unfortunately, consumer culture complicates the possibility of a static correlation 
between good life and material goods. In a culture that places tremendous value on the 
individual’s freedom to forge a unique vision of the good life and express it through participation 
in the market, the very notion of the good life is susceptible to external influence(s) to which the 
individual may very well be blind. Achieving one’s vision of the good life may prove 
challenging enough, but keeping with the shifting culturally acceptable vision of the good life is 
surely impossible for a majority of individuals. For the unhealthy aging individual, there appears 
to be little to no possibility of satisfying the mercurial vision of the good life generated by 
consumer culture, and for the unhealthy and dependent aging individual, the prospect of the 
achieving the good life proves to be nothing more than fantasy.  
Commenting on the newly formed United States, Alexis de Tocqueville notes the ways in 
which autonomy manifests itself as society’s primary value. The sovereignty of the people, as de 
Tocqueville names it, is “not hidden or sterile as it is in certain nations; it is recognized by the 
mores, proclaimed by the laws; it spreads freely and reaches its full consequences without 
obstacles.”19 He explains that the value of autonomy is witnessed not only in the democratic 
structure of government alone, but also generally in the spirit of the people. That spirit translates 
                                                
19 Tocqueville, Alexis de, Eduardo Nolla, and James T. Schleifer. Democracy in America: Historical-critical edition 
of de la démocratie en Amérique. Bilingual French-English ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010) 91-2. 
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into the ways in which individuals conduct themselves politically as legislator-rulers who wield 
their power “as God rules the universe.”20 While this is only an observation conditioned by the 
experience of a liberal democratic culture, it poignantly captures how individual liberty or 
autonomy was actually understood by the American people – he was witness to the theoretical 
claims of autonomy being practiced. Rights were virtues introduced into the political sphere for 
de Tocqueville – virtues believed to be emblematic of great individuals and rights without which 
there could be no great people.21 In further strengthening the moral importance of autonomy by 
invoking the language of rights as virtues he is able to connect the absolute right of autonomy to 
those practices that enable an individual to pursue the good life. Of course, those practices need 
the proper environment in order to be exercised, thus de Tocqueville’s rosy assessment of early 
American democracy. The democratic system offered the right space for living as one wished to 
live, for oneself by oneself, but mindful and tolerant of others. The political structure was 
designed to protect freedoms and enable individuals to pursue their own goals while staying at 
arm’s length. On its own, de Tocqueville’s vision of freedom is innocuous for an ethics of aging 
because his claims are not normative, so when does an emphasis on autonomy within the good 
life become detrimental to the aging? It does so when autonomy takes a libertarian turn, and the 
idea of dependency is disparaged.   
Beyond the early stages of autonomy’s prominence in American culture, the late 19th 
century arrival of John Stuart Mill’s treatise on liberty moved autonomy into a more libertarian 
                                                
20 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 97. 
 
21 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 389. 
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interpretation.22 Mill’s work to connect individual liberty to wellbeing more fully established the 
primacy of autonomy as the value among American values. His beliefs on individual liberty and 
the autonomous nature of the person are neatly summarized: “Human nature is not a machine to 
be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires 
to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which 
make it a living thing.”23 From this it is clear that Mill proclaims individuality and one’s capacity 
and duty to express one’s self as an individual are essential human characteristics.24 Mill’s 
autonomous individual does not differ from those before him: one is naturally absolutely free to 
pursue his or her own good in his or her own way, so long as one does not attempt to deprive 
other individuals of theirs, or impede their efforts to achieve their own individually identified 
good(s).25 Pursuing a self-legislated vision of the good life is part of Mill’s understanding of 
                                                
22 Mill, John Stuart, and Leonard Kahn. 2015. On Liberty. (Peterborough, Ontario; Tonawanda, NY: Broadview 
Press, 2015), 120. There is an ongoing debate about whether Mill can be classified as a libertarian. His remarks 
concerning the extent of a government’s power over individuals are targeted toward a government that oversteps its 
bounds in denying the individual’s pursuit of the good life. When the government takes the place of the individual 
and attempts to legislate that which is good for the individual the government has overstepped its bounds. It has 
effectively violated its very essence in having been appointed or elected by those autonomous individuals who so 
chose to cede limited powers to the government. Protection and defense, in line with his remarks about the extent of 
individual liberty, are the only legitimate reasons for government intervention in the private life of an individual. 
This sounds similar to modern day libertarian thought, but Mill adds a series of other cases for government 
intervention that go beyond the general categories of protection and defense. Those elements which have previously 
been determined to be detrimental to individuality in terms of an individual being able to flourish after practicing a 
given behavior are also under the purview of government. The modern libertarian can see moralizing, in this sense, 
as stifling individuality, but for Mill is a justifiable intervention under the auspices of protection of the individual. 
“The only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the 
world until now; things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person’s individuality. There 
must be some length of time and amount of experience, after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as 
established: and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice 
which has been fatal to their predecessors.” 
 
23 Mill, On Liberty, 99.  
 
24 Mill’s notion of autonomy is different than that of Kant, for example. Because this historical overview is 
concerned strictly with the American development of autonomy and reception of the selected thinkers, alternative 
notions of autonomy that are more developed in later philosophical discourse will not be addressed.  
 
25 Mill, On Liberty, 56. 
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individual liberty.  
The first element of liberty pertains to an individual’s conscience or “liberty of thought 
and feeling,” meaning an “absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or 
speculative, scientific, moral, or theological.”26 Second, liberty consists in one’s ability to frame 
and plan one’s life according to one’s to-be-fulfilled character,27 without impediment from other 
individuals. The cultivation of such individuality is the only thing that can produce a well-
developed person, according to Mill. Such development “brings human beings [themselves] 
nearer to the best thing they can be.”28 Last, liberty enables individuals to unite for any purpose 
so long as it does not infringe on the liberty of or harm others. Living in a community that tells 
individuals how to live or obliges individuals to be responsible for others could be seen, through 
Mill’s eyes, as infringements on liberty. Asking others to show special concern for certain 
members of the community, i.e. the aging, or worse, demanding that special concern be given, is 
not part of Mill’s vision of autonomy. While Mill maintains that society is not founded on a 
contract, he affirms that “everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the 
benefit, and…that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct toward the rest.”29 
Determining the obligations and limits of ‘protection’ and ‘return for the benefit’ was not 
necessarily a concern of Mill’s, an oversight that can be linked to current opinions on social 
responsibility concerning dependent aging persons. Nevertheless, Mill remains particularly 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
26 Mill, On Liberty, 55. 
 
27 Mill, On Liberty, 100. Character here refers to “a person whose desires and impulses are his own – are the 
expression of his own nature, as it has developed and modified by his own culture. 
 
28 Mill, On Liberty, 103-4. 
 
29 Mill, On Liberty, 114. 
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important because he connects freedom and the good life. Without freedom, one cannot live the 
good life. Without having freely established oneself as an individual, one cannot live the good 
life. These two ideas that emerge from Mill are important for an ethics of aging because the 
freedom of the aging individual is, of course, integral. No ethics should seek to undermine or 
deny the freedom of an individual; however, just as health is not the only indicator or condition 
of the good life, neither is living freely and independently. These claims will be revisited in later 
chapters, but it is important to note that they continue to influence modern perceptions about 
what it means to age well.  
Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were the values with which this examination 
began. The essential condition of freedom, protected by the founding texts of the US, develops 
uniquely in the American economic context. As an individual came to appreciate his or her 
capacity for autonomous thought and action regarding the pursuit of happiness or the good life, 
the market helped respond to what those self-generated visions might look like. As consumer 
culture evolved, the acquisition of goods became a primary source of self-expression, as Locke 
had suggested it should. While the relationship between the market and autonomy took shape, a 
newer interpretation of liberty was brought into the fold, namely libertarianism. The introduction 
of Mill’s libertarian thought reinforced the importance of autonomy, but added the idea that the 
good life should be achieved on one’s own without assistance from others (individuals or the 
government). Combining the libertarian approach to achieving the good life with the material 
good life provided by the market, it becomes clear that the social imageries of aging are complex 
obstacles for an ethics of aging to overcome. 
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Autonomy And the Good Life In Consumer Culture 
As the primary value of America, autonomy went beyond the political arena and 
permeated every aspect of culture. One such intersection is that of the creation and practices of 
consumer culture. The manner in which autonomy presents itself in consumer culture can be 
traced back to the distinction between Locke and Smith. The former claimed that the possession 
and display of goods and conduct (understood as a possession) embodied one’s notion of the 
good life, while the latter addressed the value one ascribes to goods and the means necessary for 
acquiring and maintain those goods even if the symbolic goods changed over time. Individuals 
were free to consume those things that best represented their vision of the good life. Economic 
participation, both as producer and consumer, made the pursuit of the good a more tangible 
endeavor to yield a comprehensive vision of the good life. Theories of consumer culture pick up 
on the claims of Locke and Smith and highlight those dual roles of producer and consumer. As 
Smith explained, the increase in the social value of goods being bought and sold on the market in 
the form of consumer products provided further motivation for individuals to work in order to 
facilitate the acquisition of those things that would satisfy their vision of the good life. This 
cyclical relationship was witnessed by de Tocqueville. 
In a relatively short chapter of Democracy in America entitled “Of the Taste for Material 
Wellbeing,” de Tocqueville remarks that passion for material wellbeing is a general disposition 
of all Americans. “The concern to satisfy the slightest needs of the body and to provide for the 
smallest conveniences of life”30 is universally experienced, held, and acted upon. Pursuit of the 
goods requisite to wellbeing found Americans “tormented constantly by a vague fear of not 
                                                
30 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 931. 
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having chosen the shortest road that can lead to it [wellbeing].”31 This observation reveals that 
even from its earliest years, American culture was a consumer culture that partially located the 
good life in the acquisition of material possessions (the other part belonged to individual liberty). 
De Tocqueville summarizes his observations of the early manifestations of American consumer 
culture: 
The man who has confined his heart solely to the pursuit of the goods of this world is 
always in a hurry, for he has only a limited time to find them, to take hold of them and to 
enjoy them. The memory of the brevity of life goads him constantly. Apart from the 
goods that he possesses, at every instant he imagines a thousand others that death will 
prevent him from tasting if he does not hurry. This thought fills him with uneasiness, 
fears, and regrets, and keeps his soul in a kind of constant trepidation that leads him to 
change plans and places at every moment.32 
 
He believes that this spirit of satisfying wellbeing with diverse and evolving material possessions 
is part of a democratic society in which there exist different socioeconomic strata that are not 
fixed. This spirit enables hope and a perceived ease of access to the good life for those of lower 
social strata and reinforces the need to persist in acquiring goods to keep pace with those of 
upper social classes.33 The notion that wellbeing can be and has been commodified leads to a 
more comprehensive discussion of consumer culture and its influence on both identity and the 
good life. 
 What de Tocqueville and others had observed regarding the impact of autonomy in the 
market on individual identity and moral worth recently became its own field of study in the form 
of Consumer Culture Theory (CCT). Though the recognition that consumer culture has very 
                                                
31 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 943. 
 
32 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 945-6. 
 
33 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 933. 
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noticeable effects on the thoughts and behavior can be traced to the work of Karl Marx.34 Eric J. 
Arnould and Craig J. Thompson, the unofficial founders of CCT, offered this 2005 definition of 
consumer culture: “[consumer culture] denotes a social arrangement in which the relations 
between lived culture and social resources, and between meaningful ways of life and the 
symbolic and material resources on which they depend, are mediated through markets.”35 
Consumer culture goes beyond a study of market relations between supply and demand. Instead, 
consumer culture presents a complex framework for addressing how consumed goods assume 
their respective meanings both socially and for the individual subject. The goods marketed and 
exchanged in a consumer culture are not limited to serving their designed function; they are 
integral or even necessary in aiding individuals in their pursuit of the good life. In other words, 
consumer culture does not only have economic ramifications, but also has profound 
psychological and moral influences on its subjects. “Consumption revolves around the 
acquisition of things to confirm, display, accent, mask, and imagine who we are and whom we 
wish to be,” which can “instrumentally display social status, evoke ethnicity, or exhibit gender” 
and can “also be an unexpressed process of self-definition and collective identification.”36  
Consumer culture provides a powerful and ubiquitous medium through which identity 
and wellbeing are communicated, interpreted, and realized. In psychology, identity refers to the 
subjective concept to which one holds oneself – it is deeply personal, emerging from and 
                                                
34 See Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), in which Marx outlines the ill-effects 
of Smith’s Wealth of Nations on capitalistic societies regarding the objectification of the worker, and, Capital: 
Critique of Capital Economy (1867), in which the critique of commodity fetishism and the damaging effects of the 
market on the recognition of human agency in the capitalistic society are addressed.  
 
35 Arnould, Eric J, and Craig J Thompson. 2005. Consumer Culture Theory (CCT): Twenty years of 
research. Journal of Consumer Research 31 (4): 868-82. doi:10.1086/426626. 
 
36 Mullins, Paul R. 2011. The Archaeology of Consumer Culture. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011), 2. 
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cultivated within the subject, and it is inclusive of the multitude of modes of self-representation 
that an individual displays in response to various social roles.37 Psychologists describe wellbeing 
as composed of both the traditional bodily (and mental) health factors outlined in Chapter One 
and the more amorphous idea of happiness or subjective wellbeing, which concerns “life 
satisfaction, a cognitive evaluation of life over time, but also the frequent experience of positive 
emotions and the absence of negative emotions.”38 A demonstrative example of consumer 
culture’s influence on identity and subjective wellbeing is that of body image. This will be taken 
up below, but it is worth noting that the ideal body image communicated through consumer 
culture is arguably the most comprehensively influential message conveyed to the Third Ager 
seeking to live well. How modern consumer culture became capable of influencing the individual 
in such profound ways requires explanation going beyond the seeds that were planted by Locke 
and Smith, and whose early fruits were observed by de Tocqueville. 
While the influence of consumer culture can be interpreted in a number of ways, Mike 
Featherstone, a British sociologist, limits his assessment to two. He first explains that the growth 
of consumer culture, commensurate with the expansion of modern capitalist economies, has led 
to a tremendous rise in the accumulation of a “material culture”39 expressed in various consumer 
goods. Consumer culture then not only signals the general growth of the modern economy but 
also points to the type of materialism about which Smith spoke – namely that materialism is 
intrinsically linked to the freedom one has to produce and consume so modes of self-expression. 
                                                
37 Dittmar, Helga. Consumer Culture, Identity, and Wellbeing. (New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2008), 8. 
 
38 Dittmar, Consumer Culture, 9. 
 
39 Featherstone, Mike. Consumer Culture and Postmodernism. Theory, Culture and Society. (London; Newbury 
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However, this seemingly innocuous reciprocal relationship can precipitate “ideological 
manipulation and seductive containment of the population from some alternative set of ‘better’ 
social relations,”40 which transforms the appeal of discovering the good life in the market into a 
power capable of shaping the very terms for wellbeing. This manipulative power becomes the 
substance of Featherstone’s second theory of culture where consumer culture represents the 
“zero sum game in which satisfaction and status depend upon displaying and sustaining 
differences within conditions of inflation.”41 Both the expansion of materialism and the ability of 
the market to become the source of self-identity and wellbeing are particularly relevant to the 
social imageries of the good life and for the Third Age. If it is fair to presume one’s history of 
participating in and being affected by the dominant consumer culture, then the aging person may 
very well be faced with a far more arduous task given the power of consumer culture. The 
meaning and wellbeing sought by the Third Ager may well be contingent upon factors extrinsic 
to the individual, undermining the very autonomy valued in American culture and upon which 
consumer culture is built. Faced with an increasing amount of consumer goods and experiences 
that are billed as paths to or representations of integral elements of the good life, the aging 
individual is faced with the realization that he or she is the product of Locke’s moral proprietor 
and Smith’s laborer. Negotiating consumerism and materialism must be a task of an ethics of 
aging. One of the ways in which consumer culture has come to be the primary source of 
mediating the good life is through its commodification of self-image. 
Capable of constructing and marketing ideal images of the self to be attained through the 
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consumption, either by purchase for specific use or for possession alone, consumer culture 
represents a powerful force in shaping what it means to live the good life. It has become a 
subconscious requirement to possess the so-called ‘right’ thing with the hope of it providing 
certain psychological benefits such as “popularity, identity, and happiness.”42 As one of the most 
demonstrable modes of self-creation, consumption enables individuals to achieve or attain an 
identity rather than develop one – the individual can purchase the ideal self while knowing full 
well that he or she is not and almost cannot be that ideal. Helga Dittmar notes that individuals are 
not always aware of how consumer culture influences their vision(s) of the self, but summarizes 
the formula as such: the individual has an image of the self now, is subjected (directly and 
indirectly) to the symbolic meanings of consumer goods, and then arrives at a newly envisioned 
image of how it is that the individual wishes to be – a process that begins in childhood and only 
further entrenches itself in the psyche of the person as he or she ages.43 One can attain happiness 
by acquiring possessing and/or using that which consumer culture has marketed as ideal or 
requisite for the material good life. Part of the liberal tradition assumes the value of being an 
individual, and being able to consume helps one forge an individual identity, enabling one to 
stand out from the rest – to have and to hold one’s vision of the good life. In other words, the 
goods marketed convey a very simple, yet powerful, message “buy this and it will enhance your 
sense of self-worth; indeed, buy ‘because you are worth it!’”44 The goods and their meaning(s), 
by nature of presenting themselves as capable of enabling one to consume the good life, provide 
the consumer the power to take control of the development of the self. By offering individuals 
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the ability to create, shape, and alter self-identity, the market reinforces the value placed on 
individual liberty outlined above. Not only is the individual given the opportunity to participate 
in the economy by producing goods to be consumed, but also by having the freedom to acquire 
the goods necessary to satisfy the individual’s self-identity and notion of wellbeing.  
One of the ways in which the commodification of self-image has taken place lies at the 
intersection of identity and wellbeing, namely body image. Women and men are both subject to 
the influence of consumer culture when it comes to sociocultural body ideals. Aging persons in 
particular are subjected to an array of ideal images, some of which are mediated through an 
approach to medicine that wishes to mask or correct the physical signs of aging. As was shown 
in Chapter One, the healthy functioning body is the one best suited for living the good life; 
therefore, the appearance of functioning can connote social value and the image of living well. 
Thinness is marketed as an ideal type for women and muscularity an ideal type for men. Female 
models have historically been portrayed as the ideal of thinness toward which all women should 
strive despite the potential health risks of being too thin.45 Men are presented with a similarly 
unattainable ideal image of the well-toned upper body resembling a V-shape. These images 
abound in popular media and are filtered all the way down to children’s toys including dolls and 
action figures.46 Sociocultural theorists argue that when presented with such images, “individuals 
come to feel bad about their bodies because they are exposed to unrealistic body ideals which 
they then feel pressured to achieve.”47 Clearly the symbolic value of these images goes much 
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deeper than the desire to be healthier. The ideal body, argues Dittmar, transcends notions or 
images of physical health, possessing a symbolic value that conveys “being in control, life 
satisfaction, happiness, career success, or having interesting and fulfilling relationships.”48 Ideal 
body image, understood as a consumer good capable of communicating much more than physical 
health, stresses the belief that the body’s role in achieving and displaying self-identity is 
paramount. Aging persons seeking to re-self-identify and pursue the good life as they transition 
are bombarded with unattainable ideal images. The free market and consumer culture respond to 
the aging person’s needs to achieve those ideals through the cosmetics industry.  
Defining the cosmetics industry is much more complicated than it may seem. There are 
consumer cosmetic products such as creams, lotions, hair dyes, and make-up that comprise the 
more traditional retail-consumer sector of the industry with which many are familiar. Moving 
beyond these ordinary products available to the masses are the more exclusive cosmeceuticals. 
Distorting the line between non-prescription and prescription drug, cosmeceuticals can address 
any of the following:  
the product has pharmaceutical activity and can be used on normal or near-normal skin; 
the product should have a defined benefit for minor skin disorders; and as the skin 
disorder is mild the product should have a very low-risk profile.49  
 
The products,50 such as those sold by Dermalogicaâ Perricone MD and Neutrogenaâ, combine 
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the ease-of-access of the traditional products and the scientifically researched and proven effects 
of medicinal/pharmaceutical drugs. A third sector of the cosmetics industry is cosmetic surgery 
or medicine proper (so as to distinguish it from the gray area occupied by cosmeceuticals). 
Cosmetic surgery includes any medical intervention, where medical means administered by a 
licensed medical practitioner doctor or nurse, for aesthetic (beautification) not reconstructive 
(post-injury or resulting from an underlying pathology) purposes. These can include invasive 
procedures of varying degrees such as facelifts, liposuction, brow lift, and rhinoplasty51 where 
the purpose is aesthetic augmentation or ideal body image rather than improving physical 
functioning. Arguing in line with the medical ethicists who claim that aging is a disease to be 
overcome, plastic surgeons and other medical professionals involved in cosmetic enhancement 
respond to the “transitory cultural norms of beauty” that are “sufficient cause of surgical 
improvement,”52 making cosmetic surgery capable of always transcending age.53 Cosmetic 
surgery, the most extreme of the three types of cosmetic products discussed above, presents the 
most interesting case regarding the aging person, self-identify, and ideal body image in consumer 
culture.  
Dittmar argues that ideal body image is integral to the individual’s creation of self-
identity from early childhood, and that that image is embedded within various cultural norms that 
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connect to the good life. Margaret Gullette describes an “inside/outside binary”54 in which the 
aging person tries to fix how he or she is feeling (the inside) by augmenting the appearance (the 
outside). Given what the aging person is told about the good life from a medical perspective, it 
makes sense that aging persons would attempt to mask their physical or mental decline in the 
hopes of feeling better and being more socially appealing. The appeal achieved by the aging 
person who successfully masks less than optimal health is two-fold: the general personal 
satisfaction of looking and feeling better, and the expectation that one’s looking better brings 
about broader social acceptance (i.e. in the workplace – a topic to be explored below). Although 
the personal dissatisfaction experienced in aging “is created and exacerbated by a billion-dollar 
American commerce in aging that harps on women’s and men’s imperfections and ties them to 
growing older,”55 culture’s role in self-identity dates back to Aristotle. In De Physiognomia, he 
explores the ‘science’ of physiognomy which established a connection between the outward, 
specifically facial, appearance of the individual and his or her inner self, soul, or character. “The 
face” explains Jane Northrop, “became the conveyer of symbolic meaning imbued with moral 
significance,”56 connecting beauty with goodness and ugliness with the bad. This association 
continued through the 19th and into the early 20th centuries, particularly demonstrated by an 
increase in facial modification as a means of conforming to “the dominant aesthetic ideal.”57 
While modern society does not necessarily maintain the views of 19th century cosmetic surgery, 
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the notion of conforming to social ideals remains. The 20th century saw the evolution of cosmetic 
surgery in a thriving consumer culture:  
Cosmetic surgeons progressively medicalized physical appearance by reclassifying the 
extremes of what had once been considered normal into deviations pathologized as 
defects or deformity. Such imperfections came to include any physical feature which 
caused feelings of inferiority or diminished life chances. The inferiority complex 
provided compelling justification for cosmetic surgeons and significantly impacted how 
doctors and their patients reached agreement prior to proceeding with surgery. By 
emphasizing the social, economic, and psychological aspects of appearance, surgeons 
began to share the diagnostic role with their patients, embracing their subjective 
evaluations in determining the actuality of deformity and the surgical corrective 
required.58 
 
For the aging person who wishes to maintain his or her sense of identity and project the ideal 
image currently in vogue, cosmetic surgery becomes a consumer good packaged as a medicinal 
therapy. Given the history of physiognomy in cosmetic surgery the aging person can come to 
view plastic surgery as integral to one’s pursuit of the good life.  
 Cosmetic surgery witnessed a 274% increase between 1997 and 2014 according to the 
American Society for Aesthetic Plastic Surgery; a majority of those procedures were marketed to 
and performed on women.59 The study conducted by Sammy Sinno et al examined online 
marketing of plastic surgery in the US revealing that of the researched images “3989 (94.1%) 
were pictures of female patients or models, 212 (5.0%) were pictures of male patients or models, 
and 38 (0.9%) were pictures of a female and male model together” and that only 22% of the 
websites consulted contained a male-specific services section.60 While an increasing number of 
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men are being introduced to and electing for cosmetic surgery, women remain the primary target 
of plastic surgeons. In a study conducted by Dr. Rhian Parker, women reported that cosmetic 
surgery was not a matter of choice but that of necessity. Reasons for going through with 
cosmetic surgery were grouped into three categories: a long-standing problem, body changes, 
and aging.61 The first group of reasons addressed image issues that the women have always had, 
i.e. problems with their phenotype. The second set of reasons, body changes, referred to 
pregnancy(ies), weight gain/loss, or a desire to reclaim their one’s old body. Lastly, the aging-
related reasons were psychological and physical – the image in the mirror did not reflect how one 
felt. The idea that the aging body alone was some sort of disappointment to the individual 
suggests that the ‘aging as disease’ argument holds enough popular appeal that it only takes the 
image, or perhaps thought of an aging body, to motivate cosmetic surgery. The significance of 
the physical appearance of an aging body as reason for undergoing cosmetic surgery cannot be 
overstated.  
A treatment that is as nebulous as cosmeceuticals themselves is that of hormone therapy. 
It is favored by aging persons who wish to mitigate the physical and psychological effects of 
aging without the physicality of cosmetic surgeries. Near the end of the 20th century, billions of 
dollars were spent on the promises of hormone therapy, human growth hormone in particular,62 
to no avail. Yet the failure of HGH and other hormone therapies has not stopped the anti-aging 
industry from pursuing today’s most promising elixir, telomerase.63 In short, telomerase has been 
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shown to have the potential to slow or reverse the process of aging by on the cellular level via 
blood transfusion from a younger person.64 Such products marketed as capable of reversing or 
mitigating the aesthetic effects of aging continue to benefit from exponential growth. It is 
impossible to quantify the number of individual cosmeceuticals that purport to retard the visual 
signs of aging, but suffice it to say that the billions of dollars spent on advertising in this market 
sector continue to find an attentive audience. When the promised effects are not realized, the 
users react negatively, 65 but there is no indication that the anti-aging division within the 
cosmetics industry is slowing down. Clearly the quest for the good life in aging remains 
inextricably linked to the ‘aging as disease’ school of thought and is emboldened by consumer 
culture. That culture generates the notion that consuming itself is capable of making one happy, 
and when combined with anti-aging narratives, evolves into the compelling idea that consuming 
anti-aging products is an appropriate and readily available straightforward path to the good life.  
Consumption then becomes a method for attaining the good life both in and of itself and 
in the particular forms of anti-aging products. Consuming or being able to consume provides an 
individual with a socially acceptable identity that remains responsive to shifting socio-cultural 
trends. In this regard, a satisfactory self-identity is contingent upon one’s being able to respond 
to those shifting goods. Being able to adapt to transitory norms requires the financial means, 
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which many aging people do not have, and ironically may place some aging persons in a 
situation that has them placing their anti-aging needs above their real health needs. However, 
being able to respond to the changing norms also requires that one is healthy enough to deal with 
the unforeseeable consequences of using cosmeceuticals given their lack of regulation, healthy 
enough to undergo cosmetic surgeries, healthy enough to experiment with telomerase. Once 
again it is the functioning body that is needed in order to maintain the good life; here, however, it 
is not necessary the most important element, only part of aging well. Aging well in a consumer 
culture means consuming those products that are synonymous with youth or claim to make one 
more youthful in appearance. However, what is sacrificed in the cycle of consumption is the 
individual’s authentic vision of the good life – no longer is the good life being defined on the 
individual’s terms; instead the good life is mediated through goods determined to be requisite for 
the actualization of the good life by society. In this case, the individual will never come to 
actualizing the good life given the ephemeral nature of the value bestowed upon consumer goods 
regarding one’s satisfaction. However, there has been more to aging well in the modern 
American context than what consumer culture offers. Public policies have attempted to secure 
wellbeing for the aging that was not only determined in economic (read: consumer-producer) 
terms.  
During the 20th century, a time in which consumer culture would experience a rapid 
expansion, the federal government embraced a different approach to aging, focusing on 
‘responsible individualism,’ but also declaring care for the aging a federal responsibility. The 
policies enacted reflect a disconnect between the good life in aging as contingent upon producing 
or consuming promoted within consumer culture and a political vision that the success of the 
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country was bound to the success of the aging. The ‘responsible individualism’ called upon all 
Americans to recognize shared communal bonds and that those bonds do not disappear once an 
individual leaves the work force or no longer meets cultural beauty ideals. Most importantly, the 
government policies concerning the aging population were a counter-narrative to the belief that 
the good life could be reduced to functional health, and that that good life should be made 
available to all aging persons regardless of class, race, and gender.  
Autonomy And American Public Policy 
 As has been demonstrated above, the good life in America has always been bound to 
individual liberty or autonomy whether as a political or cultural value. In consumer culture the 
aging individual is inclined to exercise personal freedom by way of responding to socially 
created ideal image norms or in acquiring goods, both of which are perceived to be 
demonstrative of the good life. Commodifying the good life, however, actually limits freedom by 
reducing its expression and fulfillment to one medium, namely consumption. The inherently 
inequitable move only exacerbates pre-existing impediments to achieving the good life given the 
socioeconomic diversity of the aging population. What commodification does then is cause aging 
persons to pursue happiness-in-having and lose sight of more profound and perhaps more 
authentic elements of the good life. While the problem of commodification of the good life does 
not universally plague the aging population given the socioeconomic diversity of individuals in 
the Third Age, commodification of the good life is part of the American cultural ethos that does 
transcend socioeconomic strata. The political discourse of the 20th century offers a view of aging 
well that transcends consumer culture in many regards. Starting with the New Deal the economic 
needs of aging persons were brought into public view. Economic needs were and still are linked 
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to health care needs, thus the latter also became a subject of public policy in order to prevent a 
person’s health from being contingent upon market forces. The health of the aging, as outlined in 
Depression and Post-Depression era policies, was described as a basic right; support systems 
were to address real-life needs – they did not focus on superficial needs like youthfulness and 
beauty. The policies were to be supported, financially and otherwise, by all members of society. 
Still, the support provided to aging persons was not intended to dismiss the value of 
independence vis-à-vis personal responsibility for self-care. Independence remained important in 
the crafting of the welfare policies designed for the aging, but the emphasis on who was 
responsible for bringing about the good life changed: American culture is one that supports all 
individuals and helps them to move toward their own vision of the good life, never claiming that 
having to rely on the help of society or the government diminishes the value of the person.  
 The myriad effects of the Great Depression can still be felt today, and in many ways, are 
more overtly present than we might recognize. A time that called for a reassessment of national 
values and corollary policies and practices, the Depression asked that Americans push their 
“dreams of boundless prosperity and the images of pioneers carving out a niche in the frontier”66 
aside in the face of harsh economic realities. The recovery begun by Hoover did not tear down 
capitalism, nor did it attempt to change the systemic problems that contributed to the implosion 
of the economy. Hoover assumed that the proverbial ship would right itself so long as the 
citizens practiced a “responsible individualism.”67 History shows that the economy did not 
respond to such a thin solution to an incredibly complex problem, and the man who is associated 
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with saving the economy and perhaps the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was elected 
after campaigning to make dramatic improvements in the so-called first 100 days. The New Deal 
was an economic and a socio-cultural policy aimed correcting the past and augmenting the 
future. The specific initiatives of the New Deal understood the “limits of self-reliance” and 
accepted “the value of interest-group liberalism,” which led to the federal government promoting 
the general welfare and economic security of all citizens.68 Those citizens who had suffered the 
most with the least amount of time to recover became a primary focus of New Deal economic 
policy, thus the rescue of aging persons, whom faced insecurity through no fault of their own, 
would be a priority. 
 The Social Security Act of 1935 (SSA) was the first step in addressing the complex needs 
of the aging population in the US. Intended for those who had reached the age of 65 as of 
January 1, 1942, the account to be drawn upon was overseen by the federal government but left 
to the states regarding distribution amounts. Despite its founding on an incrementalist69 belief 
that the type of protection could be changed minimally here and there with the possibility of 
major overhaul, the policy proclaimed that the federal government had a duty to “deal with the 
elderly’s plight as a vital aspect of ‘general welfare.’”70 However, the aging, identified as elderly 
given the time period’s standards of longevity and mortality, was not as inclusive a category of 
65-year olds as it appeared. SSA described the aging as white individuals who had previously 
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labored in particular production sectors: “Title II [of the Social Security Act] did not initially 
apply to farm workers, government employees, military personnel, or clergy, among others.”71 
SSA established a threshold of minimum contribution to the aged poor and ensured that an 
equitable return on contribution was offered to everyone (who met the specifications of SSA) but 
the policy-writers “assumed that people would resume making provisions for their old age and 
that corporate involvement in welfare capitalism would be expanded.”72 Social Security taxes 
that were instituted then functioned as they do now with the wealthier members of society paying 
larger amounts so as to enable a wider and more equitable distribution of funds to those most in 
need. Regardless of whether the relevant taxes directly aided individuals or provided financial 
relief to the larger family unit of the aging person, SSA was designed to ease the transition from 
working life to retired life for society writ large. However, it was in the interpretation of the 
timing of that transition that debate arose. “Provisions of the old-age insurance program were not 
used to initiate a compulsory retirement scheme at the national level,”73 but it was partially 
received in that way for at least two reasons. First, mandatory retirement programs in the private 
sector emerged to complement SSA. Second, SSA dollars were allocated differently to persons 
who were able to continue to work after age 65, a disproportionate benefit created by the 
mandatory retirement movement. While Social Security continued to be debated, amended, and 
augmented, Roosevelt continued his push for a vision of democratic government that genuinely 
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cared for the wellbeing and happiness of each and every citizen.74 After the Second World War 
there was a marked shift in the social policies regarding aging persons; however, an increase in 
spending did not produce the expected commensurate decrease in poverty among the aging.75 
Despite this, the policy arrangements were left mostly unchanged and instead private insurance 
companies marketed “old-age insurance” to aging persons as a complement to SSA. The political 
concern for the wellbeing of the aging did not dissipate and reached an apex with the children of 
the Great Depression who worked to establish the ‘Great Society.’ 
 Lyndon Johnson adopted Roosevelt’s moral vision by making the war on poverty the 
cornerstone of the ‘Great Society.’ The aging members of American society became the primary 
focus of this war insofar as their demonstrated need and vulnerability exceeded that of many 
other groups. One of the primary ways in which the aging person could experience wellbeing is 
through overall health, thus a supplement to Social Security with the particular focus on health 
care access and insurance for aging members of society was implemented during this time.  
Public Law 98-97, Medicare, consisted of two parts: A and B. Part A was, and is, an 
insurance plan granted to those who qualified for Social Security benefits. Part B, a voluntary 
supplement, functioned to defray the cost of physician visits and diagnostics, much like a 
traditional private health insurance plan. Still, as helpful as Medicare was (and is) for those over 
65, it did not completely satisfy Roosevelt’s wish to protect the welfare of all citizens or 
Johnson’s war on poverty. Thus, another plan materialized into a policy that addressed medical 
needs of the aging and the poor regardless of age, namely Medicaid. An additional contribution 
of the ‘Great Society’ era was the passage of the Older Americans Act (OAA) in 1965 that 
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ensured the aging population would be a focus of policy-making on the federal and state levels,76 
while working to ensure “adequate incomes and health services on the one hand, and 
independence and creative leisure on the other without intimating that such goals were 
incompatible.”77 OAA represents the first policy attempt to outline a vision of the good life for 
aging persons. It highlights the importance of having a sufficient amount of money and access to 
health care, both of which have already been shown to be requisite needs in achieving the good 
life in America, and also moves the conversation forward by addressing the quality of the aging 
person’s life. This initial attempt at articulating the good life for the aging marked a shift in 
political concern that revived Roosevelt’s moral vision for society. No longer were the aging just 
a group who received special benefits to ensure their health and ability to take care of themselves 
financially; instead they were a group whose social involvement was the responsibility of the 
government in part but also of the community. OAA represents a policy attempt to overturn 
previously held beliefs about what the good life in aging required: the aging person was not 
obliged to serve others in order to live well; the aging person did not receive benefits only 
because he or she was productive. An early vision it may be, the groundwork laid by OAA is of 
great import. 
 Unfortunately, the progress of OAA and many other social policies was hampered by the 
political and social upheaval of the Vietnam era, and by the 1980s America witnessed a shift in 
policies that did more to radically change the cultural opinions of the aging than previous eras. 
The election of Ronald Reagan and the consequent revisions made to social welfare policy not 
only adjusted the amount of government assistance offered to aging persons, but also affected 
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social perceptions of the aging. There was never universal agreement on the role of government 
and society in aiding the aging in their quest for the good life, but there certainly was enough 
popular support to sustain Roosevelt’s and Johnson’s morally charged political and social visions 
through the 1970s. Reagan’s inaugural address identified government as part of the problem and 
not the solution to the country’s economic problems, but to be clear, he did not attack Social 
Security or Medicare directly. His effort to balance the federal budget led to a bipartisan 
compromise that “slightly raised the retirement age, boosted payroll taxes, and taxed the benefits 
of high-end recipients for the first time.”78 Yet, there was political tumult in response to 
Reagan’s unwillingness to shrink social welfare programs like Social Security, and the budget 
was not passed. Reagan himself believed that the welfare policies contributed to poverty, but he 
understood that cuts in those programs would be costly politically.79 By the end of Reagan’s 
terms, the negative perception of the social welfare benefits afforded to the aging and the aging 
themselves became a more pronounced part of the public discourse, making the expansion and 
comprehensive realization of OAA near impossible. The initiatives that worked to secure the 
health and financial wellbeing of aging persons mitigated the effects of social and political 
marginalization for the aging.  
Democratic reforms to social welfare policies took on their own tenor during the 
presidency of William Jefferson Clinton. In one of his first entitlement program-oriented 
addresses in 1993, Clinton praised the societal benefit of the contributory entitlement programs, 
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Social Security and Medicare, exclaiming,  
Because of these programs, we are a healthier people. We are a more unified country. We 
treat our elderly with greater dignity by having allowed (sic) them to earn a decent 
retirement and to maintain a middle-class standard of living, independent of whatever 
their children are required to do, and to make them more independent over the long 
run.80  
 
Social Security and Medicare in his view, like Johnson before him, were responsible for 
lowering poverty among the aging, and worked to improve the overall welfare of society. 
However, Clinton was faced with a budget-deficit problem that required certain changes to the 
way in which the programs were structured regarding acquisition and distribution of funds. It 
was Medicare and Medicaid that presented the most problems given the exponential increases in 
cost per capita for health care during the 1990s, and Clinton knew that the health of the aging 
population was inextricably linked to the welfare of society. His popular ‘putting people first’ 
mentality shone through in his remarks concerning the aging in that he reminded the public that 
the recipients of the welfare benefits were individuals whose dignity had to be honored as part of 
what it meant to be American. “[Social Security] reflects some of our deepest values,” he 
remarked in 1998; “the duties we owe to our parents, the duties we owe to each other when we're 
differently situated in life, the duties we owe to our children and our grandchildren.”81 He 
attempted to reinvigorate the moral vision of Roosevelt and the idea of the good life in aging first 
outlined in OAA by reminding society of its interdependence and the reciprocal duties all 
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citizens have in taking care of one another, especially cross-generationally.82 On an almost 
monthly basis throughout his presidency, Clinton addressed the importance of Social Security 
and Medicare in protecting the nation, but that protection came at too high a cost for the 
taxpayers. In order to maintain these entitlements, taxes were raised, not cut, despite there being 
a sizeable surplus in 1999.83  
 Today, Medicare has been amended to include a Part D for prescription drugs, and the 
Older Americans Act continues to be reauthorized without much progress materializing from its 
renewal(s). In 2015, the US Senate focused on the revitalization of community senior centers, an 
important topic to be explored in chapter five, but there remains legislative work to be done as 
the welfare of aging Americans remains a perennial concern for policy-makers.84 Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid (insofar as it addresses the older poor), continue to be the subjects of 
political conversation, yet there is reluctance to suggest cuts to those programs given the political 
power of the aging voting demographic among other practical concerns. However, the idea that 
the end of these programs reemerges for public discussion during every election cycle reveals 
that there remains a cultural disconnect from the very essence of the policies, namely that the 
government should not be responsible for taking care of the needs of particular individuals. The 
tension that exists between social and civic responsibility and the value of autonomy in America 
                                                
82 Clinton, “Social Security.” “This fiscal crisis in Social Security affects every generation. We now know that the 
Social Security trust fund is fine for another few decades. But if it gets in trouble and we don't deal with it, then it 
not only affects the generation of the baby boomers and whether they'll have enough to live on when they retire, it 
raises the question of whether they will have enough to live on by unfairly burdening their children and, therefore, 
unfairly burdening their children's ability to raise their grandchildren. That would be unconscionable, especially 
since, if you move now, we can do less and have a bigger impact, especially since we now have the budget surplus.”  
 
83 According to the Office of Management and Budget at the Whitehouse, the 1999 budget had the following 
spending distributions: 37% ($792,525,999,248) for Social Security, unemployment, and labor; and, 19% 
($415,355,218,644) for Medicare and other health services.  
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further complicates how it is that the good life aging is portrayed and achieved.  
The pushback against welfare policies for aging persons that manifested itself quietly and 
more prominently during the 20th and now 21st centuries finds an ideological home in the liberal 
and libertarian view of autonomy promoted through American culture. Part of that history as 
observed by de Tocqueville, written about by Emerson, and mythologized in the stories of 
frontiersmen, comes from an American individualism that moves beyond the interpreted value 
placed on autonomy. Individualistic tendencies romanticized ideas of the self-made individual. 
That self-made individual, acting upon his or her right to autonomy, is valued for having thrived 
without the help of anyone else. This may be attributable to the American spirit before, during, 
and immediately after the Revolution regarding the establishment of American political and 
individual sovereignty but it is difficult to say precisely when this shift occurred. However, the 
history of individualism’s influence on autonomy has clearly effected a change in how some 
Americans perceive the responsibility of the government in helping certain individuals or groups 
of individuals.  
Born out of liberal autonomy’s prominent place in American society, libertarianism is a 
platform for those who disagree with the government’s assisting the aging (or other groups in 
need of financial or medical aid). A general libertarian critique of government intervention has 
been that the individual should not have his or her rights infringed upon by the government so 
long as fundamental freedoms are guaranteed; the government has no business involving itself in 
the private lives of individuals. Robert Nozick argues that the government is not responsible for 
ensuring the equitable distribution of resources or maintaining an equality that extends beyond 
basic freedoms. This is perhaps part of the reasoning behind some of the pushback against 
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policies involving government and social intervention directed toward taking care of a group of 
individuals who are either viewed as or are no longer being capable of taking care of themselves. 
Reasoning of this sort, combined with the mythologized value of the self-made individual in 
American culture, pushes the criticism of welfare programs to a more personal level – not being 
able to take care of yourself means not being American. In this way, the suite of welfare 
programs for the aging person symbolizes the very antithesis of the American notion of 
autonomy.  
Ironically, this dispossession of one’s American-ness regarding individualism and self-
reliance was paramount during the Great Depression, the time that gave birth to the very safety 
net that would later be disparaged. Sweeping unemployment put a strain not only on the day-to-
day responsibilities one had to one’s family, but also called into question the very extent to 
which one was self-reliant. Achenbaum remarks “that one-fifth of all men who wanted to work 
still could not find jobs as late as 1938 painfully demonstrated that ‘rugged individualism had 
fallen upon rugged times,”85 causing Americans to realize that the dreams of prosperity forged in 
the 19th century and believed to have been made possible during the industrial expansion of 
consumer society during the early 20th century were just that – dreams. As the economy 
recovered, however, the acceptance of Social Security as a necessary provision waned as 
individuals were able to return to previous earnings levels. During the 1950s Americans yearned 
for the restoration of the idealized male-centric rugged vision of self-reliance that evaporated 
during the Great Depression, and popular culture responded with literary, television, and film 
characters capable of taking care of themselves outside of the influence of a central 
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government.86 Still, economic prosperity had not quite rebounded entirely, so the fictional 
images remained fictional until the era of the Great Society. As the economy experienced its 
longest sustained expansion during the 1950s and 60s, the pushback against the welfare 
programs, couched in libertarian terms, began. The economic boom, largely powered by the 
private sector, led to a further separation of socioeconomic classes, leaving certain groups, 
namely those who were already poor, but also the aging population, struggling to keep up and 
restore their own self-reliance. The question that emerged during this time was that of prolonged 
dependence on government welfare, specifically for the aging who had received special attention 
in the form of government-funded social programs to help aging persons achieve the good life. 
“Leaders in federal government did not expect, and the American public certainly did not 
want”87 the welfare programs, Social Security Medicare Medicaid (and Welfare), to create either 
a group or a society that would be permanently dependent upon the financial support of the 
government. The policymakers maintained their optimism concerning the legislation passed 
during the Great Society era, but the idea that the government was continuing to involve itself in 
maintaining the wellbeing of the individual beyond securing fundamental freedoms during a time 
that did not require such direct help was not popularly believed to be germane to the government. 
The same pattern of support during time of economic crisis and protest during economic surge 
befalls American society today.  
The problem, however, is more complex than the ‘libertarian self-made autonomous 
individual’ critique of the welfare policies. Aging persons are not homogenous despite the 
blanket categorization applied by the government vis-à-vis welfare policies. A diverse group 
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such as the aging complicates what is intended to be an equitable program that attempts to secure 
individuals’ financial wellbeing. What Social Security does not account for is the varying level 
of contributions that individuals were capable of making over the course of their working lives. 
Embedded in what appears to be only a problem of socioeconomic class are the contributory 
problems of gender and race.  
Noted during the time of the New Deal was the policymakers’ belief that individuals, 
once financially stable, would continue to contribute to their own individual retirement funds, 
understanding that Social Security was intended to be temporary or at least a last resort. 
However, it became part of the foundation upon which many Americans built their retirement 
plans. If one’s contribution to Social Security is contingent upon one’s capacity to earn, the fact 
that racial minorities and women enter retirement at a significant disadvantage when compared 
to their white male contemporaries is exceptionally problematic. As mentioned above, the 
original Social Security Act enacted during the New Deal limited the types of jobs that were 
eligible for benefits, and this directly impacted racial minorities whose jobs did not qualify for 
the full benefit. Median income for full-time African-Americans in 2014 was roughly $36,000 
compared to the entire full-time working population’s average of $44,000.88 African-American 
men fare better than African-American women regarding Social Security benefit collection - 
$14,672 versus $12,640. However, the Social Security Administration states that workers with 
lower wages receive a higher percentage of wages back compared to higher wage earners. Still, 
African-American life expectancy remains shorter than the general population – 65 years of age 
compared to 78.8 years, so the return on the benefit has a better chance of not being realized 
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when compared to other racial groups. Hispanics with full-time jobs do slightly worse in terms of 
median income, earning $31,760 per year, but they have above average life expectancies with 
Hispanic men at 85 and Hispanic women at 89.89 Hispanic men received an average benefit of 
$14,626 and women received an average benefit of $11,172. Median wages for women working 
full-time were $39,000 compared to $49,000 for men, and female beneficiaries of Social Security 
received an average of $12,857 whereas the benefits for men averaged $16,590. Life expectancy 
for women overall was approximately 88 years of age and 86 for men. Beyond the evident 
disproportionate access to Social Security benefits experienced across sexes, classes, and races, 
what these statistics indicate is that the government’s vision of wellbeing, understood as the 
financial and medical assistance necessary to live the good life in aging, is fundamentally flawed 
as it does not account for these glaring inequities. The type of health care one can afford 
throughout one’s life is obviously based on one’s income; however, if the type of health care to 
which one has access in later years is contingent upon contributions made during working years, 
is it fair to say that the policies actually intend to support the welfare of the aging population as a 
whole? No, aging persons from racial minority groups receive more limited care during their 
younger years and during the time in which they are most likely to need medical care. It is 
nonsensical to have a policy that aims to protect the health and financial wellbeing of aging 
persons when the policy does not seriously consider the diverse needs of that population. Issues 
of gender, class, and race are problematic in any analysis of economics, but there exists a 
different type of discriminatory practice that targets aging persons without concern for these 
otherwise important demographic descriptors. 
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The Social Construction Of Aging And Ageism 
 Unproductive. Financially insecure. Ugly. Dependent. Unhealthy. These descriptors, 
implied or explicitly stated, have been used throughout the above sections to demonstrate 
cultural and political perceptions of aging persons. While the terms used may accurately describe 
some individuals, they do nothing more than reveal the fact that aging itself has been socially 
constructed, and constructed negatively. Whether the aging person is viewed as un-American 
because of a lack of independence, viewed as sick given his or her failure to meet certain health 
standards,90 or simply recognized as a 65-year-old who qualifies for government support, 
American culture has largely informed what it means to be a Third Ager and what that 
experience is or should be like; the aging person him or herself turns to cultural norms on 
direction for how to age well. Of the many ways in which the social construction of aging can be 
witnessed, the discriminatory practice of ageism is especially concerning.  
 Akin to the formula of other prejudices or stereotypes, ageism refers to “the negative 
attitudes or behaviors toward an individual solely based on that person’s age.”91 The term may 
not seem immediately relevant to the subject group of this dissertation, but members of the Third 
Age who may be financially insecure, experiencing new health care needs, transitioning out of 
the workplace and into new social and familial roles, and turning to the marketplace for guidance 
certainly are subjected to ageism. Operating discreetly by means of subliminal messages in 
pharmaceutical advertisements and workplace restructuring, or overtly in the claims that aging is 
a pathogenic condition, ageism’s effects reach Third Agers and anyone who is self-conscious of 
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age. Regardless of how it is communicated, this “alteration in feeling, belief, or behavior in 
response to an individual’s or group’s perceived chronological age”92 has far reaching effects on 
those outside and within the Third Age.  
Margaret Morganroth Gullette argues that the theories of culture and (consumer) 
culture’s influence on aging illustrate what she identifies as decline. “Decline,” according to 
Gullette, refers to “the entire system that worsens the experience of aging past youth,”93 which 
can be mitigated or exacerbated depending on one’s social context.94 Aging itself, the physical 
and mental changes that one might naturally experience, is not what Gullette means by the term 
decline. She does not suggest that this process of aging is the problem, but rather that the 
problem rests in the ideology of aging-as-decline. This form of thinking permeates social, 
political, economic, sexual, and aesthetic beliefs of both the non-aging and aging alike. Thus, 
Gullette’s call is to “defy ageism, not aging”95 for ageism96 reveals the manner(s) in which aging 
is socially constructed. The complicated and sweeping effects of aging-as-decline are 
experienced in a number of areas of need, i.e. health care and the aforementioned high value 
placed on youth in the social imageries and the value of productivity exemplified by ageism in 
the workplace. 
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Economic and cultural factors come together in changing the landscape of the workplace 
and work force regarding the aging. Maintaining full-time work has become increasingly 
difficult for aging members of the workforce and has already begun trickling down to younger 
age groups.97 Age discrimination in both the hiring and terminating processes, “job 
obsolescence, changing job-performance capabilities, and adverse institutional structures (such 
as mandatory retirement),”98 are but a few of the problems aging persons face when it comes to 
maintaining or finding full-time work.  
 Though there are laws that prohibit discrimination based on age in both the hiring and 
firing processes of jobs, “negative stereotypes about older workers, as well as elderly people in 
general, may act as precursors to ageist discourse or discriminatory practices.”99 The Age 
Discrimination or Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967 was designed to 
protect workers over age 40 from being passed over for employment based on age and as a 
means to increase job opportunities for older Americans so long as they were capable of 
whatever a new job might require. Despite the 20,588 suits filed in 2014, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruled that 552 or 2.7% had reasonable cause, illustrating that 
age discrimination in the workplace remains difficult to prove.100 The number of cases 
proportionate to cases determined to be reasonable may seem alarming, but what proves more 
interesting are the cultural biases that perpetuate the continued increase in such cases, those 
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ageist tendencies that come with Gullette’s era of decline. 
 Discourse in the workplace, casual or formal, can reveal much about the pervasive nature 
of implicit ageism. Talk of job performance or productivity oftentimes is employed to mask age 
discrimination in the hiring and firing processes – Robert McCann and Howard Giles identify 
‘young blood’ remarks as often being used in lawsuits sent to the EEOC.101 Comments such as 
“we need some young blood around here,” “let’s make room for some M.B.A.s,” or “let’s bring 
in the young guns” may take on various forms in typical conversation, but they always reveal the 
belief that aging persons are replaceable and/or in need of replacing because they are older. 
There is a cultural perception that older workers demonstrate a natural decline in productivity 
alleged to begin once a worker turns 40; a decrease in productivity correlates to a decrease in the 
very value of the aging worker as person.102 However, research that explores the relationship 
between increasing age and decreasing productivity reveals no concrete causal relationship.103 
This lack of connection parallels the same argument made by those who believe that aging is a 
disease – research does not show that aging always brings about the same series of health issues, 
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yet the myth is perpetuated by physicians and ethicists. There may be individuals whose 
productivity dissipates, just as one’s health may decline, but when a number of studies are 
evaluated there may be more truth in the claim that “older workers may actually be more 
productive than their younger counterparts, or at least on par with them,”104 than in the idea that 
aging workers are less productive. What seems to be at work in perpetuating the myth that aging 
persons are less productive is the myth revealed in chapter one regarding the functional health of 
the aging.   
An unsubstantiated belief that all aging persons experience a synchronous and uniform 
decline in physical and mental health contributes to an inhospitable workplace. However, the 
myth of inevitable cognitive impairment is most damaging. While “there are losses in attention 
and working memory with increasing age,” which can present a problem insofar as individuals 
are capable of maintaining work performance and being trained to perform new tasks, “only a 
minority of older adults develop extreme impairment in the form of dementia.”105 Needing to be 
replaced on the grounds of productivity is one thing, on the sole basis of age is another; however, 
there remains a perceived link between the two, a link that is pseudo-science at best. The myth 
that all aging persons experience cognitive decline and are thereby incapable of working at all, 
contributes to a work culture that impedes the willingness of employers to spend time improving 
the aging worker, let alone hire aging members of the workforce. 
Continuing in the pseudo-scientific realm of ageist myths, aging persons are generally 
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thought to be resistant to and even unable to change. Whether there is an underlying cognitive 
pathology that may justify a resistance (i.e. prior traumatic life experience with a certain type of 
labor practice) to change or not, the perception is that an old dog cannot be taught new tricks. 
Such a belief may not only lead to an employer’s firing an aging worker, but also might stymie 
the worker’s chances of obtaining a job later in life. A number of studies point to “strongly held 
societal beliefs that older people are unwilling to change” and effectively “not worth training 
because they will not be around long, learn too slowly…and are computer illiterate.”106 Beliefs 
that aging persons are generally set in their own ways take on a unique tone when applied to the 
workplace because such beliefs can be transformed into discriminatory practices that can damage 
one’s sense of worth or value, and more tangibly, financial security. Again, however, normative 
claims about the rigidity and inflexibility of aging persons have been proven untrue by a number 
of studies, and aging-person specific training initiatives among several Fortune 500 companies 
demonstrate that the aging person’s ability to learn new skills is on par with younger trainees.107 
However, societal beliefs about the difficulty that comes with training and a perceived decline in 
productivity persist despite evidence to the contrary. These conscious or subconscious beliefs, 
when coupled with the realities of financial security and correlative end-of-work policies 
illustrate the convergence of the social construction of aging and ageism. 
Financial security for the aging population has been a public concern in the US since the 
time of FDR, and it has been seen as integral in fulfilling the good life as one ages, yet achieving 
that security can be rather complicated. The complex difficulties of attaining financial security 
highlight the relationship between the social construction of aging and ageist claims. On the one 
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hand the aging worker is told by society that he or she will be able to stop working and enjoy 
more leisure time once he or she reaches the requisite age for Social Security benefits. On the 
other hand, the aging individual is confronted with the aforementioned difficulties in keeping the 
necessary full-time employment that enables an adequate level of contribution to Social Security. 
All the while, the retirement age of 65 itself, which exists as the point of demarcation for the 
receipt of benefits, has been arbitrarily chosen. Outside of the existence of the Social Security 
Act and its requisite age for benefit collection, there exist no conclusive studies or sound 
rationale that legitimize any claims regarding when an individual should no longer work. 
Retirement is a relatively new concept that responds in part to increased longevity and to the 
belief that one should have time to enjoy the benefits years spent working. The time when one 
should retire does not necessarily reflect the needs or wishes of the aging worker, but rather the 
wishes of the employer. As has been explained, the older worker is often viewed as no longer 
productive and incapable of learning anything new to improve productivity, thus there is a need 
to move the aging person out of a given job and replace him or her (with a younger and 
oftentimes less costly person). With 65 having become the marker for the time when one is no 
longer expected to work, companies and society alike expect that individuals will remove 
themselves from the workforce at that time. If 65 is too late from the employer’s perspective, 
more appealing retirement packages may be offered so as to help facilitate the removal of the 
aging person.108 Pensions have contributed to the belief that individuals should retire at 65 or 
even younger. For those who are financially secure enough to supplement Social Security 
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benefits with pensions, retiring ‘as early as possible’ may be encouraged. Some employers have 
gone so far as to make the process of retiring early easier and more cost effective by “absorbing 
all or most of the added costs of paying pensions out over a longer period of time,” and creating 
even more appealing early retirement incentive programs that offers workers “credits to increase 
their pension levels or a lump-sum payment (typically equal to one-half to two years’ salary) in 
addition to their regular pension.”109 Retiring early enables individuals to enjoy more leisure time 
and more of the comforts that one has earned, which happen to coincide with societal norms 
regarding what the retired person is supposed to do and when the aging person is supposed to 
retire (i.e. spend time with family, care for grandchildren, serve the community, leisure actives). 
However, the security provided by retirement benefits does not necessarily guarantee the good 
life in aging; in fact, this sudden change for the life-long worker can leave the retired person 
“feeling isolated and confused,”110 wondering what to do.  
To summarize, the social construction of aging and ageist beliefs and practices reinforce 
one another. The social construction of aging perpetuates ageist beliefs and practices in the 
workplace, and these further entrench socially constructed views of aging. No longer regarded as 
capable of productive employment at Job A, the aging person is let go, and because of the belief 
that older adults are less capable of adapting to change or are difficult to train, they cannot find 
new Job B. The aging worker needs Job A in order to retire comfortably, regarding health and 
financial security, per society’s standards, but can be manipulated into a forced retirement or let 
go because of a decrease in productivity. If displaced workers do find new work, they will 
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“typically recover only a percentage of their salaries; some [will] need two jobs” whereas their 
younger replacements can have a greater potential for earning more than the outgoing aging 
worker.111 Needing to work longer, aging persons return to the job search and face the problem 
with which this example began. All of this has been considered for the aging population 
identified in this dissertation, but the problem is beginning to impact younger adults.112 If the 
aging person around 62 finds difficulty with these issues, imagine the anxiety over financial 
security faced by the 50-year-old who is not close to retirement but is subjected to the same types 
of ageist tendencies as older adults. Consider those who lost work, homes, and retirement 
savings during the Great Recession–those aging persons suffered greatly and may not ever have 
a chance to age well. This creates an endless series of problems for the aging person who wishes 
to work so as to achieve the good life in aging. 
Ageism underscores the value placed on youth in society. Whether in the workplace or in 
popular images mediated through consumer culture, the youthful person or healthy youthful 
body is identified with the good life. Individuals in the workplace capable of doing good work 
are those who are young while those who physically appear to be older or are older are 
stigmatized. Assuming that productivity is linked to age, and continuing to push the perceived 
age-based productivity line down toward increasingly younger ages, undermines the aging 
person’s ability to achieve the good life in terms of one’s autonomy as a producer and as a 
consumer vis-à-vis having the necessary finances to fulfill one’s own or a culturally determined 
vision of the good life. If the workplace itself becomes an impediment to an individual’s 
expression of autonomy and the free market cannot adequately fulfill the desires of the 
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individual, then autonomy itself has been denied. Compounded with the images of the good life 
communicated through consumer culture and the beliefs emerging from the ‘aging as disease’ 
school of thought precipitated a principle of autonomy in biomedical ethics whose creation 
absorbed the entirety of the history of American autonomy in a consumer culture that 
commodified wellbeing. 
Conclusion 
Aging persons in America are told, directly or indirectly, that the good life can be or is 
achieved by remaining independent and autonomous, continuing to participate in the economy as 
a consumer of goods and services, and appearing to be more youthful. The interwoven history of 
independence and individualism, coupled with consumer culture, present aging persons with a 
complicated narrative to which they are asked to respond. Unfortunately for the aging, the force 
of such cultural beliefs can derail them from ever identifying and pursuing the good life as they 
themselves may see it. While this assessment may be applicable to other groups within society, 
the aging are unique in that they will have had a long period of social and economic 
participation, and they will have contributed to the very narratives to which they are called to 
respond. As Third Agers, they suddenly - or not so suddenly - find difficulty in being able to 
clearly see and move toward what will afford them the type of good life they have been promised 
and/or that they have envisioned. The individualistic identity that is so highly valued in and 
through American culture transforms autonomy into a principle of self-determination that 
reduces freedom to pursue the good life to existential freedom alone. Transitioning from 
primarily being a producer who consumes to strictly a consumer can be difficult for those who 
have spent a majority of their adult lives identifying themselves as someone who does X or is an 
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X-er. Instead of being identified by what one does, the aging persons is are identified by their 
possessions, whether that be in the form of material goods or a youthful appearance. If one is no 
longer capable of contributing to the good of society in terms of productivity then one has 
forfeited, at least partially, one’s right to be locus of social concern. Gullette suggests that this is 
not only part of the producer-consumer transition, but also a natural progression of public 
opinion. The welfare policies were developed to assist helpless individuals who had no 
opportunity, but today aging persons have been afforded a surplus of opportunity to prepare and 
generally are better prepared for personal and social life after work.113 Failure to prepare 
adequately over the course of one’s life is no reason for continued socio-political support; 
however, being unable to prepare is. Gullette’s observation of the populace’s disposition toward 
helping care for the aging points to the way in which the social construction of aging and ageism 
has been fueled by the values of consumer culture.  
 What remains puzzling is the idea that on the one hand culture promotes productivity as 
the path to enjoying the good life while on the other social and political practices push 
individuals from the realm of economic productivity to that of consumption without offering 
much help beyond the minimal financial and health benefits. In such a time of vulnerability and 
ambiguity, there is a natural turn to sources that guide aging persons through this existential 
change. However, what is offered by culture is not necessarily as accommodating or sympathetic 
as one might have hoped and instead further complicates an already uncertain period of one’s 
life. Perhaps what is needed is a look to other perspectives that can better work to counteract the 
rather detrimental views of aging coming from American culture.  
                                                
113 Gullette, Agewise, 11. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AGING WELL IN THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have sought to offer competing models of aging well while 
examining the socio-cultural context in which such models are received. Medical perspectives 
emphasized that aging well was inextricably linked to good physical and mental health. Medical 
ethicists responded to that very one-dimensional assessment of the good life by attempting to 
resolve a more complicated question regarding whether or not aging itself was pathogenic or a 
natural part of life – a question that continues to be debated. A coincidental development in 
gerontology attempted to do the work that biomedical ethicists should have been doing at the 
time, namely, publicly discussing how one might age well. That discussion within gerontology 
was very much rooted in developmental psychology, and focused on psychosocial struggles and 
the sense of achievement or completeness afforded by such psychological progress. Still, what 
was offered from medicine, biomedical ethics, and gerontology, lacked any sort of 
systematization, any consensus, and worse, any normative teeth. This shortcoming has only been 
further complicated by the context in which it was evolving – an individual-centric and 
consumer-driven American culture that struggled and continues to struggle with what is to be 
made of aging persons. What is necessary, then, is an alternative perspective capable of 
addressing the holistic needs of the aging person while also proposing an approach to an ethics of 
aging that is responsive to the diversity of the modern American aging demographic. An 
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alternative approach will both describe the intrinsic value of the aging process and demonstrate 
how an aging individual might live the good life in the Third Age and beyond. The Christian 
tradition is one such discipline capable of informing an ethics of aging for modern Americans.  
Given Christianity’s place in the history and development of biomedical ethical 
discourse, it is necessary to analyze its insights regarding the question of aging well as the 
pursuit for an ethic of aging proceeds. When considering the range of contributions made by 
theology and theological ethics to the question of aging well, it is important to examine first the 
insights of Scripture and then those of the tradition as a whole.1 Biblical scholarship, albeit 
limited vis-à-vis aging persons, offers several important insights that can begin the work of 
countering the negative socio-cultural narratives posed in chapters one and two. Likewise, the 
theological tradition serves as a source of insight. Again, what is necessary is that the surveyed 
commentaries on aging be read as pieces of a broader, though disjointed, Christian theo-ethical 
perspective on aging persons and the good life. First, then it is important to go to the beginning 
and look at several of the themes emerging from Scripture.  
Gordon J. Harris’ benchmark work Biblical Perspectives on Aging recalls and examines 
the “stories, poetry, and character studies”2 of aging and elderly persons in Scripture, particularly 
the Old Testament. The Bible “certainly had a concept of old age and aging” and the stories 
                                                
1 Ahearn, David Oki and Peter R. Gathje. Doing right and being good: Catholic and Protestant readings in 
Christian ethics. (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2005), 33. These are but two sources of Christian ethics. The others, 
reason and experience, complete the group of four that constitute the Wesleyan Quadrilateral. David Oki Ahearn and 
Peter R. Gathje explain the beginnings of the quadrilateral: “The United Methodist Book of Discipline describes the 
Wesleyan quadrilateral this way: ‘Wesley believed that the living core of the Christian faith was revealed in 
Scripture, illumined by tradition, vivified in personal experience, and confirmed by reason.’ In the intervening years, 
this way of understanding the relationship of sources has entered into the common vocabulary of Christian 
theological ethics. All Christian denominations and theorist draw from all four of these sources, though they differ in 
how each is understood and the relative weight given to a particular source.” 
  
2 Harris, J. Gordon. Biblical Perspectives on Aging: God and the elderly, second edition. (Hoboken: Taylor and 
Francis, 2013), 13. 
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presented “have given us a variety of perspectives,”3 integral for an ethics of aging. Harris 
admits that there is no systematic theology of aging but is convinced that there are “clues about 
general attitudes and practices.”4 A sampling of Harris’ findings will be covered below, but 
suffice it to say that among the attitudes toward aging and behavioral pre-and proscriptions, one 
theme clearly emerges: aging persons hold a special place within the community. 
A number of biblical characters are said to have lived past age 100 with some reaching 
900 years5 – the accuracy of which must always be viewed through the prism of symbolic 
importance (i.e. long life demonstrating someone who was in God’s favor). With few exceptions, 
the chronological age of such characters is not explicitly stated with biblical authors tending to 
use expressions of age rather than numbers to describe older individuals. Idioms such as “‘full of 
days or advanced in years,’” writes Gordon Harris, were used in conjunction with vaguely 
defined age ranges of “childhood, youth, young married, and elderly”6 to connote the social 
stature of the individual. The term elder often came with an individual’s having achieved a 
leadership position, but such a status could be earned as early as age 30 or 40.7 In some Ancient 
Near Eastern communities, 50-year-olds were considered to be “of ripe old age.”8 Regardless of 
the precise numbers attached to various stages of life in the Bible, Harris concludes that “old age 
                                                
3 Knierim, Rolf. “Age and Aging in the Old Testament” in Ministry with the Aging, ed. William M Clements (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers, 1981), 21. 
 
4 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 6. 
 
5 Note: All Scriptural references are taken from the NRSV translation. In Genesis 5, ‘The Generations: Adam to 
Noah’, notable ages include: Adam 933, Seth 912, Methusaleh 969, and Lamech 777. All of these men fathered 
children well after their 100th birthday.   
 
6 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 54-55. 
 
7 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 58. 
 
8 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 55. 
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in the Bible signifies the transition into a weakened social and physical condition,”9 and 
therefore establishes the basis for the notion that surviving into old age was only made possible 
through God’s special concern for the aging; aging is regarded as decline, yet accompanied by 
grace. 
According to the Old Testament, the manner in which special attention was to be paid to 
aging members of the community is born of two interrelated notions: God’s beneficent nature 
regarding Israel’s chosen status and God’s calls for justice within a society. Harris argues that the 
special care provided to older members of society is a direct result of the Exodus story in which 
God reveals God’s “intense passion for the welfare of strangers and the dispossessed.” Aging 
persons who might lose their ability to see or hear are included in Leviticus’ condemnation of 
mistreating disabled individuals.10 Likewise, other impoverished persons, such as older people, 
in need of food and shelter are identified as the helpless ones for whom God cares and for whom 
the rest of society is called to embrace and care.11 Despite their physical limitations and exposure 
to social marginalization, older persons were believed to be integral in daily religio-social 
functions. Older persons, having an esteemed place in society vis-à-vis God’s having made 
possible their living into later years, were understood to be the conduits through which God was 
able to communicate God’s word. Not only was this done pragmatically through the transmission 
of Scripture and tenets of the Jewish faith, but also through their overseeing and practicing rites 
                                                
9 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 57-58. 
 
10 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 103. 
 
11 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 104. 
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and serving as arbiters of legal disputes within the community.12 Still, God’s graces did not 
primarily work to overturn or even thwart the biological signs of aging, with several notable 
exceptions.13 The point remains, however, that God did not intervene in the lives of older persons 
for the purposes of restoring their youth or needlessly extending their lives—there was a divinely 
appointed meaning to life uninfluenced by cultural norms. Regardless of the physical effects of 
the aging individual’s journey into the later years, one was given profound religio-social 
responsibility and essential to the continued flourishing of the community.    
However, simply because an aging person experienced the physical and mental effects of 
the aging process, Knierim notes that there was not an association of aging itself with death like 
there is today, but certainly aging was known to come with some form of decline. Because of 
aging’s special status, the process itself was not believed to be a disease in and of itself, despite 
biblical times presenting myriad threats to life, medical or otherwise. “Deadly diseases, 
accidents, killing, hunger, and war”14 were part of the lived experience of every generation, 
further distancing any correlation between one’s age and proximity to death. Death was viewed 
as a single event marking the end of life rather than part of a developmental stage. Therefore, it 
was not treated with such public aversion or need for reversal or delay. Instead, those who lived 
into later years were lauded as having lived a full and well-rounded life, despite whatever decline 
                                                
12 Barak, Y and Achiron, A. “Age Related Disorders in the Bible” Aging and Mental Health (1998); 2(4) :275-278, 
276. 
 
13 In Genesis 21, Sarah, who previously states that God has prevented her from bearing children (16:2), gives birth 
to Isaac at the advanced age of 90. Sarah’s age is revealed in Genesis 17:17. In this case, God is directly responsible 
for overturning the physiological functioning of the aging body.  
 
14 Knierim, “Age and Aging in the Old Testament,” 22. 
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may have been experienced because they were able to live for a long time.15 Because of more a 
widespread acceptance of aging as natural, aging was viewed as a blessing despite decline, and 
was sometimes even viewed as an opportunity for honor. That honor could be the type that one 
demonstrated by responding to God’s grace and loving others and transmitting the faith. Honor 
could also be bestowed upon the aging by others, thus an obligation imposed on others within the 
community by God to care for the aging.  
The Book of Proverbs16 articulates a special condemnation for the children of older 
parents who might mistreat or steal from their vulnerable parents. Harris explains that 
mistreating one’s parents is the equivalent of murder insofar as the act of stealing from an ailing 
parent could very well hasten his or her death.17 A famous story of parental care is that of 
Jacob’s deception of his father, Isaac in Genesis 27. The story is important for two reasons: it 
points to the notion that taking advantage of older persons is a long-practiced problem, and that 
the one who takes care of the aging parent gains God’s favor (regardless, unfortunately, of the 
deceit involved). Important to note is how central the parent-child relationship was in 
maintaining justice in biblical society. “Israel’s legal collections strengthen social structures and 
order by stressing obedience to and respect for the older generations,”18 which are reflective of 
secular legal and social codes of contemporary societies in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Canaan.19 It 
was widely known that dysfunction between the older, believed to be better equipped at 
                                                
15 Knierim, “Age and Aging in the Old Testament,” 23. 
 
16 Proverbs 28:24, “A person who robs father and mother and says ‘There is nothing wrong with it,’ becomes the 
accomplice of a murderer.” 
 
17 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 104. 
 
18 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 74. 
 
19 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 59. 
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organizing and maintaining order within a society, and younger generations would result in 
tumult capable of destabilizing an entire society. Thus, care for the aging was both religiously 
and socially necessary, the relationship between which Harris admits is difficult to distinguish.20  
What can be said about the insights offered by both Harris and Knierim is that there are 
two important themes with a causal relationship: God claims aging persons as special, and aging 
persons are to be cared for by members of the community. In a number of stories, it is the elderly 
members of a society who are described as being in God’s favor, inferred as a direct result of 
their age. Being an aging individual in a biblical community signified one’s achievement in 
overcoming the inherent difficulties in living into one’s 50s and 60s in the ancient Near East – a 
feat believed to have only been attributable to something else, something otherworldly, 
something divine. God’s enabling the aging to continue on in years indicated to the people that 
they had also succeeded in achieving God’s vision of a just society. God’s role in the aging 
process itself presents a positive vision of aging that stands at odds with today’s aging narratives. 
However, the biblical vision of aging well only represents one contribution from the Christian 
tradition.  
Theological models addressing the aging have relied upon a somewhat Thomistic 
framework highlighting the spiritual or supernatural ends of the person and/or the practical or 
natural ends of human life. In focusing on the faith life, the practice of theological virtues is seen 
as integral to aging well, and satisfies the practical needs of the aging person. Approaches that 
emphasize the practical needs of the individual make use of other virtues whose practice may 
then bring about the good life for the aging person. The details of these approaches will be 
explored below, but, generally, the literature emphasizes faith and hope as first steps toward 
                                                
20 Harris, Biblical Perspectives on Aging, 71. 
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aging well, and emphasizes additional essential virtues needed to age well. A number of texts 
dealing explicitly with the theological virtues are spiritual or pastoral/ministerial in nature. These 
will not be considered below for several reasons. Though they are important, the texts do not 
necessarily contribute to an ethics of aging – they lack a normative schema that outlines what is 
central to aging well in the Christian tradition.  Little to no attention is paid to the type of 
responsibility the aging person has as an agent regarding his or her own contribution to aging 
well vis-à-vis peers and other members of society. The pastoral literature also falls into 
biomedical ethics’ trap of connecting aging with end-of-life care, and it is mostly tailored toward 
dealing with death – an ars moriendi. Interesting to note is that the theological literature of this 
‘aging-as-dying-well’ tradition is that it is a marked shift from the biblical notion that death was 
a single event or moment rather than a process. Given that change in perspective, the spiritual 
literature, albeit unknowingly, adopts a perspective on aging that undermines the possibility of 
aging well.  
Theological Perspectives Of The Good Life In The Third Age 
A theological ethics of aging is a necessary response to the social question of the Third 
Age. It remains true that a Christian ethics of aging can be gleaned from the tradition by making 
use of concepts of human dignity, love, and justice (as was the case with some of Harris’ 
scriptural findings); however, the specific application of those concepts to aging persons is not 
necessarily the focus of the teachings in which they appear. In the following section, I will 
address the faith-based responses to aging that explore the relationship between aging and 
suffering, the virtues ethics responses that attempt to identify the various practices understood to 
be integral to aging well, and I will end with two newer approaches that move into an ethics of 
care for aging persons. 
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Aging And Suffering  
Richard’s “Toward A Theology of Aging” begins with an admission that theology has 
“never concerned itself directly with the phenomenon of aging.”21 He gives credit to the work of 
David Tracy22 and Henri Nouwen23 who attempted to apply elements of Christian theology to the 
aging population, but notes their inadequacy in addressing the question of “what can be done to 
transform the oppression of the elderly” and “what pragmatic consequences should follow from a 
theology of aging?”24 Richard believes that these authors fail in their lack of awareness of and 
response to the cultural context of aging persons has been insufficient given the power of 
culture’s negative perception of aging persons. In response to the cultural context of aging being 
inextricably linked to the loss of self and self-rejection, Richard argues that “a frame of reference 
                                                
21 Lucien Richard. 1982. “Toward a theology of aging.” Science Et Esprit 34, no. 3: 269. 
 
22 See: Tracy, David W. 1975. “Eschatological perspectives on aging.” Pastoral Psychology 24 no. 299, 119-134. 
Tracy explains that understanding this way, “The Christian doctrine or symbols of eschatology bear intrinsic 
disclosive power for illuminating certain important dimensions of our common human experience of the process of 
aging: our sense of temporality and history.” By placing our lives in the context of the already and not yet 
dimensions of eschatology, a more cohesive understanding of human life can be uncovered. Lack of attention to the 
overarching trajectory of our lives is limiting. Tracy believes that thinking about life as “atomic moments” which are 
parts of a cycle of experience of “another now” offers no help in providing meaning in the aging process nor can the 
past or future aid in providing a context within which the present occurs. Only by being able to connect the 
proverbial dots is it possible for one to understand him or herself as an individual and as a person embedded within a 
larger structure. Awareness of the “three modalities of time – past, present, and future” provides a “horizon of 
meaningfulness, an orientation to the value” of life and of aging that minimally offers a pause for reflection and 
ultimately enables an individual’s receptive posture to the temporal and eternal life. Thus, an appreciation for the 
eschatological dimension not only helps individuals deal with the issue of mortality vis-à-vis the triumph of Jesus, 
but it also offers a way in which humans can find meaning in their lives beyond a stitched together series of 
moments, which may impede personal fulfillment for the aging person who cannot see beyond her immediate 
circumstance.  
 
23 Henri Nouwen’s Aging offers a theo-spiritual reflection on the process of aging that is applicable to aging persons 
themselves as well as their caretakers and those with whom the aging will be in contact through the later years. 
Nouwen emphasizes that aging is not a time for despair but a time for hope and joy in that God’s promise of 
salvation is close at hand. Aging is not to be feared; instead aging should be embraced as a natural part of human life 
that offers new opportunities for one to engage in spiritual and religious life.  
24 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 272. 
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where loss and negation can be affirmed without falling into a permanently enervating despair”25 
is the necessary counter-narrative capable of re-contextualizing the Third Age as a period of life 
and hope. The current narrative, replete with negative cultural images, ageist social norms and 
practices, “provides no set of values that can represent aging as a process worth the effort.”26 If 
there is to be a genuinely fulfilling model for successful aging there must be a reorientation of 
American culture, liberation from “a functional ethic which suggests that self-worth is contingent 
on performance in economic and social positions.”27 The process in which aging persons and 
American culture itself in general can be liberated begins with the cornerstone of the Christian 
faith, the Paschal Mystery.  
 Instead of attacking the cultural and social norms that alienate aging persons in an 
attempt to offer a corrective for the system that birthed such norms, Richard uses the themes of 
alienation and self-rejection as an almost positive starting point. Inspired by Gaudium et spes, 
Richard argues that even within the theological discourse the profound meaning of the Paschal 
Mystery has been diminished – God’s presence among humanity was reduced to a completed 
historical act that only set the stage for the fulfillment of the eschatological promise.28 Absent 
from Richard’s analysis, but helpful in further understanding Richard’s vision is Johann Baptist 
                                                
25 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 275. 
 
26 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 275. 
 
27 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 286. 
 
28 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 276. Richard argues that theologians have focused on the resurrection as 
being the definitive moment in which evil was conquered. “The cross becomes the symbol of an evil that has no 
longer any power over us; that no longer needs to be taken seriously. The impact of the ‘already here’ has blocked 
out the cutting edge of the ‘not yet.’” He further remarks that “Christianity in North America replaces the 
‘already/not yet’ with a straightforward ‘already,” suggesting that the triumph of the Cross is interpreted as letting 
American Christians off the hook regarding their faith lives and the manner in which they conduct themselves.  
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Metz’s two categories of religion: bourgeois and messianic.29 Bourgeois faith is characterized by 
taking life and the future for granted, and “affirms autonomy, competitive struggle, property, 
stability, and success.”30 It is this type of lazy faith of which Richard is critical, particularly how 
that type of faith life is perceived to represent the good life in aging. Metz’s messianic faith, 
however, is what Richard hopes the aging Christian can live out in the Third Age. The messianic 
faith is one that inspires unconditional love for all, compassion, and virtuous living. Thus, 
Richard moves to remind Christians of the Mystery’s significance, specifically the way in which 
God’s kenosis31 changes the very meaning of the human experience vis-à-vis suffering. In doing 
so Richard turns what culture has determined to be a negative experience, aging, into a deeply 
meaningful religious experience.  
 Transforming a culture “based on domination and mastery” into one that “underline[s] 
man/woman’s poverty; man/woman, the receiver,”32 requires that the alienation that culture 
forces upon the aging be reframed around the positive experience of being finite and contingent 
vis-à-vis the Paschal Mystery. For Richard, this is made possible through a ‘theology from 
below’ that views Jesus’ suffering as an act of love. Not all that dissimilar from other liberation 
theologies, the theology of aging advocated by Richard starts with the plight of the aging person, 
with both its physical and mental effects as well as the social marginalization, recalling that 
                                                
29 Metz, Johann Baptist. 1981. “Toward the Second Reformation: The Future of Christianity in a Postbourgeois 
World.” Cross Currents 31, no. 1:85-98. 
 
30 Hanchin, Timothy. 2006. “Messianic or Bourgeois?” America. Vol 194. New York: America Press.  
 
31 Based on Philippians 2:7, which explains God’s emptying of God’s self into a human servant, kenosis (and 
kenotic theory) stresses the importance of the Incarnation as a profound act of God’s love. By taking on the human 
form God attaches God’s self to the rest of creation God very really surrenders part of God’s being for the benefit of 
humanity. 
 
32 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 277-8. 
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Jesus’ “total participation in our finite powerlessness” has made “suffering and death the central 
interpretive principle of God’s nature.”33 It is in the actual suffering, in this case the aging 
person's physical, cognitive, or psychological suffering, that one begins to come to understand, 
albeit limitedly, the type of self-sacrificial love God has offered to humanity and asks to be 
reciprocated. The acceptance of such suffering as being part of life provides a “deeper love for 
reality”34 grounded in the hope that life is wholly meaningful. However, it may remain 
challenging for the aging person to accept that the type of suffering endured is an act of love or 
opportunity for one to experience God’s love. Richard moves to address this apparent disconnect 
by expanding on the theology of kenosis or kenotic Christology.  
 Turning to the events of the Cross and its aftermath Richard suggests that aging persons 
can begin to identify with the type of self-emptying that provides the basis for coming to realize 
the type of good life that can be experienced in aging. The Cross is symbolic of God’s entering 
into the suffering of humanity, and particularly the suffering of the oppressed, those whom Jesus 
championed. In the self-surrender demonstrated on the Cross Jesus accepts God’s plan and 
affirms his own love for humanity and love for God – the mark of complete dependence upon 
God. Relevant to aging individuals, the “conversion to the ‘crucified Christ’ liberates” the Third 
Ager who has been conditioned to understand one’s existence in a particular way by directly 
confronting “cultural and social illusions.”35 No longer is the aging person limited in how she or 
he can understand the self, no longer is the aging person determined from without; instead, the 
                                                
33 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 280. 
 
34 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 281. 
 
35 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 281. 
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liberating experience of the Cross enables the aging person to love as Jesus loved, to truly live.  
This use of kenotic Christology takes the perceived negative interpretation of dependence in 
aging and adjusts the hermeneutic such that the love practiced by both God and Jesus on the 
Cross reaffirms God’s “love of the unworthy, the worthless, the lost…characterized by its 
universality.”36 In effect, the events of the Cross and the love it displayed, and continues to 
display, exemplify the truth of living interdependently. 
 Standing in contradistinction to the American cultural ethos, Richard argues that 
individual independence is not the essence of the human experience, and is therefore not an 
appropriate value to hold absolutely. Humans are and always will be dependent or contingent, 
never fully capable of mastering the world and always intertwined with the lives of the other, a 
point to be taken up further below regarding care in an ethics of aging and in the following 
chapters concerning dependency and communality. The interdependent life modeled by Jesus “is 
one of radical mutuality and reciprocity, of giving and receiving, of giving so completely from 
and for the other that nothing is left of self-centeredness.”37 Richard directly denounces the type 
of absolute autonomy espoused in American culture, saying that it is but an illusion precisely 
because our very being is dependent on the other. 38 The Third Age represents a period in which 
the experience of interdependence is highlighted in new and unique ways capable of reminding 
the aging person that he or she is not entirely autonomous and/or self-sufficient despite what one 
might believe. Surely the shift from independent adult to an increasingly dependent aging person 
                                                
36 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 283-284. 
 
37 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 284. 
 
38 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 284. 
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is dreaded; however, the fear is constructed by a culture that is incapable of discovering 
“meaningfulness for situations of limits, finitude, suffering, and losses.”39 Richard believes that 
the surrendering of the self to the Cross will enable the construction of an “un-American 
consciousness of finitude and limitation” that will promote a model of successful aging capable 
of accepting “limitations, conditioned autonomy and freedom.”40 This model for aging meshes 
well with Callahan’s approach to health care rationing for aging persons based on a religiously 
grounded form of disengagement and re-engagement – the aging person will become more 
limited as nature progresses, but there remain other meaningful opportunities in the Third Age 
for active involvement that counteract discriminatory and demeaning cultural narratives. Once an 
aging person has given him or herself over to God’ salvific power and rejected other alleged 
forms of salvation, i.e. life-extending medical technologies or the notion of vitalism41, the aging 
person can move closer to his or her destiny.42 Richard concludes that the theology of aging, 
rooted in kenosis and hope, offers the “ultimate form of engagement” for the aging person who 
will now be able to face life “realistically without deception and the ‘new life’ without undue 
fear.”43 
 Henri Nouwen had tried previously to address this issue of the good life, arriving at a 
                                                
39 Lucien Richard. 1991. “Aging: Setting Limits with a Christian Vision: A Theology of the Paschal Mystery.” 
Journal of Religious Gerontology Vol. 8(1): 31. 
 
40 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 286. 
 
41 Vitalism is a position maintaining that life itself is the greatest possible value. Vitalism advocates for life to be 
sustained at all costs. Catholic theological ethics tends to disagree with the claims of vitalism in a manner akin to 
that of Richard on the grounds that the Resurrection and the eschatological promise do not allow for Christians to 
place earthly life over eternal life. 
  
42 Richard. “Aging: Setting Limits with a Christian Vision,” 36. 
 
43 Richard, “Toward a theology of aging,” 287. 
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conclusion similar to Richard’s: “fearless surrender in which the distinction between life and 
death slowly loses its pain”44 will provide a sense of meaning to the aging person in the midst of 
competing socio-cultural values and norms about aging. Nouwen believes that “a gentle letting-
go” is the first step in what is needed to allow the aging person to “break through the illusions of 
immortality and smile at all the urgencies and emergencies” of one’s life, finally arriving at “the 
true reasons for living.”45 Yet the true reasons for living, beyond the hope provided by the 
Christian faith, is a task or duty that takes on new meaning during the Third Age, namely to love 
and care for others. That love and care starts with the self, and then flows outwards. 
 Nouwen suggests that in order to better care for the aging self, the aging person must first 
reaffirm one’s self-worth. Losing a sense of the self can be attributed to the aforementioned 
cultural factors influencing how aging is perceived, but Nouwen suggests that the problem lies 
more in an individual’s belief that he or she does not change and will always be the same person. 
“The old man awakening at our own center” writes Nouwen, is perceived as the “intruder 
threatening to rob us of what we consider our own.”46 In clinging to the idea that we never will 
change, the process of aging is jarring for someone who does not gradually adjust to the natural 
changes of physical, mental, and psycho-social development. In order to care for oneself, one 
must come to embrace the idea of becoming old so that one may begin to first care for oneself 
and heal. Nouwen explains that embracing the aging process as poverty-inducing is analogous to 
the total detachment found in Richard’s kenotic Christology. The poverty experienced by the 
aging person allows him or her to let go of that which provides the illusion of ownership and 
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control over one’s life and one’s surroundings – those external forces that are otherwise 
responsible for the marginalization of the aging persons.  In that poverty, the aging person can 
begin to reclaim whatever self-worth one has lost in the process of aging; a self-worth that is 
capable of transcending the natural and socially constructed limitations placed on the aging 
person. 
 However, Nouwen believes that the care for the self and reclamation and reinvention of 
self-worth in aging is impossible without the assistance of the other, the younger other, which 
can perhaps be interpreted as his harkening back to the Scriptural and early Church history of 
Christianity, but the relationship with younger generations is not one based in physical care or 
respect for elders. Instead, Nouwen’s belief raises the pyscho-spiritual benefits the aging person 
can reap from a productive relationship with younger persons. While rediscovering the self, and 
finding meaning in aging, Nouwen argues that the encounter with the younger other will provide 
the aging person with a reflective mirror whose effects are numerous. First, it works to bridge the 
social gap between generations, which is important for the carrying on of culture and the 
continued moral education of the community. Second, the intergenerational relationship in and of 
itself provides meaning and purpose for the aging individual whose later years are more 
commonly associated with loss than gain. Third, engagement with younger persons can aid in the 
aging person’s process of reflection by reminding him or her of earlier times in one’s life and 
bringing to the fore the good and bad one has done as the process of a life review commences. 
For the younger person, he or she is exposed to the wisdom of the aging and learns how to offer 
care to those who have spent their lives caring for others. Encouraging the interaction between 
younger and older persons in society is a common theme in today’s theological dialogue. 
Fostering intergenerational relationships, and the principle of intergenerational solidary will be 
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explored more closely in Chapter Five, but recent official statements from the Catholic Church 
do more than only address intergenerational relationships. Recent works offer a fragmented 
outline of valuable elements of the aging process and what an individual might to do live well.  
  While the Catholic Church does not offer a singular official position on aging persons, a 
number of statements from popes and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB) have been issued. John Paul II’s 1999 letter “To the Elderly,” was inspired by the late 
pope’s own experience with advancing in years. He reminds aging persons that the difficulties 
experienced in the finite life we live are but part of our earthly existence, and work to help 
individuals grow and develop rather than diminish the good offered by earthly life. The ability to 
look beyond the obstacles of growing older is rooted in the belief that “we will survive beyond 
death itself,”47 and that “God always gives us grace and strength to unite ourselves with greater 
love to the sacrifice of God’s Son and to share every more fully in the plan of salvation.”48 
Following in the religio-spiritual footsteps of both Richard and Nouwen, John Paul II reminds 
Christians that “the correct perspective is that of eternity, for which life at every phase is a 
meaningful preparation.”49 However, the pope adds an important element to his message: the 
inherent value of growing into old age. Instead of only outlining the hope of the Christian faith 
and its possible benefits for the aging person seeking fulfillment in later life, John Paul II offers a 
counter-narrative to an increasingly ageist culture. 
 As one progresses through the various stages of life, John Paul II explains, one 
experiences commensurate seasons of life. The Third Age, or Autumn as he describes it, is a 
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time during which the well-experienced aging person shares his or her wisdom with others 
within and outside of that period of life. Continuing that wisdom is one of the many signs of 
divine favor bestowed upon the aging person in Scripture, the pope suggests that just as aging 
represents an opportunity to share wisdom with others, it is a time in which the bonds across 
generations can be strengthened – a period during which all members of the community can 
come together in solidarity. Building upon Richard’s belief that interdependence or mutual 
dependence is central to the experience of human life and serves a unique relevant to aging 
persons, John Paul II argues that interdependence serves both the older and younger persons of a 
community while placing a threefold duty upon the younger individuals so as to bring about 
fuller “enrichment from the gifts and charisms of all.”50 That duty is based on the commandment 
to honor one’s father and mother, and thus it asks younger persons to 1) welcome older people, 
2) help older people, and 3) make good use of older people’s qualities.51 The practicing of these 
unspecified duties is meant to lead to the reversal of cultural trends that marginalize older people 
or make them feel as though their lives are not worthy of dignity.  
However, John Paul II does not offer the type of robust description of the dignified life 
that the faithful may have expected. He commends social programs aimed at keeping older 
people healthy and involved in their community, but the praise is always connected to older 
persons making “themselves useful” and putting “their time, talents and experience at the service 
of others.”52 The value in aging appears to be contingent upon one’s ability to contribute to the 
                                                
50 John Paul II, “To the Elderly,” §10. 
 
51 John Paul II, “To the Elderly,” §11. 
 
52 John Paul II, “To the Elderly,” §16. 
 
 151 
society with society having some tangential and nondescript role in making such participation 
possible. This sentiment is reiterated in a short statement delivered to the World Assembly of 
Aging 2002, in which John Paul II warns that the aging not be understood as a burden to society, 
but rather viewed as “a resource which can contribute to society’s well-being.”53 Likewise, Pope 
Benedict XVI claims that the intergenerational conversation spurs human growth and education 
because of the aging population’s diverse experiences,54 but again places the emphasis on what 
the aging individual can do for others. For both recent popes, aging persons are made to be 
useful to the next generation whose interaction with the aging is interpreted as mutually 
beneficial – the wisdom transmitted is viewed as good, and the interaction itself is good for the 
aging persons because “no one can live alone and without help; the human being is relational.”55 
The USCCB echoes the notion that meaning is most readily found in being of service to others, 
noting the aging “have the opportunity to give something back.”56 Contributing to the Church 
and to the larger community will enrich the life of the aging person. However, the opportunity to 
serve others is not necessarily an opportunity for self-expression in pursuit of the good life so 
much as it is a requirement stipulated by the USCCB: “older persons have a responsibility, 
commensurate with health, abilities, and other obligations, to undertake some form of service to 
others.”57 Regardless of the elevated status and role of aging persons in Scripture, both the recent 
popes and USCCB tend to view aging persons in terms of their productivity within the Church 
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community without much specific attention to how they might live well beyond such 
contributions. That is not to say that it is the responsibility of the Church to advocate for 
vacations and golf outings, or other stereotypical leisure activities associated with retirement; 
however, it is curious that retirement-aged persons are looked to as contributors within the 
Church given consumer culture’s suggestions regarding productivity and worth and retirement 
being a time of not being productive.  
In placing a demand upon the aging, the voices of the Church tacitly support cultural 
stereotypes and practices against which they claim to argue. Society tends to view the would-be 
aging persons vis-à-vis productivity as useless, perhaps even as freeloaders. No longer 
contributing to the economic production of society and shifting to patterns of consumption linked 
to an increasing level of dependence, aging persons can fall into socially constructed narratives 
about being burdensome or offering very little (economic) contribution to the fabric of society. 
Catholic voices recognize this socio-cultural problem and ask that it be reversed; however, each 
of the aforementioned documents begins with the assumptions that older people are frail, 
dependent, and otherwise lacking a purpose in society. The latter element, purposefulness, is 
what the Church turns to as the existential problem faced by aging persons. If the primary way to 
age well is through service to others, the Church’s response to aging well is not all that dissimilar 
from other functional-productive approaches to aging well. Of course, aging persons are to be 
treated with dignity, an idea to be explored below and again in Chapters Four and Five, but there 
remains an obligation to be productive in order to age well. Such an approach from the Church 
demonstrates, albeit subtly, the pervasive nature of the functional-productive cultural narratives 
addressed in chapters one and two: one’s value, one’s good life is always connected to what one 
is capable of and actually contributing to the community or society. Surely, the Church does not 
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oblige those who are incapable of serving others to do so, but the expectation remains that if one 
is functionally healthy he or she must serve in order to age well. Being able to serve, or the 
capacity to serve points to a type of freedom that is important for an ethics of aging, and this 
freedom will be explored below; however, it is the seemingly quick answer to finding meaning in 
aging that the Church provides in obliging service to others that is disquieting. Instead of 
reversing the effects of the ageist trends in modern culture, the Church’s attempts at 
reinvigorating Christian hope and faith in aging mask its tacit acceptance of shortsighted cultural 
narratives about Third Agers. 
Moreover, the Church’s focus on the usefulness of aging persons points to the acceptance 
of yet another ageist-inducing narrative. The interpretive lens through which the Church has 
viewed the aging process and aging persons is the assumption that aging always means physical 
and mental decline, or a general state of frailty. Present within each of the documents mentioned 
above are phrases like: “The signs of human frailty,”58 “physical and mental deterioration,”59 
“old age is a season of life in which individuals are victims of human frailty,”60 “very often, the 
onset of chronic illness incapacitates the old person and serves as in inevitable reminder of life’s 
end,”61 “problems and limitations of this age,”62 “the diminishment of the senses”63 “changes 
later in life involve losses…you probably worry about a decline and eventual loss of your own 
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personal health,”64 all of which suggest that the general consensus of the Catholic Church is that 
aging is invariably linked to physical and mental decline, illness, dependence, and a general state 
of despair. Adopting the popular “aging as disease” line of thinking undermines the Church’s 
mission to be more inclusive; holding such a perspective, intentionally or not, validates the 
beliefs of those in the ‘aging as disease’ school of thought and their adherents who are often 
responsible for the perpetuation of ageist social, economic, and cultural trends. In other words, 
the Church’s position both limits its conceptual framework for the good life in aging and tacitly 
endorses the various elements that have led to the marginalization of the aging.  
Furthermore, theological voices65 can also succumb to the problem found in biomedical 
ethics – connecting aging to end-of-life care. An exemplary text is Allen Verhey’s The Christian 
Art of Dying, which, as its title would suggest, articulates a modern ars moriendi. He recalls the 
tension between religion and medicine that emerged during the era of Francis Bacon that can be 
seen today in the questions arising in medical technologies. “Medicine needs the church not only 
to limit and challenge the Promethean triumphalism of the Baconian project” urges Verhey, “but 
also to sustain its vocation not only to preserve life but also to care for the dying.”66 How that is 
to be done, however, limits the role the Christian faith might have in addressing how one might 
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age well rather than die well. Faith, hope, patience, humility, and letting go are described as 
virtues to be practiced by the dying person so as to mitigate the meaninglessness, uselessness, 
and total dependence one might view as burdensome in the dying process – the same socially 
constructed problems inherent in the experience known as aging.67 Practiced by the aging 
Christian, these virtues mark the foundations of Verhey’s modern ars moriendi. The faith about 
which Verhey speaks is similar to the faith in the resurrection outlined by Richard – a faith that 
“is displayed in delight in God and in the fits of God, which include this world and this 
embodied life, and in confidence that the limits of that life God can still be trusted to care and 
save.”68 Echoing Richard once again, Verhey highlights the importance of the Christian’s hope 
in the death and resurrection of Christ in which Christians learn of God’s power and purpose to 
offer salvation to humanity. Patience in dying well derives from Christ’s love exemplified in 
Scripture in which Jesus humbly accepted the suffering that befell him and continued to show 
love and compassion for the other. The humility of the dying Christian stands in the face of the 
pride demonstrated by those who might tend to value autonomy and control over the natural 
progression of dying. As a virtue, humility tempers the would-be hubris of an individual and 
reminds him or her that humans are and always will be vulnerable and contingent. Verhey 
describes letting go as consisting of “words of gratitude and praise, requests for forgiveness and 
the granting of forgiveness, provision for their [those with whom the dying have relationships] 
future wellbeing, and words of love and affection.”69 Thus letting go enables the dying individual 
to make peace and bring closure to one’s life, but not discard others with whom one has 
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relationships to ‘make it easier’ once death arrives. Taken together, these virtues, adopted from 
the Ars Moriendi of the 15th century, work together to provide comfort and balance to the 
individual as he or she moves closer to the end of life (i.e. the terminally ill patient). As helpful 
as this model of virtuous living may be for the dying person, it is still not a theology or ethic 
catered toward the aging members of the Christian community. Faith, a patient love, hope, 
humility in the face of God, and the ability to make peace with this life are not virtues 
exclusively relevant to those who imminently confront mortality. Accepting the challenge 
outlined by recent popes and the USCCB, incorporating the theology of aging conceived by 
Richard, and adapting the virtues to be practiced in the face of death, Edward Vacek SJ moves 
toward specifically addressing the members of the Third Age.  
Aging And The Virtues 
Critical of gerontologists who “usually avoid normative claims,”70 Edward Vacek offers a 
vision for the aging that attempts address the Third Age’s ethical significance more directly than 
previous approaches. His concern arises out of the impending influx of retirement-aged 
individuals based on the historic size of the Baby Boomer generation itself, and from current 
trends in longevity improvement among Americans. Vacek’s two-pronged approach begins by 
addressing four moral priorities of old age as proposed by gerontologists and later turns to 
virtues as “habits appropriate for good human living.”71  
Continuity, new beginnings, disengagement, and completion: each priority addresses 
particular aspects of aging, with an emphasis on each priority proportionate to the phases of the 
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aging process. Vacek suggests that continuity and new beginnings are primary during the earlier 
stages of old age, the Third Age, while the other two find their immediate relevance closer to an 
age where the end-of-life looms larger. Continuity is a priority for the aging so that they persist 
in fulfilling moral duties they have had during earlier stages of life. Divorcing oneself from 
moral responsibility to family, friends, the community, is not an option for the aging person who 
is “required right to the last breath” to “love God, others, ourselves, and our world.”72 Simply 
because the aging individual no longer has a job to report to or a grandchild for whom to care 
does not release him or her from the bounds of moral responsibility. One such responsibility is 
that of continuing to work while one is healthy. As an expression of being a co-creator with God, 
producing goods for oneself and others is a “contribution to the world’s salvation.”73 Continuing 
in the workforce will require a rethinking of economic and social policies regarding retirement, 
but aging persons should begin to believe that there is value in working after the requisite 
retirement age and that to arrive at that age does not mean that one is no longer capable of 
working. Implicit in Vacek’s notion of work is the idea that aging persons cannot and should not 
retire from religion. Faith and hope, he suggests, remind the aging person that everything he or 
she has done, does, and will do, will ultimately “be taken up into God and thus will never cease 
to be.”74 In order to make the satisfaction of these duties possible the aging person must care for 
his or her body – the body will not take care of itself – the aging person is responsible for his or 
her health in this regard. Acting on moral obligations is contingent upon the body being 
biologically capable of fulfilling them. Presuming that the body does not respond or recover as it 
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once did in the later years, it is incumbent upon the aging person to exercise and maintain a 
proper diet. Vacek identifies new beginnings as a progression of continuity insofar as the gradual 
change accepted in continuity is interpreted and experienced as new ways in which the aging 
person can be active, physically cognitively or socially, ways in which the aging person can 
continue to be reinvented.  
Being a developmental period of change and reinvention, according to gerontologists, the 
Third Age provides aging persons with an opportunity to invent and reinvent themselves by 
directing their time and energy into new personal or social activities.75 Inventing and reinventing 
the self is part and parcel of loving the self and others; only when an individual continues to 
grow and adapt can he or she respond rightly to the other. However, specific ways in which one 
can progress, outside of “gardening, politics, the arts, or church outreach”76 evade gerontologists, 
and, as Vacek laments, Christians. While “elderhood,” as Vacek calls it, should be an opportune 
period in one’s life to further explore and deepen one’s relationship with God, “church 
attendance actually is declining among the elderly” because “Christians have not sufficiently 
reflected on what this elderly spirituality might be.”77 Still, as a proposed priority of aging the 
opportunity for new beginnings remains important as it has been shown that aging persons are in 
need of new avenues of fulfillment, regardless of how that need is socially constructed or 
culturally perpetuated. A new start in pursuit of aging well resulting from the “intellectual, 
economic, and physical resources”78 afforded to aging persons requires that Third Agers learn to 
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accept what gerontologists say will come with disengagement and be made aware of the benefits 
of going through the process of completion. Once the aging person conscientiously decided that 
he or she wishes to age well, achieving the good life in aging is made possible. However, more 
practical guidance is needed.  
In light of the moral priorities of aging, Vacek suggests that living the good life will 
require the practice of specific virtues. He admits that those virtues one has cultivated during 
earlier stages of development may no longer be appropriate during the Third Age, that what once 
served an individual well in his or her 40s will no longer provide the same type of balance 
regarding movement toward the good life given the new context of retirement. Continuity will 
require the habit of integrity while new beginnings will ask the aging person to move away from 
self-gratification and instead practice generosity. Humility and repentance help the aging person 
disengage constructively. They create the space in which the aging person can practice the 
virtues of trust and detachment in the pursuit of the good life.  
The virtue of integrity helps to fulfill the priority of continuity in old age difficulties 
concerning the multidirectional changes occurring during the transition into and further 
development within the Third Age. Maintaining coherence between “one’s principles and 
norms”79 is offered by Vacek as an important but not “strictly necessary” way of conceptualizing 
integrity; instead of trying to import a fixed set of values into a new era of one’s life, one should 
realize that just as one has developed wrong ideas that are incompatible with aging there might 
also be right ideas that are met with challenges in the later years. Thus, complete coherence from 
one stage of life to another is not the type of integrity that should be sought, but rather an 
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integrity of the person that maintains the unity of both the body and soul.80 The task of 
maintaining unity can provide a purpose to those who have lost a sense of purpose, which, 
according to Vacek, can be fulfilled by the theological virtues. While the frivolities of instant 
gratification become increasingly meaningless and less satisfactory, the hope in God’s salvific 
plan can provide ultimate purpose. Vacek echoes Richard, John Paul II and Benedict XVI in his 
appeals to faith and hope, virtues he believes capable of providing the right meaning for Third 
Agers seeking to live well. Though featured prominently in Vacek’s approach, it is unclear how 
faith and hope will practically lead the aging individual to the good life beyond an inherent 
spiritual satisfaction and comfort.81 Perhaps a complementary discovery of new activities will 
provide stability in one area of an aging person’s life, allowing for spiritual integrity to be built 
upon a better, well established foundation.  
One of the primary ways in which aging persons are told to spend their time and money 
during retirement is on socially constructed images of self-improvement. Simply because social 
policies and cultural norms facilitate and encourage the value afforded by various self-
improvement activities (i.e. cosmetic surgery, acquisition of material goods), the good life cannot 
be reduced as such. To combat the attraction of self-gratification in aging, Vacek suggests the 
virtue of generosity. For Christians, the Third Age should provide a new context in which one 
can be of service to others, not only financially but also through active involvement in the 
community. This requires that aging persons move beyond the desire to only take care of 
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themselves and realize that their actions do in fact have implications for the future: “each of us 
comes into a world that has been prepared for us by our predecessors,”82 and the aging have a 
moral responsibility to prepare their world for those who will follow. This may come by way of 
philanthropic endeavors such as donating to charities, sharing one’s wisdom with younger 
persons in community gatherings, or serving the Church community in varying roles. Understood 
in this light, generosity resembles an act of intergenerational justice and teaches others a valuable 
lesson in gratitude. Recognizing that one is connected to others and that one’s actions have 
casual links to the fulfilment of the good life for the aging agent and future generations should 
work to inspire the type of generosity about which Vacek speaks. New activities in the Third 
Age naturally raise the question of how such engagement fits alongside the third moral priority 
of aging, disengagement.  
Practicing repentance and humility are important for aging persons as they move into 
life’s later stages. As a virtue in aging, repentance asks the individual to both seek and offer 
forgiveness. For the Christian, such self-examination is part of one’s daily faith life (or at least 
should be), but it remains “a common feature of contemporary life that many people think of 
themselves as without much sin, at least as any felt need to repent.”83 The trouble is that aging 
persons, according to those who work with them, fall into the group that do not find much need 
to seek or give such forgiveness.84 Vacek attributes this primarily to aging persons, and perhaps 
contemporary culture, being ignorant of sinful behavior and in need of a crash course in what 
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everyday thoughts, words, and actions are sinful in and of themselves or indicative of being in a 
state of sin.85 While such an endeavor may prove beneficial for aging persons, it is hard to 
determine whether aging persons who already show some signs of being unwilling to accept 
moral failures would be receptive to a modernized age-specific penitential manual. Regardless, 
the belief that aging persons need to acknowledge their own shortcomings and genuinely 
apologize for them and offer an equally sincere absolution to those by whom they have been 
wronged is an important step in transforming the aging subject “through grace into persons who 
would no longer sin, or at least, who hope they would no longer commit the sin.”86 The 
transformation not only helps individuals let go of the past and detach themselves from the bad 
while they pursue the good life in aging, but also sets them up for another important virtue in 
aging, humility.  
Admitting weakness in both the forms of sin and of one’s own unwillingness to forgive 
begins the practice of humility for the aging person. Humility first requires that aging persons 
recognize that they are not entirely self-made, as some very proud individuals may believe. The 
product of a given social environment, the aging person is indebted to the opportunities, both 
earned and unearned, that one has been afforded. That sometimes-jarring recognition takes on a 
new meaning when one is confronted by a body that begins to fail, a mind that slowly 
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diminishes, or by the loss of authority one used to have over the workplace home or the self.87 
Vacek summarizes what necessitates the virtue of humility:  
Seniors have to humbly admit that they are not what they once were and they will never 
become what they could have become…they have to face the fact that they are no longer 
(as) necessary in the lives of people who once considered them central…they have to 
acknowledge that in all likelihood they have already made their most meaningful 
contributions to history.88 
 
When practiced diligently, humility can further open one up to God’s grace by making the aging 
person both aware and accepting of one’s dependence (which may become increasingly literal). 
Despite the cultural narrative, accepting that one may be dependent in aging is not meant to be 
demoralizing; instead it is to be, as Richard suggested, liberating in light of God’s promise. 
Denying one’s contingency, one’s mortality, by opting for medical procedures that only serve to 
delay death is a response to the values espoused by American society and not by the Christian 
faith.89 Vacek, like Callahan, does not suggest that accepting one’s mortality means not taking 
care of oneself (see continuity above), but rather that the accepting one’s finitude provides the 
appropriate perspective as one tries to age well. After recognizing one’s limitations and 
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89 Richard McCormick SJ identified “the denial of mortality” as an influential value variable in bioethical thought. 
He argued that this and other value variables in bioethical thought and health care planning “can be profoundly 
influenced by certain cultural assumptions, trends, unexamined attitudes, [and] biases.” In general, denying 
mortality means exhausting all possible medical interventions regardless of their ability to cure the underlying 
pathology, their cost, or the quality of life they could promise. McCormick, Richard. Corrective Vision: 
Explorations in moral theology. (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1994), 165-6. In the broader theological context, 
McCormick argues that this denial of mortality is antithetical to the core of the Christian faith. Life, he explains, is a 
basic, but not an absolute good. “It is basic because, as the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith worded it, it is 
the ‘necessary source and condition of every human activity and of all society.’ It is not absolute because there are 
higher goods for which life can be sacrificed (glory of God, salvation of souls, service of others, etc.).” See 
McCormick, Corrective Vision, 146.  
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practicing humility in the face of the “humiliations”90 of old age, the aging person must accept 
that his or her vulnerability involves trust, a trust that is unique to this particular developmental 
period.  
 Practicing trust in the Third Age and beyond asks that the aging person surrender oneself 
to others and to God. However, trust in aging, particularly in the face of death, is made difficult 
by the loss of autonomy, uneasiness about our own contingency, and a fear of death. Trust and its 
impediments in aging are representative of Vacek’s entire project – the preceding three moral 
priorities and requisite virtues are summarized by a fundamental trust that enables the individual 
to age well. As a moral priority in aging, continuity means trusting that there can be a new 
purpose found in the Third age. Disengagement91 requires that aging persons trust that their 
limitations are acceptable and do not diminish their being, and completion asks aging persons to 
trust that life has been completed well. That trust is really faith, faith in the Christian God who 
will take care of the aging person, who will usher the aging person into the next life, and who 
will remain with the person throughout eternity. Within a culture that promotes independence 
and self-sufficiency, and facilitates those values by way of “social security, retirement accounts, 
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91 What Vacek terms disengagement must be kept separate from formal disengagement theory. Vacek notes that the 
experience of aging may come with a certain level of loneliness as one loses friends, loved ones, or that one may be 
forced to be ‘lonely’ as a result of physical or cognitive decline. Though these experiences are not desirable, they 
sometimes provide “more space for reflecting on the self that we have become,” and remind the self that there is 
more to life than the attachments of this life. Disengaging resonates with much of what Tornstam’s gerotranscendent 
model addresses. The priority of completion is based on what gerontologists note as a process involving attention to 
an integrated life story that has does indeed have an end in sight. Gerontologists believe that stitching the narrative 
of one’s life together can enable aging persons to resolve prior conflicts or repair relationships, or generally provide 
a framework for making sense of what has happened, is happening, and will happen. The backward and forward 
look made creates the space in which attentive to the past can influence how one acts in the present, and thereby 
reconfigure the past, in an attempt to believe one has lived a satisfactory if not good life throughout, not only in 
aging. 
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and government sponsored savings plans,”92 trusting fully, however, is exceptionally difficult. 
Social security benefits are not nearly enough to facilitate a comfortable independent life, and 
retirement accounts are largely determined by forces outside of the contributor’s wanting to save 
more for retirement. Living the type of independent life of advertising campaigns and television 
is not the most plausible of scenarios for many retirees, but the kind of spiritual independence 
espoused by Vacek is different in nature. The independence achieved through trust or faith is the 
kind that allows the aging person to more fully let go and detach him or herself “from their 
important life-long practices of constructing a symphony of meaning out of the booming, 
buzzing cacophony of life’s sound” and instead “rely on God’s ‘silent music’ that has been 
playing in the background through their entire lives.”93 As both the beginning and end of 
Vacek’s vision for the good life in aging, practicing trust enables aging persons to use this stage 
of life productively and contemplatively. 94 Taken together, Vacek’s virtues, implicitly and 
explicitly contingent upon a profound Christian faith, identify the good life in aging as the result 
of a series of transitions that require prudential reinterpretation and re-appropriation of 
previously held and practiced values. In short, the good life in aging is achieved by the individual 
who is capable of discerning how the Third Age can be a positive and fulfilling experience in the 
face of narratives that would suggest otherwise. 
 In addition to the virtues of the ethics of aging outlined by Vacek, other theologians, 
namely Charles Pinches and Stanley Hauerwas, offer their own virtues whose practice also 
promises to lead to the good life in aging. Pinches affirms Vacek’s concern that the virtues to be 
                                                
92 Vacek, “Virtues and Vices,” 173. 
 
93 Vacek, “Virtues and Vices,” 174. 
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practiced in aging are not one size fits all in terms of the specific time in which they become 
relevant and how each individual will adopt and practice a given virtue, and that the aging person 
is indeed capable of showing others what the good life is all about.95 Admiring the beauty of 
God’s creation, the aging person can practice the virtues of simplicity and delight. In 
appreciating that which surrounds the aging person, Pinches believes that the appreciation will 
materialize into an act that engages the individual with others, whether they be intra-generational 
friends, grandchildren, or family members.96 Such acts will inspire another virtuous practice, 
empathy, in which the Third Ager transcends one’s own needs and takes a wholehearted interest 
in the wellbeing of the other.  Like Vacek and those before him, however, Pinches’ suggested 
virtues are only useful for the aging insofar as they are grounded in the theological virtues: faith, 
hope, and love – once again, the faith and hope of the Christian are most important in making 
possible and orienting other the requisite virtues for the good life. Though he explicitly reminds 
aging persons not to become fixated with faith and hope to the extent that mortality is always 
first and foremost on the mind of individuals, it is impossible to say that Pinches’ approach does 
anything beyond demanding the aging Christian to be even more faithful, if that is possible, so as 
to enable the individual’s living the good life.97 Working within a virtues framework for much of 
his own theological ethics, Hauerwas’ articulation of what he calls the virtue of friendship offers 
                                                
95 Charles Pinches. “The Virtues of Aging,” in Growing Old in Christ, ed. Stanley Hauerwas et al. (Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2003), 202-204. 
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97 Pinches’s own vision of the good life is informed by the virtues tradition within Christian ethics born out of 
Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The good life, or happy life, is one lived virtuously. 
Exemplary virtues for Pinches include: hope, obedience, courage, and patience. See: Hauerwas, Stanley and Charles 
Pinches. Christians Among the Virtues: Theological conversations with ancient and modern ethics. (South Bend: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997); and, Pinches, Charles. Theology and Action: after theory in Christian ethics. 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2002). 
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something a bit more substantive and tangible than the extensions-of-faith-type virtues outlined 
by others. 
 Couching Christian friendship in Aristotelian terms, Hauerwas believes that pleasure is 
intrinsic to friendship, and continues that friendship is found, understood, and expressed most 
fully in one’s Christian community.98 A Christian friendship that aids one in the acquisition and 
practice of Christian virtues, builds up the Christian community, and makes possible a friendship 
with God reveals to the aging person the gift of aging in the Christian community.99 Maintaining 
friendships with the right people can reveal the good to the aging person and move him or her 
toward the good bound up with God. The friend and the aging individual inform the virtuous 
practice of one another and thereby reinforce each other’s movement toward the good life, 
together. In this way friendship reminds the aging person of his or her need for relationships and 
begins to reveal, perhaps more gently than Vacek’s approach, one’s vulnerability and 
contingency in an innocuous manner. Friendships that are cross-generational provide the aging 
person with the opportunity to reflect on one’s own experiences at a given age (that of the friend 
from a different younger generation) while also facilitating a mutually informative relationship 
that will ultimately help the entire community in its pursuit of the good life.100 Authentic 
friendships among the aging enhance the Christian community by enmeshing the wholly present 
aging, who are often socially reduced to being best equipped to be present, with younger persons 
who are distracted and consumed by their daily goings-on, smartphones, or other outlets for 
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instant gratification.101 Aging members of the Christian community remind their friends that 
Christianity is more about being than doing, a life exemplified by the aging person. Finally, 
friendship creates the opportunity for achieving the very purpose of the Christian person – a 
friendship with God. The experience of being friends with God is made possible through human 
friendships with others and with the self.102 Though the relationship is asymmetrical regarding 
humans’ finitude and God’s infinitude, friendship with God reminds the aging person of his or 
her vulnerability without making it the explicit starting point as others have suggested. 
Acceptance of mortality is necessary so that one’s friendship with God and one’s self is honest, 
but in the context of a communal pursuit of the good comprised of individual friendships 
acknowledgement of one’s contingency offers reassurance that one is moving toward the 
ultimate good and that one need not be anxious about what is to come.103 Like other theological 
authors, Hauerwas’s conception of Christian friendship eventually calls upon the aging person to 
acknowledge and accept mortality, and it is faith and hope that become central to aging well in 
the face of death. Love for the other, love for the self, and then love for God helps the individual 
to age well. But to whom is this uncomplicated act of turning to love available? 
 Throughout this section the authors have stressed the importance of the virtues, 
theological and intellectual, for the aging. Yet what remains unclear is to whom the authors are 
speaking. Turning to faith and being humble are certainly worthwhile practices as one ages, but 
faith and humility’s ability to solve the aging person’s problems assumes that the only problems 
the he or she faces are how to balance one’s relationships with God and others. A presumption of 
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the affluent Baby Boomer is explicitly made in Vacek, but he does not say how his virtues are 
capable of transcending socioeconomic status. Practicing generosity will be quite difficult for the 
aging woman who has suffered from inequality in pay throughout her life and must continue to 
work through the Third Age to support herself; she cannot afford to be generous with her money 
or time. The aging person who has been poor may not possess the means necessary to participate 
in the type of fulfilling friendships outlined by Hauerwas. An aging man in rural Iowa may not 
have the ability to maintain close relationships with friends and family, and thus becomes further 
dependent on social institutions to help him age well. Similarly, the sick underinsured aging 
person may not be enabled to stay healthy as she ages and never be given the choice to disengage 
and accept her limitations, despite how psychologically and spiritually important that may be. If 
she is able to disengage, she is still left with the question of how to practically age well beyond 
being committed to her relationship to God. Is a good part of her adult life meant to be one of 
isolation or simple devotion with the hopes that her earthly problems will resolve themselves?  
And worse, is the limited message she hears ‘accept your mortality’? It is difficult to assume that 
this is the conclusion intended, but the question remains, given the authors’ collective lack of 
attention to both the individual and social contexts in which aging takes place, and how their 
messages can be received. Needed are ways in which the virtues can be modeled in different 
settings so as to address the diversity of the aging population and its needs. One recent 
theological work emphasizes the importance of care within the community.  
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Aging, The Community, And Care104 
Moses’ Ethics and the Elderly: The Challenge of Long-Term Care examines two models 
of communal care that address much of what has been outlined above as central to aging well. 
While the title may suggest that her concern is for members of the Fourth Age, Moses argues that 
the distinctions made between the Third and Fourth Ages are dubious. Further, she believes the 
distinctions do not adequately speak to the subjective experience of aging and only work to 
obfuscate the fundamental claim that aging persons are in need of and entitled to care.105 Citing 
                                                
104 It is important to note here that the ethics of care is an important but distinct model that I choose to stay away 
from in this and the following chapter. I do so for several reasons. First, the ethics of care, when used in medical 
contexts, presumes the caretaker-caregiver relationship, which as the dissertation has shown, is subject to myths 
about all aging persons needing to be cared for regarding health concerns. It is necessary that the need for a 
medicalized notion of care not be an identified as an essential characteristic of aging. Broadly speaking the ethics of 
care is important for an ethics of aging, but for the purpose of not perpetuating a popularly cultural or intuitive 
association, I have chosen to keep it separated from this foundational discussion. Second, the models of justice I will 
rely upon to inform my vision for an ethics of aging (chapters four and five) will come from the communitarian 
tradition of Alasdair MacIntyre, whose work on dependency offers the same type of attention to relationships of 
asymmetric dependence that an ethics of care does while continuing with the theological themes addressed in this 
chapter; Martha Nussbaum, whose capabilities approach to justice meshes well with the work of the feminist 
perspectives that inform an ethics of care regarding empowerment, access, disability, and equality; and Catholic 
Social Teaching, which considers, to the best of its ability, the entirety of the social context in which the individual 
lives, and offers proposals for improvement in areas of the economy and health care among many. Still, I do not 
want to be dismissive of an entire discipline that can help inform and be a continued conversation partner with an 
ethics of aging. Margaret Farley is but one theological voice within the ethics of care about whom it is worth sharing 
some words. In Compassionate Respect, Farley revives the relationship between compassion and respect using the 
normative framework of care ethics. She argues that compassion enables the caregiver to more effectively respond 
to the person in need by suffering with the person. Respecting the person in need refers to respect for “bodily 
structures, historical and cultural contexts, personal and institutional commitments, potential for many kinds of 
growth as well as actual maturation, individual and communal opportunities and responsibilities, failures and 
achievements, desires and hopes.” [Farley, Margaret. Compassionate Respect: A feminist approach to medical ethics 
and other questions. (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2002), 39]. The relevance of Farley’s call for respect in this regard 
will become apparent in the fourth and fifth chapters, but it is evident that on this particular point, her work can be 
instructive in how to proceed in constructing an ethics of aging. However, it is in regards to compassion that 
concerns arise regarding assumptions about the aging. The suffering other is the stimulus for the type of care that 
she speaks about, and it is my concern that lumping aging and suffering together does more damage than good. 
However, as will be shown below, care does have a place in aging, but it must be spoken of very carefully so as to 
not unintentionally support social constructed imageries of aging that run counter to the potential for the good life in 
aging.  
 
105 Though I agree with much of Moses’ assessment of the experience of aging and the futility of drawing concrete 
boundaries between stages of development/aging, it is important to stress rather than collapse the tension that exists 
between the needs of someone in the Fourth Age and his or her capacity for and conceptualization of the good life 
and that of someone in the Third Age. Frequent use of the word ‘elderly’ is symbolic of Moses’s adopting culturally 
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the Sant’Egidio and Green House Project as exemplary models of care proven (on smaller scales) 
to be effective in manifesting the theologically rooted ethic of care, Moses offers a social action 
model for aging. Both Sant’Egidio and Project Green House are described as capable of 
invigorating “our moral imagination by demonstrating the practical possibility of caring for older 
people in a way that honors their dignity and promotes their ongoing agency.”106 Thus the 
communitarian structure is not intended to undermine one’s autonomy; instead the work of the 
community is intended to foster the aging person’s agency. Because both models of care respond 
to the challenges posed by social, cultural, political, medical, and even religious forces that can 
impede aging well, Moses’ appeal to both is instructive for how aging well can be facilitated. 
She is able to bridge the gap between faith and virtues by turning to a community that is 
mutually supportive and empowering. The models proposed provide a way forward for achieving 
the goals set out by both Richard and Vacek within the contexts outlined in chapters one and 
two. On the latter point, it is important to turn to one of Moses’ most important contributions to 
the discussion: that is, her discerning the role of autonomy for the aging person.  
Moses maintains that the community is called to ultimately advance the aging person’s 
agency. She defines agency as “possessing the capacity for ongoing development and 
contribution, as having preferences and desires that correspond with one’s self-identity and life 
goals, and as capable of interpersonal relationships and exchange of affection and support,”107 
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and that such agency is to be practiced and affirmed in relationships with and even dependence 
upon others. Both Sant’Egidio and Project Green House are “shaped by a fundamental 
understanding of old age as a time of potential growth and development,”108 which affirms the 
theological contributions considered above. Instead of disparaging dependence, these 
communities offer an alternative vision of dependence that empowers the aging person through 
continued social interaction with peers and younger persons, access to the medical care needed at 
various moments in the Third (and Fourth) Ages, and opportunities for genuine friendship born 
out of voluntariness. Perhaps understated by Moses, the voluntary109 nature of participation in 
the Sant’Egidio community confers upon the aging person the very dignity and sense of worth 
that has been impeded by social and cultural norms that promote an absolutist autonomy and 
pathologize aging to the point of it inherently being an undignified developmental stage that is 
only understood as it relates to death. Quoting the founder, Andrea Riccardi, Moses highlights 
the link between the Gospel’s call to serve the poor which becomes the mission of Sant’Egidio’s 
“‘everyday members’” who “‘live in concrete solidarity with the poor.’”110 The type of 
commitment involved on behalf of the volunteers and on the aging themselves who must give 
themselves over to such a model of living reinforces the idea that “the experience of dignity in 
old age is profoundly affected either positively or negatively by the attitudes and treatment of the 
larger community.”111 One of the larger communities responsible for affirming the dignity of 
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aging persons is the church. 
 Adapting a model of discipleship for aging well, Moses argues that it is incumbent upon 
the church to continuously and more vigorously affirm the dignity of aging persons. Important in 
counteracting the popular ‘aging as negative’ narrative is the church’s promotion of equality 
expressed through mutuality where mutuality is rooted in the Christian’s fundamental call to love 
and serve one another. The vocation to serve is an equalizer for Christians in that being a 
Christian, regardless of age or any other descriptor, carries “a mutual moral obligation to one 
another.”112 As a result of this call to serve, being a Christian can and always does provide a 
purpose whether one is young or old. Such an established and unceasing purpose can mitigate the 
so-called burden of being a recipient of care in later life as the aging Christian can instead see 
oneself as the subject rather than object of care.113 However, it would be impossible to say that 
the aging individual will not sometimes feel like the object of care. In those moments, it is 
important that the church community works to enable aging persons to “respond to these 
demands as ways to contribute to the moral and spiritual growth of others.”114 How exactly that 
response directed toward others is to be both fulfilled and fulfilling remains difficult to articulate 
given the diversity of experiences of the aging.  Thus, we return to the role the love of self plays 
in aging well.  
Conclusion 
 The Christian theological tradition has presented us with a range of sources for the further 
development of an ethics of aging. The biblical literature demonstrates the positive value of 
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aging, both religiously and socially. The obligation to serve and contribute to society in the Third 
Age, addressed as problematic in the first and second chapters, returns in the Christian tradition. 
When it is upheld as a Christian duty, it is perhaps even more problematic. Part of the theological 
tradition tries to negotiate the problem of giving aging persons the freedom to do nothing and 
obliging them to do something, but the former is antithetical to the Christian faith as witnessed 
by Richard (and Metz) and the latter runs the risk of only seeing value in the aging person that 
contributes to the community. Yet, what the Scriptural and later theological traditions suggest is 
that life is lived well through the practice of virtues. The different virtues ethics explored in this 
chapter rely so heavily on the theological virtues of faith and hope that the practicing of any 
aging-specific virtue almost becomes secondary to them. This is the same problem addressed 
above regarding how theologians and ethicists have tried to negotiate between Metz’s bourgeois 
and messianic Christianity in the context of the aging.  
Part of the problem is that the virtues ethics approaches to aging presume a community of 
like-minded individuals, which the second chapter has shown is, at the very least, complicated by 
the American interpretation of individualistic autonomy. Despite the impediment posed by strong 
claims to autonomy as independence, Moses explores the success of Sant’Egidio communities 
for aging persons. Despite their efficacy, there are few Sant’Egidio communities. They are the 
exceptions rather than the norms.   
The Christian tradition presumes an acceptance of communality that relies upon 
interdependence as a way of achieving the good life and that recognizes phases of dependence as 
opportunities to love and care for the other – and perhaps this is exactly the locus of the 
disconnect between Christian norms and American cultural values. If the question of 
independence and dependence is a primary impediment to conceptualizing and living the good 
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life in aging, then it is necessary to offer a counter-theory capable of firming up some of the 
foundational claims about community implicit or explicit in the Christian tradition. Virtuous 
living must be part of an ethics of aging, but the community-centered context for the success of a 
virtues approach requires that autonomy as independence be reconsidered. The next chapter will 
explore philosophical responses to the question of how to live well in the Third age, before we 
turn one again to the theological-ethical tradition, and a proposed framework for an ethics of 
aging.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FLOURISHING IN THE THIRD AGE – DEPENDENCY  
AND THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
 
Introduction 
 The previous three chapters have surveyed various visions of aging well presented to 
Third Agers in modern America. The contributions of medicine and medical ethics, analyzed in 
Chapter One proved helpful in both identifying a standard of health and discussing how it is that 
those health metrics should be achieved. Gerontology focuses, in part, on the psychological 
development of aging persons. The problem, however, was that the ways in which aging and 
aging well was described in the first chapter optimal physical and mental functioning alone. 
Reducing the aging person to a functioning body and mind can have deleterious effects on a 
person’s sense of self-worth, a problem explored in the second chapter. The exploration of the 
social contexts in which imageries of aging well are offered revealed that in America, the 
concept of the good life has always been inextricably linked to an individual’s autonomy. 
Autonomy is indeed important, and preserving its place is necessary in constructing an ethics of 
aging. It is its interpretation within the American consumer context, however, that contributes to 
a detrimental influence on notions of aging well. The current consumer culture reveals the 
relationship between the functionality, productivity, and social valuation of the individual. 
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Productivity is the socio-economic analogue to the medical model of health of well-functioning 
body and mind.  
As a potential corrective for an overemphasis on autonomy and the perceived lack thereof 
in the Third Age, Chapter Three turned to theology. The biblical sources grant the older 
members of society a sacred status and demand social obligations toward them, while the 
theological tradition emphasizes the positive contributions of the aging population to society. 
Reminding aging Christians of their unique capability to transmit the faith to the community and 
share their wisdom with younger generations is important, but an ethics of aging must be careful 
not to claim the value of aging is to be found in what one can do for others.  
Theological scholarship of aging turns to the importance of faith in the aging process. 
The theological virtues of faith and hope are regarded as essential to aging well because of their 
ability to provide meaning to one’s life. Such profound and transcendent meaning is capable of 
easing both the fears of and actual physical and/or mental decline by reminding the aging person 
of her or his relationship with God as being of ultimate importance and reaffirming one’s 
ultimate purpose. Similar to Lars Tornstam’s gerotranscendence model, faith and hope would 
involve moving beyond aging to a state of peace that allows one to more fully place one’s life 
into perspective and live well in light of one’s finitude. Using parts of the biblical and spiritual 
tradition, a virtues ethics approach emerged as a primary model for aging well in theological 
ethics.  
Though faith and hope feature prominently in these virtues approaches, some models 
provide lists of adapted moral or intellectual virtues as well. Humility, generosity, and friendship 
serve to direct the aging person in his or her relationships with peers and non-Third Agers alike, 
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which are believed to be beneficial for the individual and the community. When taken together 
the virtues provide a vision of aging well that does not center on productivity. Instead, the virtues 
identify habits that are valuable ad intra (i.e. self-identity) and ad extra (i.e. public expression 
and recognition of self-identity and value). If, however, we take the virtues framework as being 
the most complete approach for living the good life in aging we are still faced with the problems 
of the cultural and social factors of Chapters One and Two that impede an aging person’s ability 
to practice those virtues. Perhaps the most important cultural influence that hinders both an aging 
person’s ability to envision and actualize the good life in aging, and skews society’s perception 
of aging persons is the primacy of the liberal concept of autonomy, understood as individualistic 
independence. As was made clear in Chapter Two, the particularly individualistic interpretation 
of autonomy weighs heavily on what it means to age well, a problem that is reinforced by 
medicine, consumer culture, and some social policies. Needed then is alternative point of 
departure that does not view individualistic independence as essential to the good life (and 
American identity). In particular, an ethics of aging needs an approach that can address the 
fundamental condition of dependence experienced by all humans without threatening the 
autonomy of the individual. Because of the prominent place of autonomy in American culture 
and, more broadly, as a central value of modern (Western) culture, autonomy must be integral to 
the construction of an ethics of aging. After exploring Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophical 
approach that aims to solve the apparent conflict between autonomy and dependency in aging, I 
will turn to Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach (CA) as a framework for constructing 
and ethics of aging.  
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Dependency, Autonomy, And Aging 
 Central to MacIntyre’s perspective is that the good life, or human flourishing, is not at all 
possible if persons do not accept their natural state of vulnerability or dependence. The good life 
as flourishing is rooted in Aristotle’s ethics, understood as the telos of human life, or 
eudaimonia, sometimes translated as happiness, welfare, or flourishing. Eudaimonia is also 
translated as the highest happiness, which is described as such because the individual seeks it for 
its own sake. Aristotle notes that there are goods in life that make one happy and are constitutive 
of the good life, but are subordinated to the highest good, living well. For example, health and 
wealth may be important in one’s ability to and experience of flourishing, but alone do not 
constitute the fullness of flourishing. Living well is never a completed action; it is practiced and 
maintained through participation in those other goods that contribute to one’s wellbeing. Such 
subordinate goods are those activities that provide the satisfaction of desires, or yield a happiness 
that is fulfilling but that does not bring about the state of eudaimonia. Without practicing or 
attaining lesser goods, eudaimonia would not be possible, but practicing lesser goods in and of 
themselves does not bring about eudaimonia. If our wellbeing is contingent upon being able to 
practice and participate in other goods, then it is fair to say that flourishing itself is dependent on 
various factors. Extending this idea to the individual and his or her flourishing, the individual’s 
wellbeing is always dependent on externalities that make flourishing possible. With this in mind, 
debunking the myth that all individuals are “independent rational agents”1 is the subject of 
MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals. 
The task of overturning the popular belief that the human telos is to be or become an 
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independent rational agent, and the corollary claim that the good life is contingent upon one’s 
independence, starts with MacIntyre’s assertion that our dependency is an inescapable 
anthropological truth: for “it is most often to others that we owe our survival, let alone our 
flourishing, as we encounter bodily illness and injury, inadequate nutrition, mental defect and 
disturbance, and human aggression and neglect.”2 While one’s dependency may not be 
experienced in the same exact ways throughout one’s life, all persons live along a continuum of 
dependency.3 Lives are marked by moments of increased dependence as in the instances of those 
needing support, moments of unperceivable dependence when an individual does not recognize 
the role of others in his or her current state of flourishing, or moments in between when an 
individual appreciates the help of others in his or her success but continues to attribute success to 
individual effort. The successful adult businessperson does not necessarily need someone or 
something else to help him or her live the good life, but as a child that same person was very 
much dependent upon others to make sure that his or her wellbeing was ensured. Similarly, as 
individuals move beyond the middle years of life and into the Third Age they may begin to rely 
again more upon other persons or social institutions. MacIntyre goes so far as to say that any 
philosophy that does not start with this fundamental truth is not credible. Yet, being dependent is 
neither opposed to nor threatens individual autonomy. He turns to virtues to reveal how our 
autonomous decisions have always been contingent upon others, but first a discussion of 
MacIntyre’s approach to dependence and vulnerability.4  
                                                
2 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 1.  
 
3 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 1. 
 
4 Though MacIntyre is not a feminist per se, his work in Dependent Rational Animals is clearly the fruit of the 
feminist philosophical tradition. To show his gratitude for this perspective, he dedicates almost an entire page of text 
to his influences on the questions of disability, vulnerability, and dependency, whom include:  Eva Feder Kittay, 
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 Reasserting human animality, suggests MacIntyre, can help to understand the essential 
human characteristics of dependence and vulnerability. By showing the ways in which humans 
are like some other intelligent animals, he works to break down the barrier created in philosophy 
that separates animals and humans into two distinct categories. Though there are important 
differences, placing humans and animals on a continuum rather than on distinct planes enables 
MacIntyre to look instructively to animals’ dependence and abilities to act intelligently. He in 
turn focuses on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, arguing that an overemphasis on rationality as that 
which separates humans from animals detaches humans from the fact that we are animals, too. 
However important the distinction between humans and animals is regarding reason, there is an 
important similarity that proves instructive in light of the emphasis on autonomy and 
independence.  
Like all other animals, humans rely upon parents for basic needs such as food and shelter, 
and later upon others within the community for relevant social knowledge, i.e. “affections, 
sympathies, and inclinations.”5 From birth one “is engaged in and defined by a set of social 
                                                                                                                                                       
Diana Tietjens Meyers, Julia Hanisberg and Sara Ruddick, Susan Wendell, and others. Most notably, he singles out 
Virginia Held and her work on the mother-child relationship as a “paradigm for moral relationship.” MacIntyre, 
Dependent Rational Animals, 3. The use of MacIntyre instead of the feminist authors comes from MacIntyre’s 
Aristotelian roots, which fit nicely with the chapter’s second major thinker, Martha Nussbaum. Additionally, the 
choice of MacIntyre was intended to keep the beginnings of the constructive element away from, as best as possible, 
the aging-as-disease images that can be conjured up when one hears of an ethics of care. In building off of the 
feminist tradition without fully embracing an ethics of care, MacIntyre’s thought presents a framework better suited 
for an ethics of aging compatible with the already existing communitarian and virtues approaches within the 
theological tradition. He is able to highlight the important of dependency and interdependency without 
contextualizing their significance in the communitarian approach as an ethic of care. For more commentary on 
MacIntyre’s feminist influence, see: Joseph Dunne. 2002. “Ethics Revised: Flourishing as Vulnerable and 
Dependent. A critical notice of Alasdair MacIntyre’s Dependent Rational Animals” Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, 10:3, 339-363. DOI: 10.1080/90672550210152159. 
 
5 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 121. 
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relationships which are not at all of her or his own making,” 6 meaning that even though 
individuals may believe themselves to be independent, the individual choices that are made are 
and have always been informed by, sustained through, and in response to one’s interpersonal 
relationships and community. As the child is sustained and nourished by a mother during 
gestation and infancy, so, too, is the very person sustained by a matrix of influences.7 MacIntyre 
argues that the very independence to which individuals may appeal is never truly in the 
individual’s control. What it means to flourish or achieve the good life, though identified and 
pursued as one sees fit later in life, has already been imprinted on the individual who only later 
determines how he or she then wishes to achieve it. Virtues of acknowledged dependence, as 
MacIntyre calls them, are essential to any other virtues of independent rational agency, and “a 
failure to understand this is apt to obscure some features of rational agency,” like the problems 
resulting from an overemphasis or absolutization of autonomy. Both sets of virtues, 
independence and acknowledged dependence, are needed for understanding and achieving 
flourishing. 
 Like other intelligent animals capable of learning how to identify and pursue a series of 
goods under the guidance of a mother and/or other social grouping, humans learn what it means 
to flourish through structured social relationships operating at different stages of life.8 As an 
individual matures, he or she becomes increasingly aware of the requisite practices necessary to 
achieve the particular goods of a given developmental stage, and in achieving those goods 
                                                
6 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 74. 
 
7 See Chapter Two, pp 76-77, regarding Pierre Bourdieu’s use of the term habitus and the matrix of perceptions one 
forms living in a given culture.   
 
8 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 63. 
 
  
183 
experiences some level of flourishing. Possessing the requisite social knowledge enables 
individuals to cooperate with others in the “pursuit of a shared goal,” where goal implies a 
specific reason, and that reason is the inherent good of the goal being achieved.9 The goods 
themselves are to be pursued by specific activities, which are inherently satisfactory and 
contribute the individual’s wellbeing.10 Fulfilling those goods is what it means to flourish, where 
flourishing requires the “distinctive powers that it possesses qua member of that species.”11 The 
‘good’ is explained in three different ways: something generally good for all persons, good for 
persons in specific situations, and to be good at a particular practice or skill.12 These different 
understandings work synergistically; thus it is in the identification of the goods requisite for 
flourishing that the individual comes to realize how influential one’s dependency has been in 
learning those practices that bring about the good life. As an infant directs him or herself, albeit 
involuntarily, toward the fulfilling of bodily desires, the infant both experiences and learns the 
fruits of purposive action directed toward a given good. “The achievement of goods, and in 
taking notice of it” helps the child to understand the satisfaction of individual goods and later 
begin to explore a “wider range of kinds of good.”13 It is in the discerning process associated 
with understanding the wider range of kinds of goods that more completely satisfies particular 
desires in particular situations that the developing independent moral reasoner14 may begin to 
                                                
9 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 24. 
10 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 63-64. 
 
11 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 64. 
 
12 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 65. 
 
13 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 68. 
 
14 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 83. The independent practical or moral reasoner is one who has learned 
to “evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical judgments, to ask whether what we take to be good reasons for 
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realize the influence of others when he or she asks the question ‘what is good for me,’ or ‘what is 
best for me now.’ The developing individual “learns to make this distinction through 
encountering others who apply it [the answer based on the value derived from a given 
community or social matrix] to him or her, before he or she is able to apply it to her or 
himself.”15 Thus even when the individual believes that he or she is making an entirely 
independent or autonomous decision, the response has been habituated through earlier stages of 
development unknowingly. To flourish, then, requires the transition from responding to infantile 
desires and the explicit directions of others to being the independent reasoner who can step back 
from both sets of influences without dismissing their importance, and more fully come to 
understand what it means for the individual to move toward the good life. Given the history of 
the influential social relationships in one’s life, flourishing can be viewed as always having been 
achieved in the context of the community given the history of the influential social relationships 
in one’s life, and this is further realized by the autonomous rational agent who comes to learn 
how to better cooperate with others (peers and members of other generations) in working toward 
the satisfaction of a range of common goods.16 It is on this last point of working symbiotically 
with others in pursuit of common goods that the independent moral reasoner may come to more 
clearly understand and appreciate the importance of the virtues of acknowledged dependence. 
  Having acquired and internalized ideas about flourishing as a result of the social 
                                                                                                                                                       
action really are sufficiently good reasons, and the ability to imagine realistically alternative possible futures, so as 
to be able to make rational choices between them, and the ability to stand back from our desires, so as to be able to 
enquire rationally what the pursuit of our good here and now requires and how our desires must be directed, and if 
necessary, reeducated, if we are to attain it.”  
 
15 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 70. 
 
16 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 74. This is not to say that flourishing always requires being utterly 
dependent. 
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knowledge taught by others, the individual is then reminded, by continued practice of the virtues, 
how dependent he or she once was and still is. MacIntyre suggests that commonplace virtues 
such as honesty, justice, courage, generosity, and temperance are necessary in the pursuit of the 
good life. But it is not necessarily because those particular virtues are beneficial to the individual 
qua individual so much as those virtues cannot even be understood outside of a community; 
hence they are integral to the common pursuit of the good for the community. The individual 
depends on the other in order to live the good life, as an individual’s practicing of virtue and 
subsequent achievement of flourishing “is always open to being destroyed by what the other 
does.”17 Though our periods of dependency fluctuate over the course of our lives, “the care that 
we ourselves need from others and the care that they need from us require a commitment and a 
regard that is not conditional upon the contingencies”18 that contribute to our dependency; 
instead, what is needed is an individual and communal recognition of the bonds of dependency 
that forge the foundation for flourishing as a community of individuals. 
 MacIntyre’s approach emphasizes terms such as ‘independent moral reasoner’ and 
‘virtues of acknowledged dependence,’ but what they might mean for the Third Age is difficult 
to determine without a better understanding of how to balance autonomy and dependence. 
Building on what had been done in feminist and care ethics before him,19 MacIntyre invokes a 
model of relational autonomy or relational agency. From a feminist theological perspective, 
Margaret Farley address autonomy and relationality as two obligating features of personhood. 
                                                
17 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 128. 
 
18 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 128. 
 
19 See fn. 4.   
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The autonomy of individuals, their “capacity for self-determination as embodied, inspirited 
beings,”20 demands respect,21 because persons are ends unto themselves. Farley explains the 
condition of being dependent as a state of “fundamental relatedness to others.”22 Surviving and 
thriving in and because of one’s relation to others is acknowledged by MacIntyre, too, but Farley 
makes an important distinction that is insightful for an ethics of aging:  
the capacity for relation is a capacity to reach beyond ourselves to other beings...We are 
who we are not only because we can to some degree determine ourselves to be so by our 
freedom but because we are transcendent of ourselves through our capacities to know and 
love.23  
 
Our relations with others push us to become someone different than we might have been, and we 
have the capacity to reciprocate – that is what Farley means by our being able to transcend 
ourselves. This relational dependence we experience helps us grow as individuals; it is not a 
deficit or to be associated with decline. Instead of undermining autonomy, relational dependency 
cooperates with one’s agency. The aging person has always and continues to pursue the good life 
in the midst of the other. There were, are, and will be times when the aging person’s dependence 
changes such that his or her pursuit of the good life may be partially thwarted, but those 
moments are occasions for one’s relational autonomy to be expressed in a new, and at the same 
time a familiar way – namely in relation and with the help of the other. The Third Ager is and 
can still be as independent as she or he has always been, but that the fear of diminished 
independence can be mitigated through an understanding of relational autonomy and the 
recognition of one’s fundamental dependency and sociality.  
                                                
20 Farley, Margaret. Just Love: A framework for Christian sexual ethics. (New York: Continuum, 2006), 212.   
 
21 The same type of compassionate respect described in Chapter Three, fn. 104. 
  
22 Farley, Just Love, 213.  
23 Farley, Just Love, 213. 
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With the addition of Farley’s lens, MacIntyre secures the dialectic between dependency 
and agency as part of the human condition, and explains why the virtues that one learns and 
practices that enable one to flourish in community with others. In nuancing the relationship 
between dependency and agency, MacIntyre brings to the fore how it is that the individual can 
understand him or herself within a society that associates independence with the highest good. 
After reflecting on and practicing a number of learned virtues, the independent moral reasoner is 
better positioned to achieve the good life. However, as helpful as the virtues are in showing the 
individual how she or he can live well, they still do not paint a clear enough picture of the good 
life. Though the virtues outlined by Vacek, for example, help address how the aging person 
might live well in the Third Age, it remains to be seen whether particular goods are more 
conducive to the good life than others.  
Martha Nussbaum And The Capabilities Approach 
Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach presupposes the dependence and sociality of 
persons and moves toward describing the particulars of flourishing. Before presenting the list of 
central capabilities, it is necessary to say a word about the nature of a capability. In the abstract, 
capabilities answer the question ‘what is a person able to do and be?’ They address whether or 
not an individual is enable or disenabled from an Aristotelian notion of flourishing or 
eudaimonia; they are not an assessment of whether or not an individual exercises a given 
opportunity. One’s ability to flourish is made possible by an individual’s natural abilities, 
education and upbringing, and the sociopolitical economic and ecological environment in which 
one lives.24 Nussbaum proposes a list of central freedoms that are minimally required in order for 
                                                
24 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 20-21. The types of capabilities defined within the text are basic, internal, and 
combined. Basic capabilities are the innate faculties or abilities with which one is born. Internal capabilities are 
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one to be able to flourish, thereby emphasizing the modern value of autonomy and individuality. 
For the aging person, the list is an attempt at answering the question ‘what makes flourishing 
possible during an experience associated with decline.’  
Born out of the liberal tradition and in direct response to late 20th century political 
philosophies, the Aristotelian Capabilities Approach identifies minimally required freedoms of 
opportunity, or capabilities, that describe a vision of the good life under the conditions of 
pluralistic modern societies. This normative vision is not simply a thick description of the good 
life; the central freedoms are to be protected under law within democratic societies. Nussbaum 
disputes that the capabilities are to be interpreted as rights, but if they are in fact a necessary 
minimum requirement making the good life possible, the implicit claim is that they are 
fundamental entitlements. As a normative anthropology, the list of central capabilities is ethical 
from the start.  
The Capabilities Approach And The Aging 
Reforming the theoretical structures that currently inform socially accepted conceptions 
of the good life is admittedly a task that concerns the ideal scenario more than it does the real. 
However, in Nussbaum’s opinion, the ideals toward which we aspire are real in that they “direct 
our striving, our plans” supply “the basis for legal action,” and “acknowledge human life as it is” 
by expressing “a sense of how real people are.”25 Her approach identifies certain shortcomings in 
society, and reminds persons of those goods to which they are entitled, and can evolve to meet 
                                                                                                                                                       
learned and developed traits that are also functions of the social and political environment in which one lives. 
Combined capabilities are considered to be the substantial freedoms that represent the “freedoms or opportunities 
created by a combination of personal abilities and the political, social, and economic environment.” A combined 
capability is the totality of the opportunity one has to exercise his or her freedom.  
 
25 Nussbaum, Martha. Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press: Harvard 
University Press. 2013), 383. 
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new basic goods derived from the experiences of persons in society. The Capabilities Approach 
is described as being ethical from the start in that it outlines what is necessary for the good or 
flourishing of the individual, asking “among the many things that human beings might develop 
the capacity to do, which ones are really valuable ones, which are the ones that a minimally just 
society will endeavor to nurture and support.”26 What then does the Capabilities Approach offer 
for the good life, and how are those capabilities relevant to aging persons in particular?  
Capabilities fit well within liberal societies that value autonomy insofar as individuals are 
afforded the opportunities to both make choices and develop and actualize a life plan. These 
freedoms to select, “so central that their removal makes a life not worthy of dignity,”27 are 
intended to both identify a threshold28 for the conditions and characteristics of dignity and to 
serve as a list-to-be-augmented as new questions of social justice arise. According to Nussbaum, 
a society that does not provide for the minimum level of capabilities does not qualify as a just 
society and effectually stymies the possibility of its citizens achieving the good life.29 What basic 
entitlements, freedoms to select, or areas of individual and social good are deemed central then? 
The ten central capabilities are: Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, Imagination, and 
Thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play; and Controls Over One’s 
                                                
26 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 28.  
 
27 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 31. 
 
28 Establishing a threshold list of capabilities distinguished Nussbaum from Amartya Sen who also first developed 
the capabilities approach. For Sen, however, the capabilities, understood as opportunities to select, are not to be 
viewed as abstract principles. Instead, the capabilities are to be regarded as quality of life measures akin to the UN 
Development Index. In this way, the capabilities are to be used as real political and economic metrics that identify 
the successes or failures of social policies vis-à-vis the capabilities that have been identified as central to the good 
life. This point will be brought to light in the following chapter. 
 
29 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 75. 
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Environment.30 The value or importance of each may vary across the diversity of demographics 
within the aging population, therefore, attention will only be paid to those that can help reframe a 
vision of aging well. 
 If in fact MacIntyre’s vision of the dialectic acknowledgement of dependence and 
independence is a primary social good capable of reorienting our sociocultural and political gaze 
while also attending to the actual needs of the aging, then certain capabilities must be prioritized 
over others. Life, bodily health, and affiliation are such basic capabilities. When they are secured 
at a minimum level, they facilitate the good life for the aging. “Being able to live to the end of a 
human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be 
not worth living,”31 reads Nussbaum’s explanation of the capability of life. Seemingly self-
explanatory, the aging may find difficulty in understanding this capability because of the ways 
that medical and cultural forces work to constantly redefine the ‘normal’ length of a human life, 
and what characteristics or state of being vis-à-vis health signal that life is no longer worth 
living. Regardless of the technological imperative, it is necessary that work be done to establish 
parameters for the natural lifespan which most persons should be able to achieve. Over-
extending life or over-treating for the purpose of prolonging life is a threat because it creates the 
illusion that living to 120 years of age is a realistic possibility; however, that is not the case 
because a majority of aging Americans do not and will not have access to the technology that 
make such a radical extension of life possible. It is also a threat because, as was addressed in 
Chapter One, it perpetuates the cultural denial of mortality that precipitates a disproportionate 
amount of spending on life-prolonging and life-extending technologies when compared to the 
                                                
30 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 33-34. 
 
31 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 33. 
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other health care needs of a vast majority of the population. This is not to say that aging persons 
or health care professionals should resort to medico-moral pessimism; instead, aging persons 
should not feel pressured to extend life for the sake of extending life. As a threshold, neither does 
the capability of life mean prolonging life, nor does it mean an avoidably truncated life. 
Similarly, bodily health speaks to the aging regarding access to health care while drawing 
attention to potentially overlooked contributors to health: nourishment and housing. Good health 
is something that already and will continue to vary from person to person, and given the aging 
population’s diversity in both age range and developmental progress it will be important to test 
and assess the current standards of health32 in an effort to establish parameters that more closely 
resemble the ‘normal healthy’ aging person. Various medical associations have offered a vision 
for good health as outlined in Chapter One, but actively ensuring adequate nourishment and 
shelter are not germane to the medical profession, lest it is redefined as social medicine, despite 
their role in contributing to one’s optimal functional health. Therefore, raising awareness and 
assuring the delivery of such services requires social solutions, because “in the absence of 
suitable support and care they [the aging] will not be able to live lives worthy of human 
dignity.”33  
Moreover, the issues associated with living arrangements for aging persons extend 
beyond inherent problems of institutionalization and home care (i.e. elder abuse and neglect). 
The ability to make mortgage or rent payments when one is no longer working, or financial 
insecurity (perhaps as a result of a health care emergency) threatens the ability to live in homes 
that are conducive to one’s flourishing demonstrates the importance of considering adequate 
                                                
32 See Chapter One, pp 38-45.  
 
33 Nussbaum, Political Emotions, 120. 
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housing as a capability for the aging. For Third Agers of lower socioeconomic statuses this 
problem is further complicated. Particularly persons of color whose history of earning may have 
been unfairly influenced because of their race or ethnicity may be unable to afford the type of 
living arrangement that meet their vision of the good life. Similarly, the aging process, as has 
been noted in Chapter Two, affects men and women differently, primarily when it comes to 
lifetime earnings and life span. For women who must support themselves during the aging 
process, the opportunities to live well can be stymied by the same series of socially constructed 
injustices that made the workplace and departure from the workplace unfair. Identifying the type 
of housing commonly envisioned as part of the good life will require research from the Housing 
and Urban Development Department, and likely from smaller organizations that are more closely 
in touch with the lives of all socioeconomic strata within the aging population whose findings 
can better represent an average or adequate kind of housing.34 Once the adequate level of 
housing is identified, the question of financing or subsidizing the housing will require further 
consideration through the retooling or various social and economic policies. If housing 
communities that approximate an aging person’s vision of independent living can also create the 
space for communal engagement, aging persons may not be as reluctant to move into such a 
community. Independent-enough living and opportunity for social interaction are sound reasons 
to pursue such a project, but an exceptionally important reason to consider how to correct the 
cultural aversion to living in a community later in life is that of the association of such 
communities with medicalized assisted-living facilities. As Chapter One has made clear, not all 
aging people will experience health problems that require full or even part-time care, but living 
                                                
34 This strategy will be explored further in the next chapter through the principle of subsidiarity found within 
Catholic Social Teaching. 
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independently carries the potential for a health need going unaddressed. That risk could be 
mitigated if there were an unobtrusive system of checking-in within a housing community. At 
the intersection of these socio-economic and health issues is the field of public health, which is 
capable of responding to some of these issues. Making health more accessible, either through 
expanded transportation services, the construction of more local health care centers, and/or 
providing lower cost care (made possible by various subsidies or philanthropic funding), can 
work to alleviate some of the health and health-related financial problems a majority of 
Americans may face. Similarly, public health programs can assist in ensuring that aging persons 
who are forced to live in communities not of their choosing or liking are not being forced to 
further sacrifice opportunities for healthy living – the healthy living that is prescribed by the 
medical field. Those opportunities may include increasing access to affordable quality food 
stores, and also access to relevant features of healthy living, such as exercise. An additional 
benefit of public health’s intervention in realizing some of what is outlined by Nussbaum and the 
type of dependent care of which MacIntyre speaks, is that it fosters the belief that the life and 
health of the aging person are not only limited to the delivery of health care services; one’s 
health is also influenced by one’s opportunities to be involved in the community. In keeping with 
the notion that the Capabilities Approach is intended to be understood and applied cooperatively, 
it becomes clear that the opportunity for the aging person to have affiliations with others is 
necessary for the fulfillment of the good life.  
 Nussbaum describes affiliation as architectonic in the Capabilities Approach given the 
ways in which it supports, informs, and is present in all of the other capabilities. A lacking or 
deficient affiliation undermines one of Nussbaum’s foundational claims about human sociality, a 
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claim that resonates with MacIntyre. Not only is living in community part of the human 
experience, but flourishing is inextricably linked to our interdependence. As pointed out by 
Farley, the good life we come to possess is only possible through and enhanced by our 
relationships with the others. To be denied the ability to associate with others or the opportunity 
to live in relation(ship) with one’s community not only impedes human flourishing but also 
undermines what it means to be human. As a capability, a minimum threshold of affiliation 
ensures that individuals are able to fulfill the natural need for relationships, learn, re-learn and 
continue to practice the virtues of MacIntyre and/or Vacek, the importance of which cannot be 
understated. Having come to face once again with what it means to be dependent in some form, 
the aging demonstrate a need for opportunities to affiliate.  
Nussbaum separates affiliation into two distinct meanings, the first of which reads: 
“Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human 
beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of 
another.”35 Given the emphasis placed on individualism, an aging person’s being entitled to and 
proactively supported in the facilitation of his or her interpersonal relationships can help to 
mitigate some of the socially and culturally imposed problems of isolation (i.e. self-identity, self-
worth) as one ages. If part of being able to age well is continuing to psychosocially develop and 
embrace new modes of self-expression, then basic support structures ought to provide the 
environment in which one can satisfy a fundamental human need, a claim supported by 
Nussbaum in other iterations of the capabilities: “protecting this capability means protecting 
                                                
35 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 34. 
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institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation.”36 As the Sant’Egidio model 
demonstrates, the idea of a communal focus on intergenerational fellowship (and active care) can 
provide the type of affiliation needed to support the flourishing of aging persons. However, the 
social interaction afforded by affiliation cannot be limited to the praiseworthy Sant’Egidio 
community or other such models because of its reliance on the goodwill of volunteers. A 
threshold level of this capability requires a social and political commitment to offering inclusive 
and meaningful opportunities for social engagement that not only work to satisfy the social 
interaction needs of the aging but that are also structured to better facilitate intergenerational 
interactions. The purpose of intergenerational inclusivity is to combat the social and cultural 
narratives that portray the Third Age as a phase of decline, loneliness, and sometimes 
meaninglessness outside of family life. Structures encouraging affiliation can also provide places 
in which aging persons can reflect and reminisce while also forging fruitful relationships with 
those whom the aging persons might not necessarily encounter in day-to-day life. But, these 
opportunities must remain opportunities and not obligations to interact or worse, serve younger 
generation lest they risk connecting the good life in aging to social productivity once again. A 
concerted political commitment to the aging in this way will publicly honor Nussbaum’s second 
element of affiliation: “having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to 
be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others,” which entails “provisions 
of nondiscrimination.”37 For aging persons subjected to ageist practices in the workplace or 
elsewhere, a more public denouncement might help to curb the problems of forced retirement or 
euphemistically being ‘over qualified’ for jobs later in life. Advocating for the fair and equal 
                                                
36 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 77. 
 
37 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 35. 
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treatment of aging persons in various social settings helps debunk myths about aging as much as 
it works to actively facilitate the good life for Third Agers.  
 In addition to the public support made possible through affiliation, aging persons, like all 
other members of society, require an opportunity to exercise practical reason as part of a 
minimum vision of the good life. Autonomy has been implicit in the aforementioned capabilities 
insofar as each are understood as being important in bringing to life an individual’s vision of the 
good life. That vision of the good life presumes an individual’s autonomy. “Being able to form a 
conception of the good, and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life,”38 
another way of describing autonomy or one’s capacity for autonomy, is already central to the 
cultural and political ethos of Western liberal societies. Emphasizing the freedom to choose and 
to determine one’s life is not presented uniquely in the list of capabilities, but for aging persons 
whose understanding of autonomy has been shaped by the cultural influences addressed in 
Chapter Two, reconsidering practical reason as a capability is worthwhile. The role of autonomy 
within biomedical ethics was examined through the work of Beauchamp and Childress who 
identify autonomy as one of four prima facie duties to be satisfied in the delivery of health care. 
Respect for an individual’s ability to choose and to determine a life plan is not an entirely 
passive (or negative) obligation; “it includes, in some contexts, building up or maintaining 
others’ capacities for autonomous choice while helping to allay fears and other conditions that 
destroy and disrupt autonomous action.”39 Put differently, this means actively working to enable 
others to act autonomously. The act of supporting or enabling the autonomy of others is precisely 
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what MacIntyre aimed for in his discussion of relational autonomy; one can still be autonomous 
and one can still be free with the help of others. What disrupts or interferes with autonomy is not 
specified, but Beauchamp and Childress highlight the gatekeeping function of competence 
regarding autonomy in regards to coercion or exploitation. Being subjected to the images 
discussed in Chapter Two suggests that aging persons are enticed or shamed or worse, exploited 
when it comes the social imageries of how they should view themselves and the lives they should 
try to achieve. This raises the question of whether or not aging persons are violated in their 
dignity, given the real and social constructed dimensions of their vulnerability. Their 
vulnerability is contrived insofar as the social construction of aging and ageism informs the 
opinion and treatment of aging persons and it is real regarding the struggles of self-identity once 
one’s economic and social roles change in retirement. The analyses drawn to our attention in 
Chapter Two have revealed that at the very least aging persons are susceptible to exploitation 
resulting from compelling and seemingly unavoidable social norms. In promoting and 
guaranteeing the capability of practical reason it is incumbent upon society to more carefully and 
selectively speak of, market products to, and care for the health and socioeconomic needs of 
aging persons to avoid limiting their autonomy as it relates to the question of competence. This 
would resemble the ways in which advertising campaigns for morally questionable or health-
damaging products must not be targeted toward minors. Furthermore, advocating for aging 
persons creating their own vision of the good life and creating a life plan to achieve such a vision 
will require a public rebuking of the ways in which an individualist-leaning independence is 
promoted and dependence disparaged as undignified. This much larger task resonates with 
Nussbaum’s claim that the very theoretical structures upon which notions of the good life are 
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built need to be reshaped. Reconsidering dependence and independence in light of sociality, and 
embracing the fact that all “citizens live in relationships of asymmetrical dependency for large 
portions of their lives”40 whether that be during childhood, bouts with illness or during the Third 
Age, is the first step in changing how care for Third Agers is conceptualized and provided. When 
one recognizes the value of interdependence over independence and guarantees the practical 
reason of aging persons, how the aging choose to exercise their freedoms requires a broad range 
of accessible opportunities for such expression. The capability that speaks to the importance of 
varied modes of self-expression is play. 
Simply stated, play means, “being able to laugh, to play, and to enjoy recreational 
activities.”41 Beyond the intuitive value of play, it is able to contribute to the good life for the 
aging person in two related ways. Practically speaking, engaging in leisure activities can provide 
both mental and physical health benefits. For those partaking in activities such as walking, bike 
riding, or recreational sports, there are the health benefits of managing one’s weight, improving 
or maintaining cardiovascular health, lowering cholesterol and reducing the risk of hypertension, 
limiting the chances of osteoporosis, and avoiding other pathologies associated with a sedentary 
lifestyle. There are similar mental health benefits as well given the ways in which exercise 
causes a neurochemical reaction in which endorphins are released, placing the individual in a 
more contented state. Anecdotally, individuals who exercise frequently might say that such 
activities are effective modes of releasing stress, or helpful ways to balance mental health in light 
of those detrimental factors one may experience. According to the professional guilds referenced 
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in Chapter One, such exercise is important in achieving the healthy life, which those guilds 
equate with the good life. However, the anecdotal remarks about feeling better after engaging in 
recreational activities or exercising points to the second way in which play is an integral 
capability for aging persons especially. Quality of life is a phrase often invoked in health care 
when it comes to evaluating whether or not to proceed with a suggested or possible course of 
treatment, defined by the WHO as  
Individuals’ perception of their position in life in the context of the culture and value 
systems in which they live and in relation to their goals, expectations, standards and 
concerns. It is a broad ranging concept affecting a complex way by the person’s physical 
health, psychological state, level of independence, social relationships, personal beliefs, 
and their relationship to salient features of their environment.42  
 
In the event that a patient is not able to live the type of life that he or she has planned, including 
but not limited to essential and recreational daily tasks identified with the good life, then the 
suggested treatment may be deemed too burdensome in light of the overall health or wellbeing of 
the individual. For aging persons, having the opportunity to engage in and receive the necessary 
social and political support to take part in activities essential to their quality of life is of the 
utmost importance. Opportunities for play then are necessary insofar as they help meet the 
physical and mental health understanding of the good life, aid in the actualization of one’s 
autonomously chosen life plan, and, in the case of the aging, offer outlets for revitalized or new 
modes of self-expression. Generally, play affords the individual an opportunity to step out of real 
life into a temporary world “with a disposition all of its own.”43 Play presents benefits beyond 
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those of physical health and mental health, such as those outlined by Johan Huinzinga.44 For the 
aging person, the capability of play is indispensable – it reminds the individual that regardless of 
what assumptions might be made about him or her, aging does not inhibit the fulfillment of the 
good life. 
Dependence, Disability, and Aging 
The Capabilities Approach, rooted in an Aristotelian ethics and political philosophy, is 
Nussbaum’s way to critique John Rawls’ (and those who have come before him) contract theory. 
Her analysis is critical both in terms of addressing the shortcomings in the approach employed 
by Rawls and constructive in her theoretical additions leading to more just practical outcomes. 
She identifies three core unresolved issues, the first of which is the combined issue of 
“impairment and disability.”45 The problems of modern contract theory, rooted in the 17th 
century, start with the subjects of the social contract: women, children, or persons with 
disabilities neither authoring or contributing to early contractarian political philosophy; their 
interests never factored prominently in such proposals. Though Nussbaum admits that several of 
the missteps were moderately corrected concerning women and children, she maintains that 
contractarian social doctrines excluded persons with disabilities despite the fact that they are 
equally citizens who should be entitled to fair treatment.46  While this is certainly correct, 
Nussbaum’s project does not adequately attend to the structures and relations that form the social 
landscape resulting in the dis-enablement based on the threshold she establishes, or the quality of 
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having one’s capabilities denied, of aging persons by focusing on specific impairments such as 
mental disabilities instead of other pertinent factors that foster or thwart one’s capabilities. 
Nussbaum’s very notion of disability must be corrected in light of her capabilities 
framework. In earlier writings, her understanding of disability is limited to functional disability, 
a problem repeated by omission in her explication of the central capabilities. A functional 
understanding of disability comes out of a medical model that emphasizes a physical or cognitive 
impairment that limits an individual’s ability to participate in daily life. Sara Goering, a 
philosopher and bioethicist, notes that the functional or medical understanding of disability has 
been reported to make disabled persons feel “excluded, undervalued, [and] pressured to fit a 
questionable norm.”47 Regarding disabilities and the capabilities approach, Nussbaum turns to 
care as the primary response to an individual’s impairment, rather than a constructive explication 
within the list of central capabilities itself. Though aware of the ways in which such disabilities 
affect one’s place in society, she does not acknowledge the importance of the social model of 
disability despite its obvious relationship to the Capabilities Approach.48 The social model brings 
light to the fact that many persons with disabilities report the primary experience that defines 
their disadvantages to come from their “unwelcome reception in the world in terms of how 
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physical structures, institutional norms, and social attitudes exclude/denigrate them”49 rather than 
their physical limitations. Some of those attitudes may be characterized as stigmatization, 
marginalization, and outright discriminatory practices. This second understanding of disability 
acknowledges physical and cognitive limitations as well as their impact on one’s participation in 
society, but nuances the distinction between disability and impairment, where the former is a 
physical condition and the latter a function of external forces. In other words, the social model of 
disability argues that the impairment(s) is primarily problematic because of society’s failure to 
recognize and respond to the needs of such persons, so problematic that society’s failure to 
address its role in marginalizing disabled persons has been characterized as “oppressive.”50 If the 
Capabilities Approach serves to name certain characteristics of the good life and a threshold 
level of capability, then Nussbaum must speak to how disability can be viewed as a dis-
enablement or a social construction that is antithetical to capabilities. Changing the language 
from disability to dis-enablement is more in line with Capabilities Approach and does not reduce 
disabled persons to their impairments. Moving to dis-enablement can expand our understanding 
of the implications and realities of being both functionally and socially disabled and force a 
reevaluation of the combined capabilities afforded to such persons. Dis-enablement allows an 
ethics of aging to engage in both the functional and social impairments of aging persons whose 
experiences have been known to embody both forms of disability without suggesting that aging 
persons are inherently disabled (functionally) or subjected to the same types of socially 
constructed barriers to living the good life. A fluctuating experience of dis-enablement is capable 
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of speaking to individuals who do not or may not ever experience the type of physical and 
cognitive decline that may be like a disability. Interpreting Nussbaum’s disabilities as dis-
enablements can then be considered in light of MacIntyre’s continuum of dependence insofar as 
we are subjected to times of more or less dis-enablement.  
  MacIntyre has a much more targeted critique than Nussbaum on the question of social 
disability. His argument is in part borrowed from Foucault in that he looks to the very structures 
of power themselves as being inherently discriminatory. “The institutionalized giving and 
receiving” with a society that may be said to be fair and just, “are always structures of unequal 
distributions of power, structures well-designed both to mask and to protect” those in charge.51 
Within the context of social disability, it can be seen how aging persons are dis-enabled by the 
very power structures erected to support their needs as well as those of others. For MacIntyre the 
physical and cognitive plight of some aging individuals cannot be overlooked insofar as those 
experiences remind us of dependence and necessitate a response of care from others; however, 
the way in which those dis-enabling moments are connected to social structures is a more 
pressing issue. Dis-enablement that results from socio-political structures can and should be 
avoided, and is in part a result of the continued failure of liberal societies to acknowledge 
dependence. Without awareness of the ways in which the social consciousness is communicated 
through power structures that do not recognize the ways in which aging persons are thought of 
and treated, no model of care raised by MacIntyre, Vacek, or Moses, nor the conception of 
human dignity outlined by Nussbaum will ever come to fruition. Failing to be mindful of and 
actively show concern for the dis-enabled is an example of and will perpetuate “far from 
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inevitable”52 unequal and unfair treatment. A remark such as that points to both the blind spot(s) 
possessed by those determining the principles of justice for a given society and how certain 
individuals or groups can be unknowingly subjected to systemic neglect resulting in the 
construction of a social or cultural opinion that continues to devalue rather than raise up such 
targeted groups.  
While the term ‘neglected’ mischaracterizes the treatment of the aging population vis-à-
vis marginalized groups who have not featured prominently in policymaking or who have 
actually been mistreated in labor health care or other social situations, the aging have been the 
subject of a cultural narrative that does suggest an inherent indignity to the aging process. As a 
result, aging persons are subjected to being dis-enabled from fulfilling the good life. A primary 
contributor to the ‘aging as bad’ narrative is the pathologization of aging. As a result of medical 
ethicists’ and medical professionals’ linking aging to disease or abnormality, a negative opinion 
about aging persons themselves is cultivated within society. Somehow aging persons are 
speciously linked to being less than the other because of a perceived-to-be inevitable physical 
and mental decline that is believed to render individuals useless. However, MacIntyre highlights 
the reality of the dependence that all persons have experienced and will likely experience, and 
maintains that the good life is still possible. Moving beyond the simplistic arguments that aging 
is a disease and reaffirming the realities of dependency can help break down the medical stigmas 
of the aging process and promote the other ways in which care can be provided. 
In addition to the issue of pathologization of aging, Third Agers are perceived to be less 
than their younger counterparts when it comes to their contributions to society. Nussbaum argues 
that the typical social contract by which modern liberal society abides falls short in 
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distinguishing between the “‘normal’ variations among ‘normally productive’ citizens”53 that 
lead to the aging, who may be traditionally (read: economically) less productive, being classified 
as impaired to some degree. However, it has been shown that the aging’s “relative lack of 
productivity under current conditions is not ‘natural,’”54 but rather is the result of socio-cultural 
practices that discriminate against aging persons, i.e. ageism. Perpetuating a belief that links 
increasing age with commensurately decreasing productivity and being labeled as impaired can 
lead to both internal (self-identity) and external (distancing by others) psychosocial problems 
that can unfairly burden aging persons. Normalizing the ‘aging is inherently debilitating and 
undignified’ view unfairly informs the idea of the good life in aging in such a way that fair and 
equal treatment moves farther from reality. This very process of removing the individual from 
the workforce is an instance of dis-enabling, a social constructed obstacle to living the good life. 
One of the ways in which aging is perceived to be undignified is through the assumption 
that complete independence is necessary for living a dignified life. As has been outlined in 
Chapter Two, the cultural import of autonomy as a defining characteristic of the good life can 
thwart mutually beneficial intra- and intergenerational relationships, family relationships, and 
prove to be detrimental to the care needed by the aging person. Critical of such a view, 
Nussbaum argues that presupposing independence as the hallmark of dignity is mistaken because 
it overlooks those who may spend periods of their lives being somewhat dependent upon others, 
for example children who are not characterized as lacking dignity because of their vulnerable 
state. Echoing the argument of MacIntyre, she claims that “nobody is ever self-sufficient” 
because “the independence we enjoy is always both temporary and partial,” and it is necessary 
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that our culture move toward accepting the need for “care in times of dependency.”55 Aging 
persons who require the help of others do not cede their value as individuals because of a loss, 
temporary or permanent, of independence. The good life in aging therefore cannot be defined by 
or limited to independence. Adjusting the focus from individualism to individuality promotes the 
value of the person, or in this case the value of the aging person, without placing conditions on 
his or her self-worth or social value. Turning toward individuality creates a space in which 
autonomy, understood as both the freedom to choose and the freedom of self-determination, can 
be preserved without dependence being perceived as an impediment to the good life. As has been 
shown through the use of relational autonomy, dependence can instead be viewed in a rather 
positive light, perhaps as helpful in one’s autonomous pursuit of the good life. Such a cultural 
shift requires an openness to CA, but the independence-dependence dynamic in American 
culture is only one way in which aging persons are subjected to unfair treatment. 
Taken together, these issues point to the ways in which aging persons are dis-enabled 
from realizing the good life, and being denied fair and equitable treatment. Aging persons are 
sometimes treated in ways like those who are physically or mentally impaired. They are 
sometimes stigmatized as being ill or prone to sickness or injury, and are not of central 
importance when considering social visions of the good life. Improving or maintaining their 
functional health (physical and cognitive) is but one way of starting to enable aging persons, but 
this task is not made clear by Nussbaum. She leaves out aging persons who fall under the 
category of socially disabled, and leaves it to them to seek the kind of holistic care for the sick 
and functionally disabled spelled out in the list of central capabilities. Nussbaum argues that 
“health care, political rights and liberties, and equal citizenship” are requisite qualities for the 
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good life, and that when it comes to providing equitable opportunity for satisfying the good life 
across all social demographics, emphasis needs to be placed on “care as a primary social 
good.”56 However, Nussbaum’s own shortsightedness on the question of aging persons in the 
face of social disability makes drawing the guidelines for the satisfaction of a capability of health 
and actualization of care as a primary good difficult. Incorporating the language of social 
disability into an ethics of aging would bring about a revised vision of care that goes beyond the 
physical and mental health needs of aging persons. In addition to responding to the needs of 
aging persons who may or may not experience deficits in health, care can be directed toward to 
the condition of being marginalized by society in a way analogous to the model of Sant’Egidio. 
Being entitled to care can also help to mitigate the tension of independence-dependence in the 
aging population and in society’s perception of that struggle, but the current social programs do 
not provide an adequate level of care to facilitate aging well. Organizing care into a primary 
social good will require that the very capabilities themselves be reconsidered in light of social 
disability and dependence in order for aging persons to truly be enabled to age well.  
Conclusion 
 As Nussbaum notes, valuing the dignity of all individuals will require a reforming of the 
public consciousness regarding what values are necessary for living the good life. However, such 
a momentous task is not possible if a list of conditions indicative of a dignified life is all that is 
offered. Helpful as the capabilities are, their efficacy is difficult to infer given their disputed 
status as either descriptions of the good life or normative claims about the good life. At the very 
least they are helpful in their attempt as political protections or conditions of a just society to 
provide an individual an opportunity to live the type of life that he or she wishes. The nature of 
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the capabilities is such that they encourage the individual to conceptualize what types of 
freedoms might be central to a good and dignified life. The political component of the 
Capabilities Approach can comfort the aging individual who worries about losing his or her 
freedom(s) just as it protects the aging individual who is in need of help from social institutions 
when it comes to actualizing his or her good life. The Capabilities Approach is amenable to a 
society that values autonomy, but its emphasis on freedoms or opportunities must be read within 
the context of Nussbaum’s other works and with MacIntyre regarding dependency and relational 
autonomy. Without attention to the ways in which the individual has been shaped by the virtues 
of acknowledged dependence the cultural narratives about individualistic independence will 
persist and thwart an ethics of aging. The concept of relational autonomy works to preserve the 
individuality, the freedom, and the independence of the person while calling to mind the ways in 
which one has arrived at such a place with the help of others. For an ethics of aging it is 
necessary that this concept be lifted up because of its ability to cross the generational lines. 
Those on the younger side of the generational divisions perpetuate socially constructed visions of 
aging that exacerbate relationships of asymmetric dependency, which can be improved if 
younger persons would be more receptive of MacIntyre’s and Farley’s notion of relational 
autonomy. Similarly, the aging need to turn to the model of relational autonomy as a way of 
breaking them out of patterns of living that fulfill detrimental cultural norms (i.e. living 
independently because one believes he/she has to). Recognizing and working with one’s 
dependence does not force the individual to compromise his or her autonomy, but instead asks 
the individual to accept that he or she has always needed help from without and that that fact has 
never stopped him or her from pursuing a self-identified range of goods. Highlighting the 
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experiences of dependency that all individuals have throughout their lives while also 
emphasizing the ways in which through those experiences individuals learn, apply, re-learn, and 
re-apply virtues instilled in them by the community allows persons to not sacrifice being 
individuals. In fact, the care that one may have received during times of dependency made 
possible the very autonomous pursuit of the good life – this reality does not categorically change 
in aging, only its perception by others and the aging person him or herself as informed by 
external forces. Negotiating dependence and autonomy is paramount in an ethics of aging; 
however, there is more to achieving the good life in aging than learning to embrace one’s 
relational agency. 
 Within an ethics of aging, protecting relational autonomy becomes part of the task of CA. 
Nussbaum addresses the fact that CA’s vision of dignity or the good life is not only theoretical; 
instead the Capabilities Approach is intended to have practical political implications. The 
freedoms identified in the Capabilities Approach are to be promoted and protected by a just 
society, not just idealized or strived for by individuals curious about achieving the good life. For 
Nussbaum, justice is achieved when all members of society are given equitable opportunities to 
live the dignified life that she envisions (informed by the experiences of others, of course). The 
justice component of the Capabilities Approach requires a more careful examination of the 
capabilities themselves in their three forms: basic, internal, and combined. Treating the list of 
capabilities only as freedoms or conditions of dignity and overlooking their secondary aim 
reduces them to mere abstractions. The political dimension of the Capabilities Approach 
accounts for the fact that not all relationships will be as harmonious as MacIntyre, Farley, 
Nussbaum, and others would hope. For the aging, the protections afforded by the Capabilities 
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Approach are integral to their visions of the good life, but also uncover practical questions of 
distributive, commutative, and social justice. For the aging person who reexamines the 
capabilities he or she possess in a new phase of life, assessing whether or not one has been 
treated fairly and enabled to live or dis-enabled from living a good life is important.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND AGING 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapters have shown that living the good life the Third Age is complicated 
by the normative visions of the good life communicated through the narratives of medicine, 
consumer culture, theology and theological ethics. Medical and cultural imageries of aging well 
present the good life as a static good to be achieved; the good life in aging can be had if one is 
functionally healthy, consumes certain goods, lives independently, or is a productive member of 
society. Viewing the good life in aging as a fixed achievement is contrasted with theological 
approaches that view the good life as a state of being, shaped by virtue and directed toward 
existential fulfilment not reducible to consumer goods. The theological vision of the good life in 
aging depicts the Third Ager as continuously striving to live well in relation to God and to others 
in the community. Chapters One and Two ultimately emphasized the individual’s responsibility 
in aging well, which is motivated and reinforced by the cultural value placed on independence 
and individuality. Autonomy as individualistic independence was explored in Chapter Two, and 
while there is no disputing the status of individual freedom as a basic anthropological condition 
and its moral significance as an American cultural value, its interpretation has weakened an 
equally important anthropological feature, namely sociality. In order to address this defect of the 
first two chapters’ findings, the third chapter appealed to theological responses with the hope of 
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offering a more holistic approach to aging well that recognizes the social dimension of human 
experience. However, the wished for socio-cultural corrective proved insufficient because the 
theological approaches are not especially attentive to the social-institutional dimensions of aging 
well beyond the idea of living well in community. The theological sources that speak directly to 
the good life in aging do not investigate the role of social institutions in directing, shaping, and 
informing the lives of Third Agers; however, in other contexts, theologians and ethicists are 
attuned to identifying the ways in which certain individuals respond to those very structures. 
Surely, any attempt at counterbalancing the type of American independent individualism 
witnessed in the first two chapters must be met with a more robust social response. Yet certain 
theological perspectives, despite their attempts to transcend medical and cultural imageries of 
aging well, unfortunately turn to productivity or contribution to society as part of what it means 
to live the good life in the Third Age. This reveals the primary problem with the sampling of 
responses to the question of aging well explored so far in the dissertation: while the type of 
individualism espoused by American culture contributes to several socio-cultural obstacles to 
living the good life in aging, existent proposals for aging well are similarly influenced by 
individualistic tendencies.  
Although the theological responses surveyed in Chapter Three further support the claims 
made about individualistic responses to aging well, the overall vision of aging well cannot be 
overlooked. In particular, the virtues approach used within theological ethics is integral in 
establishing an ethics of aging. While mere training in virtue alone is not capable of overcoming 
the broader values and beliefs held within a larger pluralistic context, cultivating the right 
dispositions in individuals, Third Agers and other persons alike, so that they might respond to the 
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needs of aging persons in the appropriate manner is essential for the flourishing of all. The 
virtues approaches place responsibility on the individual to live well, but one’s receptivity to 
virtues ethics presumes an understanding of autonomy and sociality, or dependency, that is 
different than the broader American culture as has been demonstrated in Chapter Two. Thus, 
living the good life imagined in a communitarian setting encounters difficulty in a pluralistic 
society, and requires a complementary approach in order to more firmly establish an ethics of 
aging. Quelling the American cultural fears of individual freedom being diminished by 
embracing sociality and dependency as features of personhood precipitated a turn to Nussbaum’s 
Capabilities Approach. The Capabilities Approach addresses that American concern by framing 
the dignified life around specific freedoms one should be enabled to exercise; the good life in the 
Capabilities Approach is the dignified life of being minimally enabled to freely choose from a 
range of capabilities what is in accord with an individual’s vision of flourishing. However, for 
Third Agers, a normative anthropology that supports autonomy alone is not sufficient. Despite 
the presumed democratic society of the Capabilities Approach, the good life remains the task of 
the individual alone – ‘exercise the capability(ies) that suit you’ – how the list is to be secured 
remains the important social ethical question. Appealing to both Nussbaum’s capabilities and 
MacIntyre’s communitarian-virtues approach began the type of dialogue needed to address part 
of the impediments to aging well posed by individualism. MacIntyre responded to the social 
experience of aging well on a small scale, but he underestimated the role of social institutions in 
achieving the good life in aging. What is needed for an ethics of aging in modern America is an 
approach that negotiates the fruits of both the Capabilities Approach and a MacIntyrean 
communitarian ethic. Engaging these dialectically will enable us to formulate a more adequate 
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response to the question of aging well as a social being in the face of independent individualism. 
This alone, however, is only the first step in creating a groundwork for an ethics of aging. 
The second task is to complement the important but sometimes too individual-centric 
theological perspective with a framework that accounts for the aging person as social agent 
whose good life cannot be reduced to autonomy. The proposed framework for responding more 
comprehensively to the question of aging well is the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching (CST). 
Oftentimes the principles of CST are viewed only as guideposts for the good life in that they can 
identify a series of ideals to live by; however, the principles do much more because of their 
ability to inform and organize both individuals and the institutions through which lives are 
mediated. The principles of CST take up what both the Capabilities Approach and virtues lack, 
and when taken together, the three complementarily provide a framework for an ethics of aging 
that attends to the autonomy of the individual and his or her authentic development within the 
socio-cultural milieu of modern American life. CST can be described as a form of 
“communitarian liberalism” because it identifies the primacy of “the social nature of the human, 
human autonomy and its concomitant responsibility,”1 and when it is reinterpreted for the aging, 
its principles will reveal an adequate foundation upon which an ethics of aging can be built. 
Establishing this groundwork will first require a further examination of dependency and the 
capabilities in view of CST with particular attention to the need for principles. Then I will offer a 
reinterpretation of the principles in light of the competing visions of and impediments to the 
good life in aging revealed in the first part of the dissertation.  
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Commentaries and Interpretations, ed. Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 
2005), 527. 
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The Capabilities and Catholic Social Teaching 
 Throughout Nussbaum’s articulation of the Capabilities Approach certain central 
assumptions are made. First, the Capabilities Approach relies upon two anthropological claims 
that both ground and direct the capabilities themselves: dignity and sociality. As the list of 
capabilities is explicated, the mutually reinforcing relationship between these two ideas becomes 
apparent – dignity requires that others recognize individuals as individuals worthy of recognition 
and without such social recognition, the individual does not live a fully dignified life. This is 
witnessed by capabilities such as bodily integrity and affiliation, practical reason and control 
over one’s environment, life and the expression of emotion, all of which confirm a reciprocity 
that champions one’s value as an individual and how that value is to be both respected and 
fostered impersonally. The freedoms identified by the Capabilities Approach are central to an 
individual’s dignity, but that dignity is conferred by and lived out in relation to others. The 
Capabilities Approach “begins from a political conception of the human being”2 that does not 
only mean being involved in social life. For Nussbaum, a political conception of the person 
affirms the relationship between individual’s dignity and the function of the state as the protector 
of its citizen’s dignity. How dignity functions in view of sociality and the role of the state must 
be explored further.   
 Articulating Nussbaum’s definition of dignity is impossible to separate from the very 
capabilities themselves for they represent essential features of a dignified life. Though the 
capabilities are often critiqued within political philosophy because they are reached intuitively 
and inductively rather than reasoned deductively, the value of the capabilities comes precisely 
                                                
2 Nussbaum, Martha. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values (Cambridge, Mass.) Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press: Harvard University Press. 180. 
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from their ability to speak to practical needs identified from individual experience. They capture 
the vision of a life lived above the threshold levels of capabilities, while highlighting the ways in 
which those capabilities are socially mediated. The primary benefit of dignity being interpreted 
in an inductive way as it is in the Capabilities Approach is that it comes from the human person 
first, and then only later is formalized for the purposes of assessing the fairness of social 
institution or structures. She is careful to place emphasis “first and foremost on individual 
persons and only derivatively on groups”3 as the source of claims about a dignified life because 
the individual’s experience has already been shaped by larger social groups or institutions. In this 
way, the very dignity of the person is socially mediated, calling for an institutional response 
when an individual’s dignity is not fully protected and promoted. Nussbaum argues for a liberal 
democratic political system capable of responding to the needs of individuals, to protect the 
freedoms believed to be integral to a dignified life, but cautions that the political system alone is 
not capable of identifying instances of failure and new needs.4 Because a dignified life is one that 
possesses a range of opportunities for expression of the self, it is impossible for the state to 
account for and protect the highly specific individualized visions of each person regarding his or 
her pursuit of the good life. Being made aware of how the dignity of the aging person is 
experienced and then responding to the diversity of experiences would be an impossible task for 
an institution like the state to address. Therefore, the structure of capabilities is such that the 
freedoms of individuals are learned and assessed on the ground level and later filtered up to the 
institutions responsible for promoting and protecting the dignity of all persons. This inductive 
                                                
3 Nussbaum, Martha. 2011. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap 
Press: Harvard University Press. 35. 
 
4 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 32-3. 
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task in discovering how central freedoms are promoted or thwarted will be addressed below in 
the discussion of subsidiarity, but it is worth noting that the disconnect between larger 
institutions and the experiences of individuals creates the need for complementary virtues-
communitarian approaches that are better equipped to address the specific situation(s) of aging 
persons. 
Nussbaum argues that humans are social and political beings who find fulfillment in 
others, like MacIntyre and other Aristotelian thinkers before them.5 Reasserting the claim that 
individuals are not “imagined as ‘independent,’” 6 she remarks that the interests of the individual 
are bound up with the interests of others, and that individual goals are collective goals. As 
political or social beings, all persons depend upon other, albeit to different degrees, at every 
point in their lives. Third Agers, to different degrees, may need physical help, financial 
assistance, new opportunities for self-expression, or the companionship of which Hauerwas 
speaks. Regardless of the mode of assistance that the Third Ager may need, the help of others is 
always needed; without others, an individual simply is not able to flourish.7 Fluctuating levels 
and occurrences of asymmetric dependency are not hypothetical because, like MacIntyre, 
Nussbaum embraces the reality and inevitability of these experiences.8 However, she departs 
from MacIntyre in that her response recognizes the need for institutional support in enabling the 
good life. Because the purpose of the state is understood, in Aristotelian terms, to protect and 
                                                
5 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 85. 
 
6 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 89. 
 
7 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 160. 
 
8 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 87. 
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develop “certain core human abilities”9 so that all persons could live the good life, it is 
responsible for providing the structural means that facilitate that end. But, as was revealed above, 
the state alone cannot ensure that each and every individual is capable of achieving his or her 
vision of the good life. Even an institution directed toward meeting the needs of aging persons 
would be incapable of securing the possibility of the good life for all aging persons because of 
the diversity within the population itself and every aging person’s autonomous vision of aging 
well. A communitarian approach such as MacIntyre’s helps to ensure that the individualized 
visions of aging well are made possible, but he emphasizes the more immediate community in 
which one lives without attention to the structures provided by the state. MacIntyre’s 
communitarian vision is one that focuses on the thick descriptions of the good life that cannot 
possibly be adequately articulated let alone guaranteed by the state.  
Nussbaum, however, appeals to individual experiences that describe the conditions of a 
dignified or good life, which serve as conditions to be protected by the state and its structures or 
institutions. Those minimum conditions are a thinner description of the good life than what 
comes from MacIntyre, but it is certainly thicker than Rawls’s thin theory of the good.10 In 
MacIntyre the fullest picture of the good life is described by the virtues of the community ‘down’ 
to the individual and lived within the community setting. For Nussbaum, the conditions 
necessary for the good life are transmitted from the individual ‘up’ to the state, and are then 
                                                
9 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 133. 
 
10 Rawls, John A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press: Harvard university Press, 
1999), 347-350. In Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, it is assumed that the right is prior to the good. The 
principles of justice, those that direct individuals toward the good, must, however, be informed by some basic ideas 
about the good life. The thin theory of the good functions to “secure the premises about primary goods required to 
arrive at the principles of justice.” When the thin theory is worked out and the basic primary good achieved, it is 
then possible to further pursue, on an individual basis, a fuller theory or understanding of the good. For the purposes 
of organizing a society, however, Rawls does not go beyond principles that address the thin theory of the good.  
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made the state’s responsibility. Both authors, however, are attentive to the role of 
interdependence in living the good life. In the case of the MacIntyrean approach, 
interdependence is presumed within and acknowledged by one’s participation in the community. 
In the Capabilities Approach, the state has a role in impressing interdependence through its 
interventions that ensure the central capabilities of all citizens. Connecting the good life to 
notions of dependency, communal living, and the state highlight the ways in which the good life 
in aging is socially mediated. Incorporating the valuable contributions of MacIntyre, other 
virtues ethicists, and Nussbaum into an ethics of aging requires a large framework under which 
both can work complementarily. Such a framework will also address the fact that aging well is 
socially mediated by informing and structuring the social institutions that form the Third Ager’s 
habitus. A normative framework reliant upon principles can achieve this task.  
Onora O’Neill takes up the question of the relationship between theories of justice and 
virtues in an attempt to revive their complementarity. Though some modern thinkers believe that 
universal concepts of justice, such as the Capabilities Approach, are incompatible with virtue 
theories, O’Neill suggests they are “mutually supporting.”11 Virtue theories do not advocate for 
universality given their tendency to be part of communitarian frameworks, and universal 
concepts of justice oftentimes lack the specificity needed for addressing the actual lived 
experiences of individuals. While theories of justice may be too universalist and virtues too 
particular, both are valuable for an ethics of aging. Their merit is revealed in O’Neill’s 
suggestion that the real locus of ethical concern is where the two come together, namely in 
principles of action. Principles of action, or norms, communicate “some standard or requirement, 
                                                
11 O’Neill, Onora. Towards Justice and Virtue: a constructive account of practical reasoning. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10. 
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some recommendation or permission,” that when acted upon, reflect having been “guided by or 
shaped by that standard, requirement, recommendation or permission.”12 They do not, however, 
“dominate or determine those who act on them or live by them,” or “demand uniform treatment 
or insensitivity to differences,”13 an important feature for Third Agers themselves in light of their 
heterogeneity, and the institutions tasked with securing the environment in which Third Agers 
can live well. Because the particularist virtues account of action is too limited in scope and the 
universalist account does not pay close enough attention to the specific “embodiments of 
action”14 but account for the plurality of agents and cases, the kinds of principles she argues for 
will be pointed but not impossible to fulfill. O’Neill argues that obligations, duties, or principles, 
are needed for the success of a system like the Capabilities Approach precisely because of the 
ways in which a culture of political liberalism interprets the Capabilities Approach as a series of 
rights. There are no rights without obligations for “a right that nobody is required to respect is 
simply not a right,”15 and the Capabilities Approach fails unless there are principles obliging a 
society to uphold the freedoms it outlines. Benedict XVI addressed this problem similarly:  
individual rights, when detached from a framework of duties which grants them their full 
meaning, can run wild, leading to an escalation of demands which is effectively unlimited 
and indiscriminate…Duties set a limit on rights because they point to the anthropological 
and ethical framework of which rights are a part, in this way ensure that they do not 
become license.16   
 
Loosely referring to central capabilities as rights claims is a common critique of CA, and an 
                                                
12 Onora O’Neill. “Normativity and Practical Judgment,” Journal of moral Philosophy 4.3 (2007): 399. 
 
13 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, 123.  
 
14 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, 71. 
 
15 O’Neill, Onora.  Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 78. 
 
16 Benedict XVI. 2009. Caritas in Veritate, §43.  
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issue O’Neill raises with all ethical invocations of human rights claims. Her concern is that 
human rights claims without obligation are ideals, or aspirations, and that these claims are 
ineffectual and meaningless when no person or institution is required to enforce them.   
If we take rights seriously and see them as normative rather than aspirational, we must 
take obligations seriously. If on the other hand we opt for a merely aspirational view, the 
costs are high…we would also have to accept that where human rights are unmet there is 
no breach of obligations, nobody at fault, nobody who can be held to account, nobody to 
blame and nobody who owes redress. We would in effect have to accept that human 
rights claims are not real claims.17 
 
In this way, perfect universal duties, to be explained below, always generate a corresponding 
right because there is an agent obliged to act, and a claimant entitled to the good outlined by a 
given right. 
Although O’Neill does not wish to remove rights talk from the ethical landscape, she 
believes that turning to obligations is the only methodologically18 sound manner in which rights 
can be discussed because of the aspirational problem addressed above. Principles require action, 
they are “obligation[s] to do or to desist, to act or to refrain in this or that way, in these or those 
situations, towards these or those others.”19 Principles of action identify the obligation one agent 
or institution has toward another, and establish a correlative right that the right-bearer can claim. 
The type of right associated with an obligation is not necessarily a right to a distribution of a 
particular good or service, rather it is a right that leaves the allocation of goods and services to be 
                                                
17 Onora O’Neill. “The dark side of human rights,” International Affairs 81,2 (2005): 430.  
 
18 The relationship between obligations, duties, and rights, is best understood by turning to O’Neill’s method which 
is succinctly outlined in “Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives,” Ethics 98, 1998:445-63. She pushes back against 
the manner in which consequentialist writers employ rights and offers an alternative constructivist approach that 
begins with obligations first, not rights. Her approach is “broadly Kantian” insofar as in constructing obligations 
identifies members of a set of universal principles of duty that would be reasoned to using Kant’s concept of a 
maxim. See “Children’s Rights” 456-459.  
 
19 O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, 81. Emphasis in original. 
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adjudicated in closer proximity to the specific case once various structures are defined.  The 
types of obligations will be explained below, but O’Neill’s framework of obligations and 
corresponding duties is capable of giving teeth to the weak rights interpretation of the 
Capabilities Approach and complement the virtues approaches needed in adjudicating specific 
cases. O’Neill negotiates the complementary relationship between the universality and 
particularist claims in her description of different types of duties. 
O’Neill classifies obligations into two categories: perfect and imperfect. Both categories 
are distinguished further with the terms ‘universal’ and ‘special.’ Perfect duties are those that 
impose a correlative right; imperfect duties do not. Perfect universal duties are owed to and 
performed for all. Perfect special duties are owed to and performed for specified others, and 
“require social structures or practices that connect specific agents to specified recipients of 
action.”20 Insofar as these obligations and correlative rights concern Third Agers, they may look 
like this:21 Perfect Universal – Everybody has a duty not to thwart the dignity of Third 
Agers/Third Agers have a right have their flourishing promoted and protected; Perfect Special – 
Family members, physicians, and employers/potential employers have duties to care adequately 
for Third Agers/Third Agers have a right to sufficient care by those responsible for their 
wellbeing. Regarding the perfect universal duty, all individuals and institutions within society are 
required to protect the capacities for Third Agers to live a dignified life (as outlined by the 
Capabilities Approach). The perfect special duty identifies the specific relationships Third Agers 
have with their families, doctors, employers/potential employers who have been identified as 
                                                
20 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, 147. 
 
21 This structure is adapted from O’Neill’s “Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives.”  
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sources of conflict in achieving the good life in earlier chapters. Imperfect duties, however, 
because they lack correlative rights, take a different form in practice from perfect duties. Virtues, 
argues, O’Neill, are helpful because they are “portable ethical characteristics”22 capable of being 
implemented differently in specific situations. Because imperfect universal duties are not 
claimable by others, they rely on the agent’s character imposing an obligation, not the 
relationship between the agent and the would-be claimant.23 For the aging these imperfect duties 
might look like this: Imperfect Universal – Everyone has a duty treat Third Agers with special 
care: no rights to what that care looks like in individual cases; Imperfect Special – Friends, 
acquaintances, coworkers, have duties to contribute to the flourishing of Third Agers: specific 
directives on how to contribute to the flourishing are not outlined. Third Agers benefit from 
imperfect universal duties insofar as they promote that attitudes of kindness, respect, and honesty 
be directed toward Third Agers. Imperfect special duties identify those persons with whom Third 
Agers have regular contact, and they encourage them to be cognizant of the wellbeing of the 
Third Ager and take the necessary steps in facilitating the Third Ager’s good life. Imperfect 
duties, however, rely upon the virtuous dispositions of others and their willingness to 
prudentially respond to specific situations. Obligations though they may be, the imperfect duties 
point to the fact that perfect universal principles are not all that is ethically required in society. 
Precisely because of the vulnerable nature of humanity, addressed by both MacIntyre and 
Nussbaum, universal principles alone are incapable of generating an ethics of aging; instead they 
help create a more suitable space in which the good life in the Third Age correlates with the lives 
of others. A principled framework can better enable Third Agers to live the good life, and 
                                                
22 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, 148. 
 
23 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, 148. 
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likewise, enable those who are in relation with them also to live a good, i.e. virtuous, life.     
CST offers several principles capable of informing and organizing institutions and 
individuals regarding their role in enabling a good life for the aging. Though not the subject of 
subject of O’Neill’s text, the principles of CST, like the obligations in O’Neill’s approach, 
respond to “the very social links and dependence which all social relations, including just social 
relations, create, not merely shield but restructure;” they provide the context in which the Third 
Ager becomes “more deeply, variably, and selectively vulnerable to the action of the particular 
others and the particular institutions on whom” they depend.24 Without principles organizing and 
informing the very institutions of which society is comprised, Third Agers will continue to live 
in relationships of asymmetric dependency, be vulnerable to the will of others, and be denied a 
just opportunity to pursue the good life.   
Catholic Social Teaching and The Imageries of Aging 
As I identified above, an ethics of aging requires an overarching structure that allows 
both communitarian-virtues and the Capabilities Approach approaches to work cooperatively and 
complementarily. On their own, both the Capabilities Approach and the virtues approaches are 
inadequate for an ethics of aging. The Capabilities Approach identifies and argues for a range of 
opportunities that will make living the good life possible; it also provides a helpful description of 
human dignity. Yet, the Capabilities Approach fails because it neither describes the type of 
action required by those who possess the full range of capabilities, nor does it consider what is 
required of institutional arrangements in protecting the capabilities beyond a democratic state. 
Similarly, MacIntyre and other virtues ethicists have blind spots: they stress the importance of 
accepting one’s dependency and suggest that living in a virtuous community will cultivate good 
                                                
24 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, 192. 
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character, but they overlook the social matrix in which modern aging Americans live. Third 
Agers do not exist as monads, and their path to the good life unquestionably involves others, 
whether that be directly through support of family, friends, and doctors, or indirectly through the 
policies aimed at making the transition into the Third Age smoother. Nor does MacIntyre’s 
approach account for the culture of ageism that disadvantages members of the Third Age nor 
does it answer the broader social-institutional questions of health, housing, and finances that 
Third Agers face. O’Neill’s principles address the social-institutional insofar as they present the 
different kinds of obligations for individuals and institutions regarding structural and 
interpersonal interactions and responsibilities. In what follows below, I will explore how a 
principled approach creates the space in which the virtues and capabilities approaches can work 
complementarily with each other and along with the moral vision of the social ethical tradition of 
the Catholic Church.   
 In the first chapter I showed how much of the response to the question of aging well 
revolved around the health of an individual. From the time of Hippocrates, aging and decline in 
one’s physical or mental health were intertwined, and this correlation bled into modern medicine 
and medical ethics. While clinicians may not necessarily bluntly state that aging causes a range 
of illnesses, the general opinion of the findings in chapter one is that aging begets decline. The 
answer to that decline is that the aging person should work to stay healthy by exercising and 
dieting, and by being proactive in one’s health care. A properly functioning body and mind mark 
living well, a thesis that is integral to Rowe and Kahn’s Successful Aging. However, limiting the 
idea of aging well to how the body and mind function reduces the Third Ager to a one-
dimensional being. Such a functionalist interpretation of the person creates an image of the Third 
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Ager as an aging body, and or worse, as a failing machine that when fixed will function or age 
well. What has been shown, however, is that aging is not experienced uniformly, and that the 
actual health issues potentially experienced in aging are as diverse as the population. Suggesting 
that all aging persons should strive for a single measure of wellbeing reduces attention to the 
diversity of the aging population and the individual lives of aging persons. What is healthy for 
one person is not the same for another, regardless of age, a problem that is further confused by 
the fact that medicine is known to work best when it is tailored to the needs of the individual 
subject in his or her context. Medicine expects Third Agers to improve their health in order to 
achieve the good life without being attentive to the entire picture of individual wellbeing. 
Theologians have responded to this broader understanding of wellbeing in many texts on health 
care ethics, but regarding the Third Age, there is not a cohesive voice attentive to the 
multidimensional nature of the good life in the Third Age beyond the common calls for dignity 
and the priority of the poor and marginalized. The theological vision of health care is more 
holistic in nature than that of medicine, but as it concerns the Third Age, the theological tradition 
overlooks this part of the population in favor of addressing the structures that impact other 
groups more traditionally discussed in biomedical ethics. Both medicine and theological ethics 
leave open the question of how social structures either foster or stymie one’s physical and/or 
mental health in the Third Age.25 There is an analogous response provided by the Capabilities 
Approach insofar as it stresses a freedom to be healthy as central to the dignified life. The 
freedom to be healthy is quite different than being healthy, and certainly different than an 
obligation on the part of others, institutions or individuals, to ensure that an individual’s optimal 
                                                
25 There are, of course, more socially attuned responses coming from the field of public health. These will be 
addressed below. The conclusion reached is based only on the chapter one findings of medicine’s perspectives on 
what it means to age well.  
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health is achieved. Recognition of the social factors contributing to one’s health is necessary in 
an ethics of aging well. 
 However, one must not overreact to the functionalist interpretation of health and dismiss 
the fact that physical and mental health are integral to aging well. Defining adequate levels of 
physical and mental health in aging will come from continued research with aging persons, but 
generally should include: being ambulatory (with or without the assistance of a medical device, 
including orthopedic implants), having average to strong heart and respiratory function 
(determined by quarterly stress tests), being free from depression or anxiety, and having other 
chronic conditions managed closely. Guaranteeing the availability of weight loss surgery for 
cosmetic purposes or experimental genomic therapies and other such enhancement treatments 
cannot be obligatory in an ethics of aging. Ensuring adequate levels of health for the aging 
becomes the task of social institutions and individuals. The good life is bound to health; 
therefore, Catholic social ethics advocates for quality care for all persons, and especially the 
marginalized because of their inherent dignity. Cultivating an environment that makes possible a 
right to health care begins with the adoption of the principles of CST. Representative social 
institutions can be health care providers, insurers, health care policymakers, or any other 
organization that is responsible for improving the wellbeing of a patient. When health is 
discussed in the context of dignity, as it is in the Capabilities Approach, it becomes clear that 
without health a dignified life is not possible. Thus, health is integral to the perfect universal duty 
to not thwart the dignity of the Third Ager. The correlative right to health that comes from the 
obligation to treat persons with dignity is not the starting point for an ethics of aging or for CST; 
instead it is a corollary to the obligation to treat all individuals in a dignified manner. A social 
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response is necessary to ensure that every aging agent is able to age well, the specifics of which 
must be worked out on various levels of government and within the community. As claimants to 
the right to health, Third Agers must be provided acute and preventative treatments that 
correspond to adequate levels of health. The preventative dimension of health care includes 
uncovering and combatting the social causes of poor health that further complicate an aging 
person’s ability to live the good life in aging. The obligation to ensure the health of aging 
persons owed by social institutions is one example of the principled approach of CST serves as a 
normative framework for an ethics of aging.  
 The second chapter shows that the good life in aging should, according to social 
imageries, be lived in terms of productivity and consumption, and independently. A popular 
myth about Third Agers is that they are not as efficient in the workplace and need more 
assistance (health financial etc.) than younger persons. There may be a causal link between these 
cultural perceptions and the medical perspectives that propose the inevitability of decline in the 
Third Age, and other narratives within medicine suggesting that aging is a disease; however, the 
information offered on healthy living itself does not appear to indicate such a relationship. Still, 
the belief that culture could inform the ways in which medicine is practiced and medical ethical 
perspectives are constructed highlights the need for a comprehensive reform. Of course, there 
remain other American cultural values that prove to be as influential as the aforementioned 
reductive views of aging well.  
 As a cultural value, the influence and importance of independence cannot be overstated. 
A detailed history is provided in the second chapter, but it is worth recalling that autonomy is 
largely interpreted as individualistic independence or simply as the freedom of choice, which is 
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concretized as a popular feature of American identity. Autonomy is a value promoted in both 
medical and Catholic ethics, but neither of those disciplines privileges the type of individualistic 
interpretation that is made manifest in American cultural imageries of aging well – imageries that 
do not create the space for positive interpretations of dependence or interdependence. MacIntyre 
responds directly to the problems raised by overemphasizing a libertarian interpretation of 
autonomy, but it is the Catholic social ethical tradition that responds more comprehensively 
through its principles of dignity, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the preferential option for the poor 
and marginalized. Each principle reminds all individuals, regardless of age, of the fundamental 
importance of human sociality and its role in living the good life, interdependence, and the 
mutual goals of the human family.  
Regarding the Third Ager’s economic life, the consumer-capitalistic system provides two 
incompatible ideas. First, American consumer culture is such that individuals are told to acquire 
or consume goods (i.e. material possessions for the purposes of expressing oneself and procuring 
medical treatment to look/feel younger) in order to live well. Second, the ageist tendencies 
within the capitalistic society suggest that aging persons are not as productive in the workplace 
(i.e. unwilling to adapt, physically slow at completing tasks) resulting in being pushed out of 
work more easily. These are irreconcilable ideas because in order for the aging person to acquire 
various consumer goods, he or she must have the financial means; however, being pushed out of 
the workplace because of negative cultural perceptions limits an aging person’s ability to earn 
and/or save the money necessary to consume goods in the marketplace. Regardless of the aging 
person’s financial security, the financial resources needed to satisfy the mercurial consumer 
vision of the good life in aging exceed the means of a majority of Third Agers. Although a 
  
230 
financial support program like Social Security exists, its intention was never to provide enough 
supplemental income to facilitate the consumer habits of Third Agers. However, the problem is 
not with the type of life made possible by Social Security, but rather that Third Agers are 
simultaneously discouraged from working and pressured to spend their money imprudently. 
There continues to be debate about the function and importance of Social Security, and who is 
obliged to contribute to Social Security and why they are obliged to do so. Overcoming the 
consumer psyche is not easily achievable, but the principle of solidarity and a distinct principle 
of intergenerational solidarity, whose focus is on a particular demographic, can begin this 
process. What the public debate about Social Security points to, however, is a broader thematic 
problem of the American capitalistic consumer culture.  
Debating the value of Social Security exemplifies the threat to aging well imposed by 
individualism and a fear of dependency. An unwillingness to support aging persons through 
contributions to welfare programs like Social Security demonstrates the disconnect between 
perfect universal duties and imperfect universal duties. At the very least disagreeing with the 
idea, not the tax-cost structure, of Social Security indicates a lack of compassion that signals the 
importance of O’Neill’s imperfect universal duties. Working to undermine Social Security, on 
the other hand, actively denies the dignity of the aging person by inhibiting their freedoms 
through financial constraints, and thus contravenes the perfect universal duty to not thwart the 
dignity of Third Agers. The general public questioning of whether or not there is an obligation to 
contribute to Social Security highlights a fundamental misunderstanding of one’s sociality and 
the need for principles that incorporate and inculcate the realities of sociality and dependency. 
Family and friends of Third Agers may also fall short of fully embracing a program like Social 
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Security because of the ways in which dependency is culturally disparaged. Surely, this is an 
instance in which those who are assumed to have imperfect obligations to Third Agers need both 
a principled framework and further training in virtue. The principles of CST achieve both tasks, 
but not without the support from the Capabilities Approach and communitarian-virtues 
approaches.  
On a broader level, this reduction of the aging person to producer or consumer points to 
how Third Agers are further provided with individualistic responses to the question of aging 
well. The economic dimension of aging well requires that the Third Ager have enough, where 
enough is determined by fluctuating cultural trends that precipitate new ‘needs,’ money to live 
the good life. The message communicated through the marketers and advertisers of consumer 
culture is that aging well is relevant to the affluent only, but this cannot be the model for a 
population whose demographics do not match the message. Aging white men and women are 
more likely to have the means to purchase consumer goods and elect for cosmetic surgeries 
billed as bringing about a better life. A majority of Third Agers of color who have earned less 
money throughout their lives will not, however, have the financial access to such consumer 
goods. For example: A Third Ager of color may be confronted with paying for the long-term 
effects of a lifetime of discriminatory treatment within the healthcare system in addition to new 
care needs. Here again, the social dimension of the aging person’s experience is neglected 
entirely. For the affluent white individual capable of responding to the changing visions of aging 
well emerging from consumer culture, the presumption is that he or she has should live the good 
life one his or her own, independent of others. For persons of color there is no recognition of 
what has contributed to their needing different types of care than their white affluent 
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counterparts, or why their opportunities for living the good life are stifled by correlative financial 
burdens. In both cases, there were and continue to be social institutions or policies and cultural 
norms that have worked synergistically with some demographics and antagonistically toward 
others regarding their pursuit of the good life. This further reveals the faults with not having a 
principled approach to an ethics of aging; CST provides principles that do not allow institutions 
or individuals to overlook the problems that led to the state of the Third Ager of color mentioned 
above.  
Finally, the principled framework provided by CST offer a comprehensive foundation for 
a theological ethics of aging. When treated as perfect and imperfect, and universal and special 
obligations (using O’Neill’s interpretation of Kant’s terms), the principles inform and direct 
policies, organizations, and the behaviors and attitudes of citizens. The principles hold society 
and its structures responsible for the good life of the aging. The freedoms articulated in the 
central capabilities are integral to human dignity and the inductive method provides the 
institutions responsible for ensuring the good life in aging instruction on what is essential to 
aging well. MacIntyre’s communitarian thinking provides guidance for the specific practices that 
contribute to an aging individual’s living of the good life. CST and its principles support the 
autonomy of the individual while also recognizing an individual’s matrix of relationships and 
responsibilities. The principles are universal in their applicability, but because of their focus on 
sociality they can speak specifically enough to particular situations and relationships. An ethics 
of aging requires a principled framework in order to address the conflicting visions of living well 
mediated through the social imageries without inhibiting the autonomy or sociality of the Third 
Ager as individual. 
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Why Catholic Social Teaching 
Interpreting the principles of CST as obligations and not simply themes that appear in the 
CST literature augments how Catholics are called to act, and how Catholic institutions are 
rendered. However, understanding these obligations in the terms set out by O’Neill would mean 
a much wider application of CST than just the Catholic tradition; what may have previously been 
imperfect universal obligations are to be made perfect universal obligations. According to the 
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, the principles are “primary and fundamental 
parameters of reference for interpreting and evaluating social phenomena, which are the 
necessary source for working out the criteria of discernment and orientation of social interactions 
in every area.”26 Neither are they empty formal claims nor are they particular to Catholic 
enclaves. As principles of action they call upon all persons to perform or abstain from 
performing certain acts; they challenge the conscience of all persons to act responsibly “with all 
people and also regarding all people.”27 Specific examples of how the principles can be used in 
tandem with the Capabilities Approach and virtues approaches in formulating an ethics of aging 
will be explored below.  
 The social ethical tradition of the Catholic Church has a rich history beyond its 
commonplace perception as a collection of papal and episcopal statements. As Gaudium et spes 
explains, the Church is called to respond to the signs of the times, to address the Church’s 
relationship to the world, and the faith and daily lives of believers. Such a response is witnessed 
in biblical exhortations regarding justice in the community, Augustine’s articulation of the 
                                                
26 Catholic Church. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. 2004. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Catholic Church. Vatican City; Washington, DC: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. §161. 
 
27 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §163.  
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relationship between Church and State in City of God, and Thomas Aquinas’ re-formation of 
Catholic moral theology in the Summa. Charles Curran describes Industrial Revolution-Era CST 
as influenced by  
teaching in Scripture…Catholic attitudes toward socialism and the Enlightenment, a 
Catholic tendency to look to the Middle Ages as the golden period of human existence, 
and revived interest in the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas.28  
 
Certain anthropological, political, and economic claims were developed that informed the 
principles of CST. 29  
Two of these claims evidenced throughout CST are the dignity and social nature of the 
person.30 As described by Aquinas, dignity refers to the person’s being created in God’s image 
and likeness. Whereby image and likeness mean that, like God, the person has “intellect, free 
will, and the power of self-determination.”31 All persons are bestowed equally with such dignity 
through “the generous gift of creation and redemption from God.”32 A second essential part of 
the human is his or her being social. Individuals need “the social ties of family, associations, and 
political community for their proper development.”33 As created to live socially and politically, 
the image of the person emerging from CST overturns the myth of being self-made and accepts 
dependence as an essential part of being human.  Gaudium et spes identifies the importance of 
                                                
28 Curran, Charles E. Catholic Social Teaching: A historical theological and ethical analysis. (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002), 6-7. 
 
29 The first official document considered to be part of the CST canon is Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, published in 
1891. 
  
30 In Chapter Four, these were discussed using Margaret Farley’s terms “obligating features of personhood.” Farley, 
however, discusses dignity in terms of autonomy. See: Chapter Four, pp 190-192. 
 
31 Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, 132. 
 
32 Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, 132. 
 
33 Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, 133. Summarizing Gaudium et spes §24-25. 
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social structures and institutions as integral in the flourishing of both individuals and the 
community.34 Thus the responsibility of the political order is such that is to protect the dignity of 
individuals insofar as they are enabled to live the good life or flourish. That political order itself 
is “a natural society that is based on the social nature that the Creator has given to human 
beings,”35 and has the moral responsibility to direct people to their own and the common good. 
CST’s understanding of the state’s purpose then is to avoid the extremes of individualism and 
collectivism, for the former denies the sociality of the individual and the latter subordinates the 
authentic development and good of the individual to the whole.  Curran describes the state’s role 
in promoting the common good as one of mutuality: “the common good ultimately flows back to 
the good of the individual and thus brings together the good of the community and the good of 
the individual.”36 Integral in the state’s ability to fulfill its purpose and the individual’s dignity 
and social nature being respected is the economy. Cautions against individualism in the 
economic sphere take the form of condemnations of materialism, explications of workers’ rights 
and workers’ responsibility to contribute to society, and critiques of socialist economic systems 
that diminish the dignity of the individual. Privately held goods are important, but possessing 
them to the detriment of others is immoral. Working to meet basic needs is commended, but 
work for the pursuit of consumeristic ends undermines one’s relationship with others and God. 
Though the CST position on the economy is referred to as a third way between capitalism and 
socialism, CST prefers capitalism so long as it “recognizes the fundamental and positive role of 
                                                
34 Gaudium et spes. §25. Within the section entitled “The Interdependence of Person and Society” the conciliar 
document addresses the development of persons, called ‘socialization,” which is facilitated by institutions that 
increase and protect the rights of persons.  
 
35 Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, 138. 
 
36 Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, 145. 
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business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of 
production as well as free human creativity in the economic sector.”37 This point will be explored 
below in the discussion of working in the Third Age. The anthropological, political, and 
economic themes that emerge from the various CST documents work collectively to ensure that 
dignity, the common good, and justice are integral to the individual and communal life of the 
Christian, but there is much more to be said about these and other principles in regards to the 
current socio-cultural context of aging persons today. 
“The Church sees in men and women, in every person, the living image of God 
himself,”38 reads the foundational explanation of dignity in CST. Established in creation and 
confirmed through the Incarnation, the human person is capable of self-knowledge, self-
determination, and called into relation with God and other persons. The creation of the person is 
understood as an act of love, an act of love that initiates the covenantal relationship between God 
and persons. In response to that relationship, persons are called to love and pursue a relationship 
with God, and God’s creation. The love command and the response to it, as outlined by Frits de 
Lange in Chapter Three, causes the agent to recognize and respond to the obligating features of 
personhood, dignity and sociality. Recognition of the equal dignity of all “regardless of their 
race, nation, sex, origin, culture, or class,”39 is what makes possible the common and individual 
growth of all. Respecting, honoring, protecting, and fighting for the dignity of all persons are 
obliged by this feature of personhood. However, O’Neill’s use of universal and special principles 
signals that such a vague ‘dignity for all’ message does not carry enough weight; An approach 
                                                
37 John Paul II. Centesimus Annus §42.  
 
38 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §105.  
 
39 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §144. 
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that moves beyond a cheap invocation of dignity is Nussbaum’s Capabilities approach for it 
provides a more concrete explication of dignity that is particular to a social context and the 
experience of individuals. What promoting the dignity of Third Agers means, in light of the 
O’Neillian principles applied to CST and Nussbaum’s capabilities as a normative anthropology 
for the dignified life, must be considered. 
Insofar as biomedical ethics combines end-of-life issues with aging persons, promoting 
the dignity of the aging person would mean greater attention from biomedical ethicists and 
medical practitioners regarding the needs of Third Agers. The implications are as follows: first, 
there must be a concerted effort in biomedical ethics to disassociate the elderly or those 
perceived to be near the end-of-life because of their age from the members of the Third Age. A 
turn to the gerontological literature that speaks specifically to the distinctions is helpful in 
completing this task so that aging persons are treated as the unique group they are. Of course, the 
potential pitfall of generalizing the condition and needs of all Third Agers, the same as any other 
demographic grouping, must be avoided. On this point the work of medicine as a whole can 
assist in easing the language of ‘aging as disease’ in such a way that medical practitioners do not 
assume a given condition is the result of a patient’s age or that simply because the patient is in 
the Third Age that he or she should expect to fall victim to conditions x, y, and/or z. Improving 
the communication between practitioner and patient is the first step in establishing a more 
respectful relationship between the two. In the age of the Internet, it is incumbent upon medical 
professionals to ease the woes for aging persons who may have read about a condition and fall 
into the trap of self-diagnosing based on ageist claims. The medical professional is also 
responsible for caring for the person beyond a medicinal healing by mollifying the fears Third 
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Age patients may have about their health. A role in easing the transition into the Third Age is 
also the responsibility of gerontologists given their emphasis on the inherent value of aging 
itself. If their claims about the goodness to be found in the developmental process of aging are 
accurate, more work must be done to show aging persons what that goodness is and how it is to 
be found or experienced.  
Additionally, the dignity of the aging person demands the end of discriminatory practices 
broadly within American culture, and specifically within the workplace. Hiring and firing 
practices perpetuate biases against aging persons, yet the modern economic situation of most 
aging Americans is such that they cannot afford to be subjected to such unfair treatment, as well 
as it being a slight to their dignity. Many aging Americans need to continue to work in order to 
pay for their housing, health care, and to make possible the type of retirement life that they 
envision. In addition to those basic responsibilities, some individuals may have other obligations 
to family members that preclude them from fully retiring. The economic ramifications are but 
some of the damaging effects when it comes to workplace discrimination – being treated in an 
unfair and undignified way is the more crushing experience. Work is bound to dignity because it 
is an expression of the self. Without being able to express oneself, achieving the good life 
becomes impossible.  
As John Paul II explains, work is good for individuals because it is a mode of self-
expression; work honors the dignity of person.40 The moral significance of work outlined in 
Economic Justice for All is threefold: it enables individuals to provide for their material needs, it 
is a form of self-expression, and is the primary way in which one contributes to the good of the 
                                                
40 John Paul II. 1981. Laborem Exercens. §9. 
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community; it is work’s status as “a principal way that people exercise the distinctive human 
capacity for self-expression and self-realization”41 that makes it an essential consideration for an 
ethics of aging. Institutional structures, such as mandatory Social Security collection, that make 
working in the Third Age more difficult are not wrong simply because of their discriminatory 
premises, but also because of the impact that such institutional directives have on our culture 
and, of course, on the Third Ager. Policies that mandate Third Agers retire in their 60s and 
collect Social Security benefits, even if they continue to work in which case they are subjected to 
penalties,42 deny Third Agers the right to work to which other members of society are entitled. 
The policies close off the opportunity for individuals to fulfill their responsibility to imitate 
God.43 This discriminatory practice is a fundamental violation of their dignity that, when 
mediated through our culture, finds traction in mythical claims, for example, about the inability 
of Third Agers to positively contribute to the workplace and the society. When the Third Ager is 
pushed out of or unable to reenter the workforce, the real injustice of the institutional policies is 
revealed: the very worth and identity of the Third Ager is undermined. Inhibiting the expression 
of the self through work goes against cultural norms that esteem individualism and personal 
responsibility in living the good life – society simultaneously defines the Third Ager by his or 
her productivity while removing opportunities for him or her to work. Similarly, the cultural 
images suggesting that the Third Ager is less productive deny work’s role in enabling individuals 
to contribute to the flourishing of the community.  
                                                
41 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. 1986. Economic Justice for All. §97. 
 
42 These penalties are assessed based on a Social Security recipient’s earnings while working and collecting Social 
Security benefits are paid back directly to the SSA or through the IRS on personal income taxes. 
 
43 Laborem Exercens, §25. 
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In addition to these issues the Third Ager faces the ancillary impediments to living well 
mediated through the norms of consumer culture. The first characteristic of work’s moral 
dimension, being able to provide for one’s material needs, becomes increasingly difficult for 
Third Agers who are not given the opportunity to continue to work. Acquiring material goods, as 
addressed in Chapter Two, is part of consumer culture’s message to Third Agers that the more 
goods that can be possessed the better kind of life that individual is living. Without the means to 
meet the shifting needs generated by consumer culture, the Third Ager will be trapped in an 
unending cycle, never able to satisfy culture’s image of aging well. Worse will be the 
demoralizing realization that the pursuit of consumer culture’s images of aging well was 
inauthentic and potential detrimental to the Third Ager’s flourishing. The Third Ager has limited 
institutional or structural support to meet the impossible demands of consumer culture’s images 
of aging well, and culture perpetuates norms that further demoralize and devalue Third Agers. 
Ageism impedes the good life in the Third Age on institutional, cultural, and personal levels as 
witnessed by the workplace. Its presence reveals the failures of social institutions, communities, 
and individuals to recognize how essential having opportunities to be included in all sectors of 
social life is for the good life in the Third Age. Injustices imposed upon Third Agers are 
representative of the need for several CST principles: solidarity, subsidiarity, participation, the 
preferential option for the poor and marginalized, and intergenerational solidarity or justice. 
Exploring these principles and their roles in an ethics of aging follows below.  
The Principles Of CST And The Third Age 
Benedict XVI acknowledges the ways in which certain cultural narratives thwart the 
authentic development of individuals, and calls for a conversion on the personal and institutional 
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level in Caritas in Veritate. Though he does not identify the US specifically, Benedict explains 
that “there are certain cultures in the world today that do not oblige men and women to live in 
communion but rather cut them off from one other in search for individual well-being limited to 
the gratification of psychological desires.”44 Reinforcing MacIntyre’s claims about dependency, 
relationality, and living the good life in community, Benedict affirms that the Christian vision of 
humanity is one that presupposes a vision of the person in which relationality is essential to the 
good life.  The principle that speaks to honoring the dignity and sociality of the individual is 
solidarity.  
First and foremost, solidarity is a “sense of responsibility on the part of everyone with 
regard to everyone;”45 it is a perfect universal principle, whether we are discussing Third Agers 
or not. Solidarity is a principle that acknowledges the interdependence of persons and “the 
common path of individuals and people towards an ever more committed unity.”46 It requires 
that all persons commit themselves to the “good of all and of each individual,”47 because “the 
more authentically he or she lives these [interpersonal] relations, the more his or her own identity 
matures.”48 Such a task reveals solidarity’s ability to serve O’Neill’s approach to principles well: 
it is a principle that obliges institutions and persons to act that is also capable of cultivating the 
dispositions necessary for imperfect obligations. Solidarity is not merely “a feeling of vague 
compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people,” but rather the active 
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45 Caritas in Veritate, §38. 
 
46 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §192. 
 
47 John Paul II. 1988. Solicitudo Rei Socialis. §38. 
 
48 Caritas in Veritate, §53. 
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pursuit of “the good of one’s neighbor with the readiness…to lose oneself for the sake of the 
other,”49 to serve instead of oppress. John Paul II’s words reflect the very nature of solidarity as a 
proactive principle of action, not an empty formal principle meant only to inspire an reactive 
empathy.   
Moreover, solidarity speaks to the role of social institutions in the flourishing of 
individuals and the community. It “determines the order of institutions”50 thus, practicing 
solidarity means identifying the social structures that systematically thwart authentic 
development or the pursuit of the good life and transforming them into complementary rather 
than antagonistic forces in the lives of individuals and the community. Benedict, like John Paul 
II and Paul VI before him, criticizes the ways in which modern economic practices have 
alienated individuals, peoples, and nations. Because the “economic sphere is neither ethically 
neutral nor inherently inhuman,” 51 and because every economic act has a moral consequence, 
many of the political and social structures to be shaped by solidarity are directly linked to an 
individual’s economic activity. Thus, the principle of solidarity obliges “appropriate 
modification of laws, market regulations, and juridical systems”52 to ensure aging persons are 
given comprehensive opportunities to live the good life.  
Solidarity as a virtue (understood, in O’Neill’s terminology, as an imperfect duty that 
overlaps with virtues) can be witnessed in MacIntyrean communities, and demonstrated by 
virtuous individuals who view solidarity as an imperfect universal duty. In health care, the 
                                                
49 Solicitudo Rei Socialis. §38. 
 
50 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §193. 
 
51 Caritas in Veritate, §36.  
 
52 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §193. 
  
243 
principle of solidarity signals a paradigm shift. The principle of solidarity identifies the 
obligations that health care institutions have toward caring for all persons. A solidaric view of 
health care support a system provides services to all regardless of ability to pay or insurance. 
Because health is integral to living well, and there is a duty not to undermine the dignity of the 
Third Ager, the health care system must attend to the needs of all Third Agers and ensure that 
their care plans are such that individuals are enabled to return to adequate levels of health. 
However, the solidaric vision of health care goes beyond acute care settings and compels reforms 
within preventative care services. As such, institutions are obliged to work to improve the quality 
of health care rather than disproportionately focus on curative medicine. For the aging this means 
abandoning life extension therapies in favor of improving the quality and distribution of health 
care to Third Agers. Similarly, the solidaric vision of health care compels institutions to 
moderate what Richard McCormick calls the “interventionist mentality,”53 that causes medicine 
to solve health problems with technology instead of investigating and correcting their root 
causes. Prescription drugs are first line treatments for many conditions, but there may be times 
that a symptom described by an aging person is innocuous; however, because of ageist 
tendencies, the reaction may be to prescribe a medication to treat a condition to which the 
symptom is linked. As a patient, a Third Ager may present with vitamin deficiencies, but a 
vitamin supplement does not address the shortcomings of his or her diet. Certainly, the vitamin 
does not explain why there are deficiencies in the diet. Identifying the health care needs of Third 
Agers requires work from within the communities, thus it is necessary that the solidaric vision of 
health translate into a virtue of solidarity that supports the imperfect obligations owed to Third 
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Agers. Still, the needs may exceed the resources available within the community – resources here 
do not only mean actual medications or medical devices – therefore, the cooperation between 
larger social institutions and smaller community organizations is imperative. However, being 
able to appeal to larger institutions is what enables smaller or local organizations to function as 
well as they do. The CST principle that identifies this relationship is subsidiarity.  
One of the few principles that speaks directly to the organizational structure of social 
institutions, subsidiarity can be found in a majority of CST documents. Subsidiarity obliges 
smaller social organizations to work for the promotion of the good life of individuals under their 
care with the provision that larger organizations provide support if necessary. On one hand the 
state proper is to refrain from “anything that would de facto restrict the existential space of the 
smaller essential cells of society,” while on the other hand “economic, institutional, or juridical 
assistance” is to be offered to the smaller cells of society as needed.54 Subsidiarity establishes a 
method for organizing the institutional arrangements necessary for the facilitation of solidarity, 
participation, intergenerational solidarity, and the preferential option for the poor and 
marginalized. It bridges the gap between the particularist communitarian-virtues approach to the 
good life and the universalist theories: as a principle, it is universalist, but because it turns to the 
specific cases, it requires the specificity and practicality afforded by virtues that cannot be 
captured in a purely formal principle. In addition to the space for the procedural implementation 
of other necessary principles for an ethics of aging, the principle of subsidiarity works well to 
create the space in which the freedoms of Third Agers outlined in the Capabilities Approach can 
be acted upon while having the ‘checks and balances’ nature to identify when Third Agers are 
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not fully enabled to exercise their central capabilities.  
  Subsidiarity obliges the “respect and promotion of the human person and the family,” 
the “encouragement of private initiatives so that every social entity remains at the service of the 
common good,” “safeguarding human rights and the rights of minorities,” “bringing about 
bureaucratic and administrative decentralization,” and “appropriate methods for making citizens 
more responsible in actively ‘being a part’ of the political and social reality of their country.”55 
Community models that counter the individualistic narratives of consumer culture are able to 
identify and respond to the immediate needs of local constituents. If the community cannot 
respond to needs, it is protected by the obligation of larger organizations to assist in meeting 
those needs. Smaller social units or organizations can be better equipped at identifying and 
answering what aging persons need in order to flourish using a method such as Community 
Based Participatory Research (CBPR).56 CBPR is primarily used in public health as a means for 
members of the community to volunteer information without the fear of a hidden agenda from an 
outside researcher, and often proves to be helpful in uncovering authentic needs of community 
members. A broader use of such a method bolsters the description of dignity found within CA, 
and provides genuine feedback as Third Agers experience changing life conditions. Emphasis on 
specific cases can ensure that local needs are met, that those needs are brought to the attention of 
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56 Community based participatory research is a research practice that attempts to stifle the misuse of community 
trust and instead emphasizes the importance of and need for action to be taken on behalf of the community for the 
community. CBPR “challenges researchers to listen to, learn from, solicit and respect the contributions of, and share 
power, information, and credit for accomplishments with the groups that they are trying to learn about to help.” In a 
2004 article, Dr. Meredith Minkler stated that “CBPR represents an orientation to inquiry that is highly consistent 
with the principles of public health education and ‘public health social justice,’” and that the practice “underscores 
ethical principles such as self-determination, liberty, and equity” which demonstrate the idea that individuals are 
capable of assessing and expressing their health needs without the help of a voice external to the community. See: 
Horowitz et al. Community-Based Participatory Research from the Margin to the Mainstream. 2634; Minkler, 
Meredith. Ethical Challenges for the ‘Outside’ Researcher in Community-based Participatory Research. 684 
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larger groups so as to inform other smaller communities about potential needs, and, in the event 
of the local needs not being met, the responsibility for care can be given over to larger social 
institutions. Ideally, the principle of subsidiarity ensures, on multiple levels, that aging well is 
facilitated.  
Organizations with more resources or capital are not necessarily better equipped to 
identify and address the needs of all Third Agers, but they may very well be better at correcting 
systemic issues that have precipitated those very needs. Surely, an appeal to the highest levels of 
government should not be the first step taken when moving from a relatively small social group 
to a larger institution, so there must be effective intermediary institutions ready to protect and 
promote the good of the aging individual. Publicly funded municipal or regional groups that have 
the facilities and resource staff can provide aging persons with the types of space they may need 
to pursue various avenues of fulfillment (i.e. recreational and social opportunities). According to 
the CDC, in 2014 there were 4800 adult day service centers that provided social activities, 
transportation, meals, personal care, and therapeutic activities, but they focus exclusively on 
persons with more serious health needs than the average Third Ager.57 Such facilities are 
important, but they do more to separate older adults from the community than integrate them 
with other non-peers. Though other types of community centers exist in and around many 
popular urban areas, community centers face a similar problem of separating programs into age 
groups instead of actively working to promote a truly communal life. Community centers do well 
to focus on youth recreational sports, provide fitness facilities, and offer ‘senior citizen’ 
programs, but a message of communal unity and support is necessary to cultivate the virtues that 
                                                
57 According to the CDC, 44% of the 4800 centers were for-profit institutions, suggesting that only those who are 
financially secure enough were eligible for such services. Accessed February 23, 2017. 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/adsc.htm  
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support imperfect universal obligations vis-à-vis Third Agers. Cultivating this sense of 
community begins with making access to the center easier, both financially and in terms of 
transportation; it continues with offering programs that bring the various constituencies together. 
It is important that Third Agers be distinguished from ‘senior citizens’ within these centers 
because of the ways in which stereotypes about senior citizens inaccurately reflect the experience 
of the Third Age. The Berkshire South Regional Community Center (BSRCC) of Great 
Barrington, Massachusetts is a model for such centers because it outlines a mission to “connect, 
encouraging all to build a sense of community, and common purpose,”58 with free and paid 
program offerings for early childhood, school-aged children, teens, adults, and senior citizens.  
The center offers up to a 75% discount on membership fees if individuals cannot afford 
the yearly dues59 in an effort to make the center accessible to as many people as possible. 
BSRCC offers a specific program on how Third Agers might handle the changes that come with 
the aging process. Relevant to the consumer experiences of Third Agers, BSRCC offers 
educational workshops that address fraud, identify theft, and other popular consumer scams to 
which aging persons may be subjected. While the list of programs for Third Agers goes on, 
BSRCC’s mission to create a sense of community and make all feel like they belong somewhere, 
particularly those who are experiencing changes in their lives, is exemplified in the simplest of 
programs: weekly community dinners. Open to all, the dinners are an opportunity for 
intergenerational interaction among the community members. Though the dinners may be short, 
they present inviting opportunities to cultivate intra- and intergenerational friendships. 
Companionship is as important in aging well as maintaining one’s health; therefore, having an 
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organization capable of meeting both sets of needs is integral for aging well. However, what 
BSRCC and other community centers in more rural areas might not be able to address is the 
problem of transportation. Many community centers serve an urban or suburban area that either 
has adequate transportation infrastructure in the case of the former, or a population that has 
access to reliable transportation in the latter. Ensuring that members of the community can make 
use of the services provided by the center is, of course, an issue, but getting to and from the 
community center points to the larger transportation infrastructure problems created by the shift 
from rural to urban to suburban life. Reliable access to a motor vehicle enables aging persons to 
pursue various secondary goods integral to their visions of the good life, but not all Third Agers 
can afford to own, lease, or rent cars, or hire car services. Addressing this issue requires work 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, but its role in enabling the fulfillment of the good life in 
aging is important for many Third Agers.  
Although community centers are helpful, they are not equipped to effect the type of 
change in the health of Third Agers that larger health-specific institutions can. The support of 
more organized, structured, and efficient institutions is necessary to ensure that the needs learned 
in communication with the aging do not go unaddressed. As the health care needs of aging 
persons change throughout the Third Age it is necessary that larger social institutions with 
broader reach, more resources, and weightier political influence are able to resolve health issues 
impeding an individual’s good life effectively. One such organization that collects the needs of 
various smaller communities is Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI), which has a community benefit 
program designed to improve the overall health of the community through an “organized and 
measured approach to meeting identified community health needs or increasing access to health 
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care.”60 The mission of CHI, however is admittedly informed by a larger organization, the 
Catholic Health Association (CHA). The CHA works to spread the Catholic mission and vision 
not only by augmenting health care practice or delivery but also by engaging in broader 
sociopolitical concerns relevant to individual and population health.61 The work of both these 
organizations is effective in bringing attention to the needs of vulnerable populations and 
effecting a positive change in overall health. However, the specific attention to health care 
delivery can overshadow the other relevant factors in one’s health. Limiting subsidiarity’s reach 
to making sure that health needs are identified and treatments made available still falls short of 
truly improving the wellbeing of aging persons. As important as health is in one’s being able to 
age well, the way in which health is thought of must be reexamined in light of the social 
experience of aging.  
Improving the health of aging persons has been the focus of certain initiatives in recent 
years. Pneumonia and flu vaccinations are more popular and available than they were a decade 
ago, but these two pathologies are not necessarily the leading causes of health decline in aging 
persons; however, they fit the narrative of aging as disease or aging as inevitably diseased, thus 
any efforts to curb them seems like the type of targeted care for which larger institutions are 
responsible. Policies directed at vaccination or other type of preventative care are vital to the 
                                                
60 Catholic Health Initiatives. Community Benefit. Accessed February 27, 2017. 
http://www.catholichealthinitiatives.org/community-benefit. In 2015 CHI’s community benefit program contributed 
$1.61 billion to the community health care needs across CHI’s network of hospitals. The only statistic indicative of 
resources directly impacting members of the Third Age is CHI’s Medicare-related contribution: $629 million.  
 
61 The CHA’s most recent publication, “Improving the Lives of Older Adults through Faith Community 
Partnerships: Healing Body, Mind, and Spirt,” continues in the tradition of presuming declining health for most 
members of the Third Age. However, the CHA calls upon clergy to more actively check-in on the health of 
parishioners, for clergy and parishioners visit individuals who live alone and/or who are sick, and for parishioners to 
train in caring for elderly persons, all of which are within the scope of the principles of CST. The CHA also asks 
that hospitals or health care organizations host programs in parishes or congregation spaces, interview clergy and 
parishioners to better assess the health of the vulnerable population, and to be more open to clergy or clergy-in-
training having a more active role in the hospital or health care organization itself.    
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flourishing of aging persons, but public health has a unique role in not only addressing the actual 
conditions affecting an individual, but also the co-determinants of health integral to the good life. 
Public health’s identification of the social determinants of health supports the idea that the very 
experience of the good life is socially mediated, thus requiring a response beyond the individual. 
One’s environment (i.e. air and water quality, proximity to safe exercise spaces or opportunities 
to walk/run), access to health care, availability of and ability to procure the healthy foods 
necessary for achieving optimal health, and a number of other factors contribute the health of an 
individual. However, these issues are not germane to medicine. Responding to them requires a 
systemic effort to improve the overall wellbeing of aging persons. Improving the wellbeing of 
aging persons helps them to age well by making their continued involvement in communal life 
possible. Without emphasis on the complex situation of actual individuals it is possible that 
another principle of CST is overlooked, namely participation.  
Participation is articulated in Paul VI’s Octogesima Adveniens (1971), in which he issued 
a call to action for all Christians: take up your personal responsibility in solving the various 
injustices facing individuals worldwide. Paul follows a pattern of placing the onus on the 
individual to shoulder the burden of fixing the world’s problems, which for Paul were the 
growing economic disparities between the global North and South. But for many, there simply is 
no ability to participate, which makes personally responding to injustices rather difficult if not 
impossible. However, these glaring objections to Paul and the Church’s position cannot 
overshadow the message of participation. Reasserting the importance of human sociality and 
interdependence, the principle of participation presents itself as “the greatest aspiration[s] of the 
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citizen,”62 and central in the continuation of the Church’s preferred political system, a 
participatory democracy.63 Participation refers to “a series of activities by means of which the 
citizen, either as an individual or in association with others, whether directly or through 
representation, contributes to the cultural, economic, political and social life”64 of the 
community. Such contributions promote the good of the individual and the community and are 
the very purpose of civic life. Participation facilitates the authentic development of each 
community or country “in a framework of cooperation free of domination, either economic or 
political,”65 where development refers to an individual or entire nation’s ability to pursue the 
good life free from systemic structural impediments. Being able to participate presumes the 
conditions outlined in the Capabilities Approach as the combined capabilities are the freedoms 
that enable individuals to do and be across a range of categories. Thus, at the very least 
participation requires adequate health, and maximally, demands assistance in being given a voice 
in the local, regional, and national political conversation. As Chapter Two showed, policies have 
a tremendous impact on Third Agers’ ability to live the good life, therefore they should be 
empowered to inform political conversations that immediately impact their lives. For those who 
cannot attend town council meetings or get to the polls on election days, or those who are 
uninformed about various policies, efforts should be made to ensure participation through 
                                                
62 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §190. 
 
63 A participative democracy “means that the different subjects of civil community at every level must be informed, 
listened to, and involved in the exercise of the carried-out functions.” Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 
Compendium, §190. 
 
64 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §189. 
 
65 Christine E. Gudorf. “Commentary on Octogesima adveniens (On the Eightieth anniversary of Rerum novarum),” 
in Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries and Interpretations, ed. Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 316. 
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transportation and/or communicating information. Participation also hinges on a shift in the 
cultural perception and treatment of aging persons regarding ageism. Without an effort to adjust 
policies and cultural sentiment that negatively impacts aging persons in the workforce, Third 
Agers will not be able to participate in society, which includes being a producer and a consumer, 
as they see fit. Because one’s value is closely tied to one’s work, denying individuals the right to 
express themselves through work effectively denies them the ability to participate in society. As 
one ages and continues through the stages of development, he or she may find new passions, but, 
because of ageist policies and practices, he or she may not be able to pursue them. This extends 
beyond the workforce to adult education programs. On the rise at community colleges and 
satellite programs offered through municipal school districts, education programs for Third 
Agers can be helpful in providing a social space or opportunities to pursue interests. However, 
for those who wish to start down a new work path, they may find their efforts are futile given the 
prevalence of ageism in the workplace. Participation is social, political, and economic, and 
avoidable shortcomings in any of those areas impede the authentic development or genuine 
pursuit of the good life. Participation in CST was historically contextualized by the growing 
economic divide between the developed and developing worlds, and a commensurate principle 
emerged that spoke to that experiences of economic, social, and political, deprivation.   
The first cohesive invocation66 of the principle of preferential option for the poor, and 
correlative birth of liberation theology, came during the 1968 Conference of Latin American 
Bishops at Medellin. In response to the rising social and political tensions spurred on by the 
                                                
66 “Preferential option for the poor” appears as a nascent idea in Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio (1967). In §12-21, 
Paul VI lays the groundwork for the option by identifying the Catholic vision of authentic development and the 
ways in which the then current economic and political climate thwarted such development for those in developing 
nations and particularly the poorest of individuals within them. Paul VI places emphasis on the primacy of solidarity 
and charity among Christian virtues while emphasizing the ministry of Christ regarding the least well off in society.  
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influence of Marxist ideology and globalization and industrialization’s effect on the asymmetric 
development of the global North and South, the conference resolved that the poor or oppressed 
were those to whom the Church, in the spirit of Jesus’ ministry, had a primary obligation to love 
and serve: 
The Lord's distinct commandment to "evangelize the poor" ought to bring us to a 
distribution of resources and apostolic personnel that effectively gives preference to the 
poorest and most needy sectors and to those segregated for any cause whatsoever, 
animating and accelerating the initiatives and studies that or already being made with that 
goal in mind.67 
 
To effectively act in solidarity with the poor, the Bishops suggested the creation or modification 
of social institutions that would directly combat the injustices and oppression experienced by the 
poor. As it has been made clear in earlier chapters, it would be a mistake to equate the condition 
of Third Agers as such; however, the proposed communal responses to the needs of the poor 
share a similar spirit with the proposal for Third Agers. As the interpretation of preferential 
option for the poor has expanded to include other marginalized groups, such as “the those 
without health care and…those without hope of a better future,”68 Third Agers have been made 
subjects of the principle. Third Agers who are most in need or most oppressed would require 
immediate attention, i.e. the unemployed, homeless, chronically ill, and impoverished, with the 
needs of other Third Agers being met in due time with responses proportionate to their needs. As 
was indicated in chapter two, Third Agers of color experience a lower life expectancy than their 
white counterparts,69 and are more susceptible to certain health conditions later in life. When this 
                                                
67 Conference of Latin American Bishops. 1968. Poverty of the Church. §9. 
 
68 Solicitudo Rei Socialis. §42. 
 
69 The CDC reports the following statistics for life expectancy at birth for persons born in 1950: White Men, 66.5; 
White Women, 72.2; African-American Men, 59.1 African-American Women, 62.9; Hispanic Men, Hispanic 
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reality is compounded with a preexisting economic disadvantage from underemployment or 
wage inequality, Third Age women of color experience life after full-time work quite differently 
than men. Women are more likely to be forced out of work through ageist practices and policies, 
but that discrimination is only magnified when they find themselves unable to obtain work 
before Social Security eligibility or, more generally, when the realities of financial insecurity in 
retirement materialize.70 For a majority of Americans who have been unable to save for 
retirement or for the type of retirement lifestyle they are sold through advertising, living the good 
life becomes increasingly difficult. Living as a member of any one of these demographic 
categories comes with a series of avoidable or at least potentially avoidable obstacles to aging 
well; being a Third Age woman of color makes living the good life in aging seem near 
impossible. The vulnerability of the above-mentioned woman suggests further reason for the 
preferential option for the aging to be reaffirmed across the socio-political landscape. It is in this 
sense that a preferential option for the aging, which in some cases will be the poor, is necessary 
so as to ensure Third Agers opportunities to participate, contribute, and flourish. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Women. Once the individuals reach age 65, their estimate life expectancy increases by approximately 13 years 
across all four groups. Accessed February 23, 2017. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2015/015.pdf.  
 
70 The Department of Labor reported that in 2015, men aged 35-44 had a workforce participation rate of 90.4%, and 
men aged 45-54 85.9%, and 55-64, 69.8%. For the same year, women aged 35-44 had a workforce participation rate 
of 74.3%, 45-54 73.4%, and for 55-64-year-olds a rate of 58.5%.  In 1980, the participation rates for the same 
groups of women were: 65.5%, 59.9%, and 41.3% respectively. For today’s female Third Agers, their participation 
rate in their 30s and 40s shows that less than 70% of women had the opportunity to begin planning for retirement, 
assuming that was a possibility given their other expenses. In 1998, the rates for the same groups of women were: 
77.1%, 76.2%, 51.2% respectively. In their 40s and 50s, the data reflects an uptick in participation that can help 
women plan for retirement, but the truncated duration of life-time work as they enter their 50s and later 60s does not 
necessarily offset preciously missed opportunities for financial success. Participation rates have improved, and 
future generations of Third Age women will likely be more financially secure, but the situation of Third Age women 
of color still lags behind. The Bureau of Labor and Statistics reports that in 2015 full-time wage and salary working 
women earned 81% of what their male counterparts earned. The statistic was first recorded in 1979 when women 
earned 62.3% of what men earned. Full-time working African-American and Hispanic women had a median weekly 
earning of $615 and $566 compared to white women who earned $743. Accessed February 23, 2017.  
https://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/latest_annual_data.htm#labor;  https://www.bls.gov/mlr/1999/12/art1full.pdf; 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/2015/home.htm.  
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Preferential treatment, however, does not infer deferential treatment, and it does not 
exempt Third Agers, in proportion to their capabilities, from their obligations to others. As the 
dissertation has repeatedly shown, aging is not uniformly experienced and Third Agers are not 
homogenous regarding needs and capabilities. With this in mind it is necessary to call attention 
to the notion of intergenerational justice and its role in an ethics of aging. While Third Agers will 
benefit from the social situation created by the principled framework of CST vis-à-vis their 
ability to pursue the good life, they are also obliged to contribute to the good life of others. A 
nascent vision of intergenerational justice appears in the Compendium concerning protection of 
the environment in the form of intergenerational solidarity.71 It has been invoked by Pope 
Benedict XVI72 in a way that demonstrates the connection between the environment and issues 
of economic and political justice, and most recently by Pope Francis,73 who also connects 
ecological sustainability to the authentic human development.74 Despite its significance, only 
focusing on the environment would be a mistake given the ethical implications of 
intergenerational solidarity regarding the Third Age. 
Intergenerational solidarity obliges Third Agers to pursue their own vision of the good 
life in view of their younger peers. Just as an aging person would not want to be neglected in the 
work place or at a hospital because of a more valuable younger person, so too the younger person 
                                                
71 Compendium, §470. “From a moral perspective based on equity and intergenerational solidarity, it will also be 
necessary to continue, through the contribution of the scientific community, to identify new sources of energy, 
develop alternative sources and increase the security levels of nuclear energy.” 
 
72 Benedict XVI. 2009. Caritas in Veritate, §48 
 
73 Francis I. 2015. Laudato Si’, §159-162.   
 
74 Stewardship is a theme of many writings within the Catholic Social tradition, however it is not referenced as a 
principle within the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, thus it is left out of the discussion. Still, it 
has a place within the discussion of intergenerational justice and solidarity, and will continue to do so as the good 
life in aging is considered more specifically in view of ecological concerns.  
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cannot be treated unfairly on account of the aging person’s needs. Intergenerational solidarity 
compels Third Agers to curtail any behaviors fueled by individualist and consumeristic 
tendencies that have detrimental effects on younger generations. The range of those effects is 
broad, and it is unfair to suggest that all Third Agers consume so wastefully, but for those who 
do, it is important that they are compelled to scale back on the use of unnecessary medical 
resources, that they actively participate in the greening of American society (this is especially 
true of those who can afford to do so), and that they generally be more financially responsible in 
the event of unsettled debt being passed down to their children. Third Agers are not entitled to 
thwart the participation of others because of their own experiences of being marginalized in 
selected ways.  
Though determining the limits of medical resource consumption echoes the debate 
between Callahan (aging as natural) and Caplan (aging as disease), a principle of 
intergenerational solidarity can help negotiate the middle ground between the two insofar as the 
principle would not trump the aforementioned principle of solidarity within an ethics of aging 
and it would be based upon an individual’s capabilities, thus allowing the Third Ager the 
freedom to live the good life in aging that he or she envisioned. Instead of considering 
Callahan’s call to forgo treatments because of one’s mortality and the needs of others, 
intergenerational solidarity obliges individuals not to be wasteful of medical resources, and to 
use only what is medically necessary or that which will improve or maintain a medically-defined 
state of wellbeing. Intergenerational solidarity challenges the likes of Caplan and others who 
suggest that the disease of aging be overcome and life be radically extended despite its cost to 
the individual and the health care system. Determining the particular limitations will require 
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discussions with Third Agers, medical professionals, lawmakers, ethicists, financial 
planners/managers, and insurers to name a few.  
Furthermore, intergenerational solidarity obliges Third Agers to be held accountable to 
future generations beyond their use of medical resources. The social welfare programs to which 
Third Agers are entitled, Social Security and Medicare, are not always needed by the recipient. 
For the privileged portion of Third Agers, the same ones who have the discretionary income for 
cosmetic procedures and continued consumeristic behaviors, their Social Security distributions 
and structure of premiums, copays, and coinsurances within Medicare must be adjusted. 
Reducing or eliminating the amount of Social Security funds distributed to individuals seems 
unfair on the surface, but for the well-to-do retiree, that support is superfluous in light of 
personal savings (pensions, retirement funds, etc.). The leftover funds could be used to support 
other marginalized groups in line with a solidaric vision of community life, or could be 
reallocated to other Third Agers whose Social Security benefits are inadequate. Redistributing 
sacrificed benefits to peers is a form of intragenerational solidarity that can directly benefit their 
peers who are underinsured by Medicare. Given that most Third Agers who are eligible for 
Medicare (Parts A and B) will find it necessary to purchase additional coverages offered under 
Part C, restructuring Medicare such that Part C is a subsidized option outside of the Parts A and 
B for affluent Third Agers would generate a surplus to be used to improve the coverage options 
in Parts A and B.75 program. Such a strategy would enable the majority of Third Agers access to 
the type of comprehensive care they need without financial worry. Of course, there remains the 
                                                
75 The individual could purchase Part C without having to enroll in A and B. C would be federally subsidized so that 
the cost of Part C is less than traditional private insurance in fairness to the individual who has paid into SSA 
throughout his or her life, but it would not require the affluent Third Ager to withdraw from the funds allocated to 
Parts A and B. 
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option that the most affluent Third Agers abstain from Medicare entirely, an option that inter- 
and intragenerational solidarity oblige such Third Agers to consider. Like the approaches to 
health care delivery above, these social welfare policies need to be considered further in 
consultation with a diverse group of Third Agers, policymakers, and taxpayers. Whatever form 
these hypothetical conversations may take, it is necessary that intergenerational solidarity be 
more firmly established as a principle unto itself. A right to special treatment does not mean that 
aging persons become the only subjects of justice. Obligations to others do not disappear once 
Third Agers have been given adequate opportunities to age well.  
Understanding the principles of CST as obligations that all persons have toward each 
other, albeit in different ways, explained by the distinction among different kinds of obligations, 
requires the acceptance of Catholic anthropology’s two basic components: dignity and sociality. 
As duties that produce a more just environment for the aging person’s pursuit of the good life, 
the principles of CST promote the virtuous practices of communal living while protecting 
individual autonomy in regard to individualized visions of the good life. Introducing the 
principles into the organizations and institutions that mediate an aging person’s experience of the 
good life, from a community center to a federal health organization, is required for an ethics of 
aging. The principles, when embraced by individuals and social institutions, will impute 
responsibility upon all persons in working collectively to enable aging persons to pursue the 
good life autonomously, with dignity, and with the knowledge that they can rely upon others 
whenever achieving the good life is inhibited. 
Conclusion 
The obligations born of the principles of CST provide the normative framework for aging 
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well. Solidarity, subsidiarity, participation, and the preferential option for the marginalized, 
along with a distinct principle of intergenerational solidarity or justice oblige institutions and 
individuals to provide and care for aging persons in such a way that their dignity is honored and 
autonomy protected. The dignified life described by Martha Nussbaum is helpful in articulating 
what conditions are integral to one’s flourishing, and the principles of CST incorporate much of 
what she outlines in a way that preserves the Third Agent’s agency. The capabilities are 
freedoms, so the perceived threat to the autonomy of the aging person is mitigated, and in fact, 
the agent’s autonomy is protected rather comprehensively given CA’s broad scope. When 
brought into the fold of principles as part of CST’s understanding of dignity, the autonomous 
Third Ager is enabled to live the good life, but CST goes beyond the simple adoption of CA.  
As a framework for an ethics of aging, the principles of CST are able to articulate the 
conditions of dependency and interdependency not simply as anthropological characteristics. 
Instead, CST interprets dependency as an “obligating feature of personhood,” precisely because 
it imposes duties upon others. The very concept of obligation, however must be further 
differentiated. O’Neill’s approach does exactly this and therefore sheds light on the relationship 
between obligations, rights, and virtues. Solidarity obliges institutions and individuals to respond 
to those features of personhood, which in view of MacIntyre’s continuum of dependency is 
particularly important regarding Third Agers whose (potential) needs may vary both in terms of 
timing and degree. Because the principled framework of CST does not attempt to universalize 
rules for all possible situations or disregard the import of virtues in contributing to the overall 
success of the promotion of the good, the specific dispositions cultivated in MacIntyrean and 
Christian communities in response to dependency are fortified in the larger pluralistic society. 
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Those same communitarian virtues that are oft-criticized for being too specific are given the 
space in which they can be tried and tested with the safety net of a larger support organization in 
the principle of subsidiarity. Aging well requires close attention to the needs of Third Agers, and 
that is simply not possible by large and distant government organizations even though the 
political and financial support of such institutions is necessary. Close attention to the needs of 
Third Agers can only be paid in local communities, which makes the principle of subsidiarity 
integral in the success of an ethics of aging well. Subsidiarity encourages solidarity insofar as it 
brings together different levels of institutions (i.e. federal-state, region-state, state-county, 
county-town) and forces local agencies to involve themselves more directly in the lives of Third 
Agers and address the specific needs of their constituents. While reinforcing the principle of 
solidarity, subsidiarity functions similarly regarding the preferential option for the poor and 
marginalized. Concern for the dignity of the Third Agers is obliged by the option for the 
marginalized, and adjudicated by subsidiarity. Distributions of financial, health, housing, and 
other forms of support from the state are necessary for aging well, but fulfilling the needs of 
individuals is more effectively achieved through more personal relationships. The CST 
framework cultivates a more just environment in which Third Agers can pursue the good life. 
Given its conspicuous absence from the Compendium, a Catholic vision of justice still needs to 
be considered so that the manner in which the particular issues raised by solidarity in health care, 
subsidiarity in the community, and the preferential option for the poor can be measured, 
corrected when substandard, and practiced. The question of justice that has repeatedly surfaced 
in this chapter raises serious questions for the Church and Catholic ethicists; to these I will turn 
in the conclusion.  
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LOOKING AHEAD 
TOWARDS AN ETHICS OF AGING 
	
	 The five preceding chapters have explored the concept of Third Age – a concept recently 
developed in gerontology modeled after Erik Erikson’s life stages. The context in which today’s 
Third Agers find themselves asking, ‘how am I to live well,’ revealed several imageries 
presented to Third Agers that claim to answer that question, and final chapter proposed a 
normative social ethics of aging. It was necessary at the outset to make the distinction between 
the person living in the Third Age and the so-called elderly or old-old person. Early on, the Third 
Age, as defined by Bernice Neugarten, was shown to be a rather recent development in 
gerontology – a point that was further supported in the discussion of the social construction of 
aging and ageism. In the last few decades there has been an increase in the number of individuals 
living contemporaneously in the Third Age; today, this demographic is primarily comprised of 
the Baby Boomers (i.e., those born between 1946 and 1962). While it is true that we are all 
aging, the ethical issues presented by this new Third Age are unique in that they are not 
traditional end-of-life questions taken up by medicine and medical ethicists. Instead, when the 
Third Age is distinguished from end-of-life care, medicine demonstrates the relationship between 
good life and health, and medical ethics reveals how we are to both make sense of and decide 
what medical treatments facilitate the good life. According to medicine, to live well minimally 
means to maintain an adequate level of physical and mental health to function. Medical ethicists 
go beyond their clinical counterparts and consider two prominent narratives within medical 
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ethics are: aging as a disease to be cured, and aging as a natural part of life. The former is 
problematic for three reasons: the very definition of health can shift with technological 
advancement such that the line between pathogenic condition and ‘natural’ will continue to be 
blurred; treating aging as a pathogenic process perpetuates a cultural fear of mortality that 
contributes to and is fueled by the technological imperative at work in modern medicine; and, 
radically extending life will bring with it further questions of equitable access, distribution, and 
quality of life that already strain our health care system. ‘Aging as natural,’ while better than its 
extreme alternative because it allays the fear of aging as inherently diseased and promotes a 
generally more positive outlook, can sometimes be interpreted as a defeatist position that would 
have Third Agers compromise on any and all medical care in light of our inevitable end. 
Navigating the space between these two poles remains the task of health care ethicists moving 
forward, but at present, it is the Third Ager who is in the proverbial driver’s seat in deciphering 
how to live well in light of these narratives.  
The task of living well in the Third Age is done in the context of American consumer 
culture which not only shapes images of the good life, but also images of the Third Age/rs. A 
profound value placed on independence as essential to the good life is mediated through 
American history, notably through the development of a capitalistic economy. Individual 
autonomy and contributing to the economy as a laborer are markers of American self-identity 
that, when weakened in the Third Age, can cause potential crises. In response to the search for a 
new self-identity, consumer culture urges Third Agers (as it does everyone else) to consume 
specific products to feel better, to live well. However, consumer culture has a powerful ally to 
target the vulnerable Third Ager, medicine and medical ethics. Anti-aging medicine, cosmetics, 
and cosmeceuticals fit the narrative that aging is a disease. Cosmetics and cosmeceuticals have a 
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dual purpose: they perpetuate the idea that looking younger causes one to feel better and 
therefore live well; and, they function in some cases to enable individuals to remain in the 
workforce because looking younger is believed to mitigate ageist stereotypes. Undergirding the 
perceived need to keep working is a cultural emphasis on being productive – if one is not 
contributing to society, then one has limited social value. Ageist practices are not limited to the 
workplace, though their impact there has a ripple effect on at least a Third Ager’s future health 
care and housing needs, both of which may inhibit the American vision of living independently.  
 Responding to what first appeared to be a question of health care ethics required a 
broader exploration of theological and philosophical frameworks. The theological responses to 
the question of aging well were of three types: community ethics, spiritual ethics, and virtues 
ethics.  A community-centric response emerges from the biblical tradition: persons who had 
survived into their 60s were believed to have earned God’s favor, and in turn were to be 
respected by the community and teach the [religious] tradition to younger persons. Modern 
spiritual responses place questions of aging in context of the eschatological promise: Third Agers 
should remain faithful and hopeful, continue to be loving toward their neighbors, and remember 
that life on earth is only part of God’s vision for humanity. Virtues ethics approaches to aging 
well draw on both the community and spiritual responses, but move beyond the theological 
virtues alone. The contributions from virtues ethics identify specific practices relevant to the 
experiences of Third Agers necessary in cultivating the right character for living the good life. 
Proposing individual practices raises questions, however, because of the ease with which such 
suggestions can be viewed as another individual-centric response shaped by an individual-centric 
culture. Turning to the individual as the one who can live well so long as he or she does x, y, and 
z, ironically undermines the historically important community influence present in the 
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theological tradition.  Implicit in the theological responses is the acceptance of sociality as a 
fundamental condition of human nature; that living together, not in isolation, is key in living the 
good life. Because of the ways in which ‘autonomy as independence’ reveals itself in many of 
the obstacles facing Third Agers, the significance of sociality was explored so as to begin the 
work of constructing an ethics of aging. As a basic human characteristic, sociality revealed that 
humans are not only social, but always, albeit to different degrees, dependent upon others. 
Within the community setting, the Third Ager is confronted with the truth that he or she has been 
molded by others, that all along his or her life has been lived interdependently. The Third Age is 
not to retreat from that reality; instead it is the time embrace it more fully. That is not to say, 
however, that the Third Ager resign him or herself to living in a particular community and wait 
to be cared for – accepting one’s dependency must be reinterpreted so as not to be reduced to 
only being the recipient of care. From the communitarian approach, we see that dependency does 
not threaten autonomy, and that living interdependently facilitates rather than thwarts individual 
flourishing. To ensure that this takeaway is highlighted and enhanced, the Capabilities Approach 
was used to develop a vision of flourishing and further preserve the importance of autonomy as 
the freedom of self-determination vis-à-vis the good life. Interpreting Martha Nussbaum’s central 
capabilities for Third Agers revealed essential conditions that would enable an aging person to 
live the good life. Undermining the central capabilities threatens the autonomy of Third Agers; 
dis-enabling them from pursuing the good life is an offense to their dignity. However, pointing to 
an injustice is not the same as correcting an injustice, and therein lies a primary shortcoming of 
the Capabilities Approach as a comprehensive ethics of aging. Beyond the state, which as an 
Aristotelian Nussbaum views charitably, the Capabilities Approach does not oblige individuals 
or social institutions to secure the list of capabilities, or explain how the capabilities are to be 
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secured other than through ‘the state.’ A similar problem is found in the communitarian 
responses, theological or philosophical: they are merely communitarian in that they do not cross 
over to the social or political sphere (institutions and structures that organize and mediate 
individual experience); they are limited in their efficacy for all Third Agers. Because both the 
virtues-communitarian and capabilities approaches are helpful but insufficient, we turned to a 
normative proposal that can identify the obligatory individual and social responsibilities that 
secure the space in which the good life in the Third Age can be pursued. The proposed social-
ethical normative framework, informed by Onora O’Neill’s interpretation of principle as duty or 
obligation, outlines the requisite obligations for individuals and institutions; that framework is 
Catholic Social Teaching (CST) reinterpreted for the Third Age. The reinterpreted principles of 
CST are the basis for an ethics of aging, providing a starting point for a continued exploration 
because it provides a framework for reinterpreting CA in light of obligations and social 
institutions, and ensuring that the import of the virtues-communitarian contribution is not lost. 
However, CST presents its own problem that must be addressed as an ethics of aging is further 
developed. That problem is CST’s underdeveloped theory of justice and its inefficacy in light of 
the particular questions facing Third Agers today. 
The normative approach to an ethics of aging well outlined in chapter five establishes a 
groundwork for how current institutional and interpersonal problems that thwart the good life of 
Third Agers can be identified and/or mitigated. A solidaric approach to health care delivery can 
ensure that Third Agers in need of medical care in order to maintain adequate levels of wellbeing 
will receive such care. An obligation to practice subsidiarity encourages more fruitful exchanges 
between members of the community and the larger social institutions responsible for the 
flourishing of those persons and communities. The option for the poor and marginalized compels 
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all members of society and its institutions to seek out those most in need; those whose plight in 
the Third Age is not reducible to one personal or institutional misstep, and thus require 
systematic responses. Participation obliges communities to engage with Third Agers who might 
otherwise be isolated; it demands that employers break free from the ageist dispositions they 
might hold and embrace the fact that Third Agers are beneficial to the right kind of work place. 
When acted upon as obligations, the principles not only secure the minimum conditions of a 
dignified life outlined in CA, but they also reinforce autonomy and sociality as obligating 
features of personhood.  
The principles offer a framework in which dignity can be viewed beyond traditional 
Catholic descriptions (i.e. Imago Dei). Similarly, the normative principles assist in the realization 
of the common good insofar as this is understood as an indivisible shared commitment to unity to 
reach their fulfillment or to flourish.1 Together, the principles for an ethics of aging address the 
issues created by a culture that is sometimes ageist, averse to dependency, and consumed by 
materialism; however, they are but one small part of the larger process of creating a more just 
society. In modern ethics, the principle of dignity and the principle of the common good are 
interpreted through the liberal tradition, which, in the US, has been informed by a narrow 
understanding of autonomy as the freedom of choice. This reductionist interpretation of 
autonomy posits freedom of choice as the only essential quality of the good life; the choices are 
made in the context of consumer culture. Within the liberal tradition, a representative definition 
of the common good is as follows: “general conditions that are in an appropriate sense equally to 
																																																						
1 Catholic Church. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. 2004. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Catholic Church. Vatican City; Washington, DC: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. §164. 
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everyone’s advantage.”2 Interpreted through the liberal tradition, the common good presented by 
John Rawls does not attend to the inequalities allowed by Rawls’s own framework; instead, the 
common good to be pursued is the collection of goods to be distributed that generally benefits 
the greatest number of individuals. Presenting the common good in this way runs counter to the 
Catholic vision of the common good; however, a well-developed response to this interpretation is 
lacking. More strikingly, the Catholic social ethical tradition does not provide the theoretical 
reflection of the relationship between the common good and contemporary theories of justice, 
and a framework that could be directly used for an ethics of aging. For example, there is no 
principle of justice found alongside the other principles in the Compendium of the Social 
Doctrine of the Church. In what will follow, I will briefly outline the direction of the theological 
tradition could be used to begin addressing this question. 
 Drawing upon the relevance of justice in the particular questions emerging in health care 
ethics, I identified intergenerational justice as an additional principle for an ethics of aging. This 
was necessary because without attention to members of other age groups and future generations, 
it would be impossible to say that an ethics of aging accomplishes more than establishing 
‘fairness’ or ‘equality’ among Third Agers alone. Intergenerational justice names the obligation 
Third Agers have toward others, a question that is particularly relevant in terms of ecological 
impact and health care resource allocation, and necessary for an overall concept of a more just 
society. The place of justice in an ethics of aging will need to be explored further, specifically in 
regards to the health care, economic and social policies, and their interrelation with the medical 
and cultural imageries presented in Chapters One and Two. Though Pope Francis and several of 
																																																						
2 Rawls, John A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press: Harvard university Press, 
1999), 217.  
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his predecessors invoke the language of intergenerational justice, the tradition relies upon an 
implicit rather than explicit theory of justice. The Compendium considers justice not as a 
principle but as a “fundamental social value.”3 As a value, justice serves as a point of “reference 
for the proper structure and ordered leading of life in society,” but, because of the autonomy of 
the public sphere and its institutions, the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (PCJP) does 
not attempt to offer specific commentary on how justice might be achieved.4 Yet, in its 
explanation of the elements of justice, albeit brief, commutative, distributive, and social justice 
are identified as integral to the Church’s vision of justice. Within the Compendium, these 
elements receive no extended treatment, and in fact, no substantive definition; instead, they only 
refer to previous Church documents in which they have been invoked, primarily the Catechism, 
and the Papal encyclicals Laborem Exercens and Solicitude Rei Socialis. In John Paul II’s 
encyclical letters, justice is connected to peace insofar as the conflicts of the 20th century could 
be traced to the disparities between the wealthy and the poor. Linking justice to peace, and 
particularly poverty and the distribution of wealth, John Paul II turned to commutative and 
distributive justice as appropriate responses to the injustices that contributed to the violence of 
the 20th century. Commutative justice addresses the question of fairness in exchanges or 
agreements between two individuals or private social groups. Distributive justice “requires that 
the allocation of income, wealth, and power in society be evaluated in light of its effects on 
																																																						
3 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §197. 
 
4 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium, §197. The Church maintains that its limited knowledge of 
the technical workings of political and economic systems, for example, precludes it from offering specific solutions 
to problems in those areas. Instead, the Church can only highlight what it believes to be problematic and call upon 
others to resolve the problem(s). The other half of this posture is shaped by the Church’s claim that it cannot inject 
itself into matters that are not under its political purview; autonomous nation-states, for example, are tasked with 
governing, not the Church. 	
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persons whose basic material needs are unmet,”5 and that that injustice be adjudicated by the 
political powers responsible for promoting the good of the individual or the community. Social 
justice, however, is much more abstract than either commutative or distributive justice. 
Described as the total vision of justice, social justice implies that “persons have an obligation to 
be active and productive participants in the life of society and that society has a duty to enable 
them to participate in this way,”6 and thus is also referred to as contributive justice. The 
descriptions do not identify a particular aim of justice; instead that aim is often uncovered in 
conjunction with the principles of CST – justice is achieved when the principles are fulfilled. 
However, justice should be the idea that guides those principles, measures their efficacy, and 
demands their improvement over time. Applying the tradition of CST to the question of the good 
life in the Third Age, it has become clear that the principles may well serve as a starting point but 
require further development of a normative ethics that complements a virtues ethics approach. 
Yet, in light of the limited account of a principle of justice within this framework, the social 
ethics tradition of the Church must be revisited. For example, even the extensive theory of justice 
of Thomas Aquinas is not taken up in the Compendium or the encyclicals.  
 Although it cannot be the purpose here to systematically account for Aquinas’s treatment 
of justice is not the purpose here, it is important to note that he explains commutative, 
distributive, and a nascent concept of social justice, with greater detail than the Compendium. 
Commutative justice is described with the Aristotelian term ‘arithmetic mean’ that refers to the 
quantity of the resource (i.e. money or property) that is owed to the individual. Borrowing from 
Aristotle again, distributive justice is explained as a ‘geometric’ mean, in which the importance 
																																																						
5 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. 1986. Economic Justice for All. §70. 
 
6 USCCB, Economic Justice for All, §71.	
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of the good to be distributed is considered and rendered proportionately. Restitution presumes an 
unjust exchange that must be rectified. Rectification fits into Aquinas’s account of general or 
legal justice that emphasizes the importance of interpersonal relationships within society insofar 
as laws are directed toward the good of individuals vis-à-vis the common good of all persons.7 
Additionally, legal justice is presented as an obligation8 that is to be satisfied equally. These brief 
comments are only meant to allude to the fact that the understanding of justice can be retrieved 
from the theological tradition and serve as a starting point for a more robust principle or theory 
of justice within the tradition of CST.  
The treatment of justice in Aquinas is limited, however, as has many scholars have noted. 
For example, as Jean Porter remarks, “the norm of distributive justice is set by reference to 
whatever is the organizing principle of the community in question,” and that “he [Aquinas] has 
little to say about the norms of distributive justice per se.”9 Aquinas may be more descriptive of 
the role of distributive justice as a means to an end in an organized state than the Compendium, 
but the good to be distributed and their importance in the good life is similarly inadequate. 
Trying to implement a system of equality in political institutions complicates how effective 
turning to Aquinas can actually be in nuancing a social ethical notion of justice.  
 The good of the individual and the common good feature prominently in Aquinas’s 
discussion of justice. An Aristotelian notion in Politics, the common good is the idea that the 
collective welfare of all individuals in society can be promoted and protected through 
																																																						
7 Jean Porter. “The Virtue of Justice (IIa IIae, qq. 58-122)” in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen Pope (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002), 273. 
 
8 Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q80, a.1. 
 
9 Porter, “The Virtue of Justice,” 278. 
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citizenship, which is directed by a formal government and legal system. Determining exactly 
what the common good is, in part because of its historical development from eudaimonia, is 
difficult; using it as a legislative guide is impossible. Aquinas follows in this tradition linking 
justice to the good and the common good, elaborating upon it further than Aristotle did, as Porter 
notes.10 According to Aquinas, the individual’s just acts contribute both to their individual good 
and to the common good, resulting eventually in a more just state. Charles Curran notes, “the 
common good ultimately flows back to the good of the individual and thus brings together the 
good of the community and the good of the individual.”11 In pluralistic societies and modern 
theories associated with them, however, the common notion of the common good is interpreted in 
light of contract theories of justice: those goods that societies agree upon as beneficial are to be 
exchanged in the market and/or distributed by the state. Because of its connection to the common 
good and the ways in which the Church has defined it,12 the concept of social justice raises 
particular problems.  
A number of theologians and ethicists have noted the ambiguity of social justice. Lisa 
Cahill acknowledges that social justice is never precisely defined, but comments that it generally 
is an integrative concept that brings together the questions of interdependence, interpersonal 
																																																						
10 Porter, “The Virtue of Justice,” 272. “Aquinas’s own theory of justice as developed in the Summa theologiae 
draws on all of these [Church fathers, Aristotle, Cicero, and others] conceptions. What is distinctive about his theory 
is the way in which he integrates them into a systematic account. In the course of developing this account, he 
analyzes and coordinates the different perspectives on justice, as a general virtue, as one particular virtue among 
others, as the virtue preeminently concerned with right relations among people, and as an integral component of the 
Christian life.” 
 
11 Curran, Charles E. Catholic Social Teaching: A historical theological and ethical analysis. (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002), 145. 
 
12 Formal definitions of the common good appear in Mater et magistra §65: “the sum total of those conditions of 
social living, whereby human beings are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve their own perfection;” and 
Gaudium et spes §74: “the sum of those conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can 
achieve their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way.” 
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relationships, and social institutions.13 She further remarks that social justice consists of what all 
persons contribute to the common good through their active participation in society. Thomas 
Massaro concludes that all definitions generally “boil down to the goal of achieving a right 
ordering of society,” which will “ensure that all people have fair and equitable opportunities to 
live decent lives free of inordinate burdens and deprivations.”14 Important as the concept of 
social justice is, its status as an element of justice within the PCJP’s treatment of the subject 
raises more questions than it answers, and it becomes increasingly clear that the current Church 
position on justice needs revision. Without clarifying the relationship between social justice and 
the common good, it will remain difficult to translate the Catholic vision of justice into the 
sphere of political ethics, and more specifically, the health care policies that are a concern of this 
dissertation.  
 A reimagined Catholic social ethical concept of justice is desperately needed to address 
the problems within the health care system and medical ethics presented to Third Agers. On the 
one hand, a systematic Catholic social ethical treatment of justice will be able to respond to the 
ethical challenges presented by the absolutization of autonomy in medicine (i.e. a Third Ager’s  
wish for life extension technology or request for elective cosmetic surgeries in the face of other 
needs), while on the other hand, justice will serve to check on and ensure that the solidaric vision 
of the health care system in its endeavor to improve the wellbeing of all persons beyond clinical 
care settings is practiced. To that end, justice will ensure that the successful practice of principles 
of CST identified as necessary for an ethics of aging are not sabotaged by health-related 
																																																						
13 Cahill, Lisa. Theological Bioethics: Participation, justice, change. (Washington: Georgetown University Pres, 
2005), 47. 
 
14 Massaro, Thomas. Living Justice: Catholic social teaching in action. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2008), 1. 
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problems. Regarding the economic and social policies that directly impact Third Agers, a 
Catholic social ethical concept of justice will not only ensure that the marginalized and 
oppressed are enabled to live well, but it will also advocate for the reorganization of institutions. 
Here, the critique raised within political philosophy, namely that justice cannot exclusively be 
defined using the distributive paradigm, must be taken seriously. I have argued that, in particular, 
the concept of intergenerational justice must be further developed: it will ensure that the policies 
put forth are aligned with the interests of Third Agers on the one hand, but that their interests do 
not supersede those of other members of society. Overall, justice must aim to secure the 
necessary environment in which Third Agers can pursue their notions of the good life, and assure 
that they can depend upon others while acknowledging that their own needs and freedoms must 
be balanced against the needs of others. Further developing a Catholic social ethical notion of 
justice is necessary in providing guidance for adjudicating the dilemmas that arise when 
subsidiaric community participation initiatives are complicated or stymied, when solidaric health 
care delivery options are confronted by competing interests and values, or when Third Agers are 
denied opportunities to work or are otherwise discriminated against. It is not only necessary but 
also possible, this dissertation has argued, to offer an ethics of the good life of and for the Third 
Age from within the tradition of Christian ethics. If the normative approach of CST modeled 
here were adopted and further developed in light of the shortcomings concerning the theory of 
justice, Catholic ethicists would be better positioned to respond to the ethical questions that 
continued to be raised in health care and elsewhere in the Third Age.  
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